talk – Chalmers Security Seminar

When Good Components Go Bad: Formally Secure Compilation Despite Dynamic Compromise

We propose a new formal criterion for evaluating secure compartmentalization schemes for unsafe languages like C and C++, expressing end-to-end security guarantees for software components that may become compromised after encountering undefined behavior---for example, by accessing an array out of bounds. Read More ›

talk – Chalmers Security Seminar

Risk Analysis of Privacy Policies

In this talk, I present an approach to enhance informed consent for the processing of personal data. The approach relies on a privacy policy language used to express, compare and analyze privacy policies. Read More ›

talk – Chalmers Security Seminar

The Simplest Multi-key Linearly Homomorphic Signature Scheme

We consider the problem of outsourcing computation on data authenticated by different users. Our aim is to describe and implement the simplest possible solution to provide data integrity in cloud-based scenarios. Read More ›

talk – Chalmers Security Seminar

The Rush Dilemma: Attacking and Repairing Smart Contracts on Forking Blockchains

We investigate the security of smart contracts within a blockchain that can fork (as Bitcoin and Ethereum). In particular, we focus on multi-party computation (MPC) protocols run on-chain with the aid of smart contracts, and observe that honest players face the following dilemma: Should I rush sending protocol's messages based on the current view of the blockchain, or rather wait that a message is confirmed on the chain before sending the next one? Read More ›

talk – Chalmers Security Seminar

SAID: Reshaping Signal into an Identity-Based Asynchronous Messaging Protocol with Authenticated Ratcheting

As messaging applications are becoming increasingly popular, it is of utmost importance to analyze their security and mitigate existing weaknesses. This paper focuses on one of the most acclaimed messaging applications: Signal. Read More ›