


## Plan

Lecture 1: Kripke-Joyal, some examples

Lecture 2: Newton-Puiseux, Zariski topos, Presheaf models of type theory

Lecture 3: Zariski topos, light condensed sets; towards higher topos

## Sheaf models and constructive mathematics



## Sheaf models and constructive mathematics



## Sheaf models and constructive mathematics



## Sheaf models

Rich history, which mixes logic and mathematics

1945-1950: Leray, Cartan, definition of sheaves over a topological space

1950 Eilenberg and Zilber “Semi-simplicial complexes and singular homology”

1951 Church: complete Boolean algebra semantics of type theory

1956 Beth “Semantic construction of intuitionistic logic”, *sheaf* model

1958 Kripke: letter to Prior, *presheaf* model

## Sheaf models

1960 Grothendieck: sites, topos

1964 Cohen: forcing

1966 Scott, Solovay: forcing, Boolean valued model

1970 Kreisel and Troelstra: model of choice sequences

## Sheaf models

Different intuitions

temporal (Beth, Kripke)

spatial (Eilenberg)

finite information (Cohen)

## Kripke-Joyal semantics

Unification of logic and sheaf model via (Beth)-Kripke-Joyal semantics

Compositional explanation of what a mathematical statement means

“Epistemological” explanation

This compared with the “computational” interpretation of proofs as programs

Important to combine the epistemological and computational aspects



## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

Brouwer  $(\forall_n \alpha(n) = 0) \vee \exists_n \alpha(n) \neq 0$  not valid

Heyting 1931: formal rules of intuitionistic logic

Constructive mathematics: mathematics developed using intuitionistic logic

“Dynamical structure”, evolving with time

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

Kripke model, indexed by time e.g.  $1 \rightarrow 0$

Time dependent set:  $A_0 \rightarrow A_1$

New elements can appear, and some new identifications can be discovered

We take  $K_0 = \mathbb{Q}$  and  $K_1 = \mathbb{Q}[i]$

Crucially, we can stay at time  $0$  for ever

Kripke insists on this point in his 1964 paper, and points out the difference with Beth models where we are forced to eventually move to a new stage

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

$K$  defines a *discrete* field (decidable equality) of characteristic 0

We have  $\forall_{x:K} x = 0 \vee U(x)$

where  $U(x)$  means that  $x$  is a unit, i.e.  $\exists_{y:K} xy = 1$

**Theorem:** *In this theory, we cannot prove that we have*

$$(\forall_{x:K} x^2 + 1 \neq 0) \vee \exists_{x:K} x^2 + 1 = 0$$

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

Indeed we don't have  $\forall_{x:K} x^2 + 1 \neq 0$  at time 0 since we may go to time 1, where we *do* have a root of  $x^2 + 1 = 0$

And we don't have  $\exists_{x:K} x^2 + 1 = 0$  since we may stay at time 0 forever

So the formula  $(\forall_{x:K} x^2 + 1 \neq 0) \vee \exists_{x:K} x^2 + 1 = 0$  is not valid in this Kripke model, and hence not provable

Interpretation: if  $K$  is given as a (discrete) field there is *no* algorithm to decide whether  $X^2 + 1$  is irreducible or not

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

Note that there is *no* mention of recursive function theory/Turing machine

van der Waerden (1930) *Eine Bemerkung über die Unzerlegbarkeit von Polynomen* (before recursive functions theory was developed!)

Definition of field *A field is called explicitly known if its elements are symbols from a known countable set of symbols, over which the arithmetic operations can be carried out by a finite number of steps*

For some given field, e.g. if  $K$  is a given algebraic extension of  $\mathbb{Q}$  of  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , we can decide irreducibility (Kronecker)

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

This is one first use of sheaf models/topos: to show that something is not constructively provable

Here are two more complex examples:

-in a local ring define  $J(x) = \forall_y U(1 - xy)$  then we don't have  $U(x) \vee J(x)$

-in simplicial sets, if  $Y \rightarrow X$  is a Kan fibration and  $x_0 \rightarrow x_1$  in  $X$  then we cannot build an equivalence  $Y(x_0) \rightarrow Y(x_1)$  (Th. C. and M. Bezem 2013)

The second point showed that Voevodsky's semantics of dependent type theory with univalence where a type is interpreted as a Kan simplicial set cannot be done in an intuitionistic framework

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

The second example illustrates the fact that we want more than a semantics of first-order logic

We want to be able to interpret *function spaces*

What logic should we interpret? (This will be the topic of the next 2 lectures)

Topos  $\leftrightarrow$  simple type theory

Higher Topos  $\leftrightarrow$  dependent type theory + univalence

## Semantics of intuitionistic logic

This is a *negative* use of (pre)sheaf models (independence result)

*Positive* use of sheaf models: we can *force* the existence of “ideal” objects

Example: force the existence of a prime ideal

Constructively, cannot show the existence of a prime ideal for a given ring  $R$



## Prime ideals

A. Joyal's definition of the spectrum of  $R$

Distributive lattice freely generated by *symbols*  $D(a)$  and relations

$$D(1) = 1 \quad D(0) = 0 \quad D(ab) = D(a) \wedge D(b) \quad D(a + b) \leq D(a) \vee D(b)$$

This defines the Zariski spectrum  $Z(R)$  as a *distributive lattice*

We think of  $Z(R)$  as a topological space

$a \mapsto D(a)$  is a prime filter, where the truth values are open sets of  $Z(R)$

## Prime ideals

While it is not possible in general to build a prime ideal/filter of  $R$  we have an interpretation of  $Z(R)$  as the distributive lattice of finitely generated *radical* ideals of  $R$ . This shows the *consistency* of  $Z(R)$  seen as a theory.

In general the lattice of ideals of  $R$  is not distributive

$$\langle X + Y \rangle \cap \langle X, Y \rangle \neq (\langle X + Y \rangle \cap \langle X \rangle) + (\langle X + Y \rangle \cap \langle Y \rangle)$$

However the lattice of radical ideals is distributive

$$\sqrt{\langle a \rangle} \wedge \sqrt{\langle b, c \rangle} = \sqrt{\langle ab, ac \rangle}$$

**Theorem:** We have  $1 = D(a_1) \vee \dots \vee D(a_n)$  if, and only if,  $1 = \langle a_1, \dots, a_n \rangle$ .  
 More generally  $D(a) \leq D(b_1, \dots, b_n)$  iff  $a$  is in the radical of the ideal  $(b_1, \dots, b_n)$

## Zariski and constructible spectrum

The *constructible spectrum*  $B(R)$  is simply the free Boolean algebra over the Zariski spectrum  $Z(R)$

(Compare with the definition in wikipedia!)

So we add new formal symbols  $V(a)$  with the conditions  $V(a) \wedge D(a) = 0$  and  $V(a) \vee D(a) = 1$

**Theorem:** We have  $\bigwedge_i D(a_i) \wedge \bigwedge_k V(c_k) \leq \bigvee_j D(b_j) \vee \bigvee_l V(e_l)$  iff  $\bigwedge_i D(a_i) \wedge \bigwedge_l D(e_l) \leq \bigvee_j D(b_j) \vee \bigvee_k D(c_k)$

This was Gentzen's insight when he invented sequent calculus!

## Entailment Relations

This use of Gentzen's insight to describe distributive lattices goes back to Lorenzen

*Algebraische und logistische Untersuchungen über freie Verbände*, 1951

It was rediscovered in

*Entailment Relations and Distributive Lattices*, 1998, Th. C. and J. Cederquist

and it is presented in details in

*Commutative Algebra: Constructive Methods*, H. Lombardi and C. Quitté

## Use of prime ideals

It can be shown that, even if one ring is given effectively, it is not possible in general to define effectively a prime ideal on this ring

Lawvere (ICM 1970) conjectured the existence of a prime filter for any non trivial ring in an arbitrary topos (= constructively)

Thought it would work constructively with prime filters instead of prime ideals

However, Joyal built a topos where a ring does not have any prime filter (the object of prime filters is empty)

## Logical interpretation

“Lattice-valued” model: the predicate  $a \mapsto V(a)$  is a predicate on the ring  $R$  with values in the constructible spectrum/lattice

This predicate defines a (decidable) prime ideal on the ring

This is a “generic” decidable prime ideal

This prime ideal exists, but *in a sheaf model* over the constructible spectrum

## Constructible spectrum

We have  $V(a) = 1$  iff  $D(a) = 0$  iff  $a$  is nilpotent

This corresponds to the (classical) result that an element is nilpotent iff it belongs to all nilpotent ideals

We have  $V(ab) = V(a) \vee V(b)$  since  $D(ab) = D(a) \wedge D(b)$

## Application: Prime ideals

Define a polynomial to be *primitive* if the ideal generated by its coefficients is trivial

**Proposition:** *The product of two primitive polynomials is primitive*

For instance, if  $a_0u_0 + a_1u_1 = b_0v_0 + b_1v_1 + b_2v_2 = 1$  then

$$a_0b_0w_0 + (a_0b_1 + a_1b_0)w_1 + (a_0b_2 + a_1b_1)w_2 + a_1b_2w_3 = 1$$

for some  $w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3$

This is a concrete statement, proved using an ideal element

Concrete instance of Hilbert's program



## Prime ideals

If  $\alpha$  prime ideal then  $(R/\alpha)[X]$  is an integral domain

$\sum a_i X^i$  is primitive if, and only if,  $\sum a_i X^i \neq 0 \pmod{\alpha}$  for *all* prime ideal  $\alpha$

There is no prime ideal that contains all  $a_i$

It is clear that if  $A$  is an integral domain, then so is  $A[X]$

## Prime ideals

A prime ideal of  $R$  may not exist constructively

But it *always* exists in the sheaf model over  $B(R)$ !

By working in a sheaf model, we *force* the existence of a prime ideal

If  $\sum c_k X^k = (\sum a_i X^i)(\sum b_j X^j)$  we have (“Gauss-Joyal” identity)

$$\bigvee_k D(c_k) = (\bigvee_i D(a_i)) \wedge (\bigvee_j D(b_j))$$

which is equivalent to  $\bigwedge_k V(c_k) = (\bigwedge_i V(a_i)) \vee (\bigwedge_j V(b_j))$

## Logical interpretation

One can build (effectively) a generic prime filter, but in a sheaf model (introduction), and we can then eliminate the use of this prime filter

This is a possible interpretation of Hilbert's method of *introduction* and *elimination* of ideal elements

This is closely connected to *forcing*: we force the existence of a prime ideal by moving to a sheaf model

In algebraic geometry, there is the notion of *descent*, going back to Galois, where we ask if we can “descend” the existence of the ideal object in the topos of sets

## Use of sheaf models/topos theory

This is an example of the use of sheaf models

We can understand constructively a classical argument if this argument uses an object like prime ideal in a generic way

Note that such an object is justified by the use of the Axiom of Choice, and the technique of negative translation *does not* apply there

For other examples of this method, see the book of Lombardi and Quitté *Commutative Algebra: Constructive Methods*

## Exercise

If  $R$  is connected (i.e.  $e^2 = e$  implies  $e = 0$  or  $e = 1$ ) then any unit of  $R[X, 1/X]$  can be written uniquely on the form

$$X^m \sum_p u_p X^p$$

where  $m$  integer and  $u_0$  unit and  $u_p$  nilpotent for  $p \neq 0$

Cf. Ingo Blechschmidt *Generalized spaces for constructive algebra*  
for other examples