## Typing Noninterference for a Reactive Language

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
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## **Topics**

- Noninterference for an imperative language
  - Security leaks introduced by concurrency
  - Typing rules that prevent them
- Reactive Languages
- Noninterference for Reactive Languages
- Proving Noninterference


## Noninterference property



No variable is ever influenced by higher or incomparable level variables.

Simplification to the lattice model:

 $H \ | \ L$ 



## Examples – Interference

#### Direct flow

$$y_{\mathbf{L}} := x_{\mathbf{H}} \qquad \qquad \blacksquare$$

Indirect flow

if 
$$x_{\boldsymbol{H}}$$
 then  $y_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 0$  else  $y_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 1$ 

$$y_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 1$$
; while  $x_{\boldsymbol{H}}$  do  $(y_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 0; x_{\boldsymbol{H}} := \mathtt{false})$ 

What is wrong? Low variables are assigned under high tests!

#### The context matters

Sequential language:

while 
$$x_{\boldsymbol{H}}$$
 do nil;  $r_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 0$ 

Concurrent language:

$$(\alpha|\beta)$$

```
\alpha: \mathtt{while}\ x_{\pmb{H}}\ \mathtt{do}\ \mathtt{nil}\ ;\ r_{\pmb{L}}:=0\ ;\ x_{\pmb{H}}:=\mathtt{false}
```

$$\beta: \mathtt{while} \ \neg x_{H} \ \mathtt{do} \ \mathtt{nil} \ ; \ r_{L}:=1 \ ; \ x_{H}:=\mathtt{true}$$

$$\{x_H \mapsto \mathsf{true}\} \text{ vs. } \{x_H \mapsto \mathsf{false}\}$$

## Rationale behind the types

Following [BouCas01,02] and [Smith01].

$$(P_1 \quad ; \quad P_2)$$

$$\swarrow \qquad \qquad \searrow$$

$$\text{highest-tests}(P_1) \quad \leq \quad \text{lowest-writes}(P_2)$$

What a type must tell about programs:

- an upper bound to test-levels
- a lower bound to write-levels

## Giving (double) types

	Statement	Property
Variables	$\Gamma(x) = \sigma \ var$	$\sigma$ = the security level of $x$
Expressions	$\Gamma \vdash e : \sigma$	$\sigma \ge$ level of read variables
Commands	$\Gamma \vdash P : (\tau, \sigma) \ cmd$	$\tau \leq$ level of written variables
		$\sigma \ge$ level of read variables

Subtyping: 
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P : (\tau, \sigma) \ cmd \ \tau \geq \tau' \ \sigma \leq \sigma'}{\Gamma \vdash P : (\tau', \sigma') \ cmd}$$

## Typing rules - Imperative primitives

All writes after a read

must be higher:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \pmb{\delta} \quad \Gamma \vdash P : (\tau, \sigma) \ cmd \quad \Gamma \vdash Q : (\tau, \sigma) \ cmd}{\Gamma \vdash \text{if} \ e \ \text{then} \ P \ \text{else} \ Q : (\tau, \pmb{\delta} \lor \pmb{\sigma}) \ cmd}$$

$$\delta \leq au$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash Q_1 : (\tau_1, \sigma_1) \ cmd \ \Gamma \vdash Q_2 : (\tau_2, \sigma_2) \ cmd}{\Gamma \vdash Q_1 ; \ Q_2 : (\boldsymbol{\tau_1} \land \boldsymbol{\tau_2}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_1} \lor \boldsymbol{\sigma_2}) \ cmd}$$

$$\sigma_1 \leq au_2$$

## **Topics**

- Noninterference for an imperative language
- Reactive Languages
  - Motivation and informal semantics
  - Examples
- Noninterference for Reactive Languages
- Proving Noninterference

## Reactive languages – Informal semantics

- ightharpoonup emit s
- $\blacktriangleright$  when a do P
- $\blacktriangleright$  do P watching a
- $ightharpoonup P \ \ Q$

Environment (E) Set of emitted signals.


Suspension (†) Pendency due to absent signals.

**Instant** Interval in which signals are present or absent.

$$\underbrace{\langle \emptyset, P \rangle \longrightarrow^* \langle E_1, P_1 \rangle \dagger}_{Instant 1} \quad \hookrightarrow \quad \underbrace{\langle \emptyset, P_1' \rangle \longrightarrow^* \langle E_2, P_2 \rangle \dagger}_{Instant 2} \quad \hookrightarrow \quad \dots$$

## Example – Instant change ( $\hookrightarrow$ )

$$\begin{array}{c} \langle E,P\rangle\dagger\\ \\ \langle E,P\rangle\hookrightarrow\langle\emptyset,\quad \lfloor P\rfloor_E\rangle\\ \\ \swarrow\\ \\ \text{initialize }E \qquad \text{perform kills} \end{array}$$



## Example – Deterministic concurrency

## **Topics**

- Noninterference for an imperative language
- Reactive Languages
- Noninterference for Reactive Languages
  - Some old and new security leaks
  - Typing rules that prevent them
- Proving Noninterference

# Reactive noninterference: what is the right notion?

Also here we can use double types.

Should we allow ...?

- while  $x_H$  do ...; ...  $r_L := 0 \dots$
- when  $a_H$  do  $\dots$ ;  $\dots r_L := 0 \dots$

## Counter-example I

while 
$$x_{\boldsymbol{H}}$$
 do ...; ...  $r_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 0 \dots$ 



#### because:

$$(\alpha \ \ \beta)$$

 $\alpha: \mathtt{while}\ x_{H}\ \mathtt{do}\ \mathtt{pause}\,;\, r_{L}:=0\,;\, x_{H}:=\mathtt{false}$ 

 $\beta$ : while  $\neg x_H$  do pause;  $r_L := 1$ ;  $x_H := \text{true}$ 

 $\{x_H \mapsto \mathsf{true}\}\ \mathrm{vs.}\ \{x_H \mapsto \mathsf{false}\}$ 

## Counter-example II

when  $a_H$  do  $\ldots$ ;  $\ldots r_L := 0 \ldots$ 

#### because:

$$(\alpha \Lsh \beta)$$

 $\alpha$ : when  $a_{\boldsymbol{H}}$  do nil; emit  $c_{\boldsymbol{L}}$ ; emit  $b_{\boldsymbol{H}}$ 

 $\beta$ : when  $b_H$  do nil; emit  $d_L$ ; emit  $a_H$ 

 $\{a_{\it H}\}\ {\rm vs.}\ \{b_{\it H}\}$ 

## Counter-example III

when  $a_H$  do ...  $\neg \dots r_L := 0 \dots$ 



because:

$$((\alpha \Lsh \beta) \Lsh \gamma)$$
 
$$\alpha: (\texttt{pause} \ ; \ x_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 1)$$
 
$$\beta: (\texttt{do} \ (\texttt{when} \ a_{\boldsymbol{H}} \ \texttt{do} \ \texttt{nil}) \ \texttt{watching} \ z_{\boldsymbol{H}} \Lsh \texttt{when} \ b_{\boldsymbol{L}} \ \texttt{do} \ x_{\boldsymbol{L}} := 0)$$
 
$$\gamma: (\texttt{nil} \ ; \ \texttt{pause} \ ; \ \texttt{emit} \ b_{\boldsymbol{L}})$$
 
$$\{a_{\boldsymbol{H}}, z_{\boldsymbol{H}}\} \ \text{vs.} \ \{z_{\boldsymbol{H}}\}$$

:. Alternating parallelism requires more conditions

## Double types for reactive primitives

All writes
after a read
must be higher:

$$\frac{\Gamma(a) = \pmb{\delta} \ sig \quad \Gamma \vdash P : (\tau, \sigma) \ cmd}{\Gamma \vdash \text{when} \ a \ \text{do} \ P : (\tau, \pmb{\delta} \lor \pmb{\sigma}) \ cmd}$$

$$\delta \leq au$$

$$\sqrt{\frac{\Gamma \vdash Q_1 : (\tau_1, \sigma_1) \ cmd \ \Gamma \vdash Q_2 : (\tau_2, \sigma_2) \ cmd}{\Gamma \vdash Q_1 ; \ Q_2 : (\boldsymbol{\tau_1} \land \boldsymbol{\tau_2}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_1} \lor \boldsymbol{\sigma_2}) \ cmd}}$$

$$\sigma_1 \leq au_2$$

$$! \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash Q_1 : (\tau_1, \sigma_1) \ cmd \quad \Gamma \vdash Q_2 : (\tau_2, \sigma_2) \ cmd}{\Gamma \vdash Q_1 \ \neg Q_2 : (\boldsymbol{\tau_1} \land \boldsymbol{\tau_2}, \boldsymbol{\sigma_1} \lor \boldsymbol{\sigma_2}) \ cmd}$$

$$\sigma_1 \leq au_2 \wedge \ \sigma_2 < au_1$$

## Interference at instant changes

Instant changes...

...are reflected in the signal environment (it is set to empty).

...can depend on high tests

emit  $a_L$ ; if  $x_H = 0$  then nil else pause

... are not statically predictable

... So we **must** allow **some** low signal reset after a high test.

## **Topics**

- Noninterference for an imperative language
- Reactive Languages
- Noninterference for Reactive Languages
- Proving Noninterference
  - The language and some properties
  - Noninterference using bisimulation
  - High programs

## The language

#### **Imperative**

 $\mathtt{nil} \mid x := e \mid \mathtt{let} \ x := e \ \mathtt{in} \ P \mid \mathtt{if} \ e \ \mathtt{then} \ P \ \mathtt{else} \ Q \mid \mathtt{while} \ e \ \mathtt{do} \ P \mid P \, ; \, Q$ 

#### Reactive

emit  $a \mid \mathtt{local}\ a : \delta$  in  $P \mid \mathtt{do}\ P$  watching  $a \mid \mathtt{when}\ a \ \mathtt{do}\ P \mid P \Lsh Q$ 

Configuration  $C_1, C_2, \ldots = \langle \Gamma, S, E, P \rangle$  where:

 $\Gamma$  - typing environment S - variable store

E - set of present signals P, Q - programs

Step  $C \longmapsto C' \stackrel{\text{def}}{\Leftrightarrow} \mathbf{Move} \ C \to C' \text{ or Instant change } C \hookrightarrow C'.$ 

## Formalizing Noninterference

Idea: a program should be bisimilar to itself when executed on low-equal memories (bisimulation preserving low memories):

#### Definition 1 (Secure Programs).

P is secure in  $\Gamma$  if for all set of low security levels  $\mathcal{L}$  and for all  $S_1, E_1, S_2, E_2$  such that  $\langle S_1, E_1 \rangle =_{\mathcal{L}}^{\Gamma} \langle S_2, E_2 \rangle$ , we have

$$\langle \Gamma, S_1, E_1, P \rangle \approx_{\mathcal{L}} \langle \Gamma, S_2, E_2, P \rangle.$$

#### Reactive bisimulation

Definition 2 (Reactive bisimulation equivalence ( $\approx_{\mathcal{L}}$ )). The largest symmetric relation  $\mathcal{R}$  such that  $C_1\mathcal{R}C_2$ , where  $C_1 = \langle \Gamma_1, S_1, E_1, P_1 \rangle$  and  $C_2 = \langle \Gamma_2, S_2, E_2, P_2 \rangle$ , imply:

- $\langle S_1, E_1 \rangle =_{\mathcal{L}}^{\Gamma_1 \cap \Gamma_2} \langle S_2, E_2 \rangle$ , and
- either
  - $-P_i \in \mathcal{H}^{\Gamma_i,\mathcal{L}} \text{ for } i=1,2, \text{ or }$
  - $C_1 \longmapsto C_1' \text{ implies } \exists C_2' \text{ such that } C_2 \longmapsto^* C_2' \text{ and } C_1' \mathcal{R} C_2'$

## Semantically High programs $-\mathcal{H}^{\Gamma,\mathcal{L}}$

**Definition:**  $P \in \mathcal{H}^{\Gamma,\mathcal{L}}$  implies

- $\langle \Gamma, S, E, P \rangle \to \langle \Gamma', S', E', P' \rangle$  implies  $P' \in \mathcal{H}^{\Gamma', \mathcal{L}}$  and  $\langle S, E \rangle =_{\mathcal{L}}^{\Gamma} \langle S', E' \rangle$
- $\langle \Gamma, S, E, P \rangle \hookrightarrow \langle \Gamma', S', E', P' \rangle$  implies  $P' \in \mathcal{H}^{\Gamma', \mathcal{L}}$

#### **Examples:**

- if  $x_H = 0$  then nil else pause
- if true then nil else  $y_L := 0$

#### Main results

**Lemma 3.** Suppose  $C_1 =^{\Gamma}_{\mathcal{L}} C_2$ ,  $C_1 \longmapsto C'_1$  and  $C_2 \longmapsto C'_2$ .

- 1. If P has only low tests, then  $C'_1 =^{\Gamma}_{\mathcal{L}} C'_2$ .
- 2. If P has high tests and  $C'_1 \neq_L C'_2$ , then  $P \in \mathcal{H}^{\Gamma,\mathcal{L}}$ .

Theorem 4 (Noninterference).

If P is typable in  $\Gamma$  then P is  $\Gamma$ -secure.

#### Current and future work

- Investigate alternative semantics for reactive concurrency.
- Extend the result to the distributed reactive language ULM = call-by-value + side-effects + reactiveness + mobility [Bou03].