Advanced Functional Programming TDA342/DIT260

Tuesday, March 15, 2016, Hörsalsvägen (yellow brick building), 8:30-12:30.

(including example solutions to programming problems)

Alejandro Russo, tel. 031 772 6156

• The maximum amount of points you can score on the exam: 60 points. The grade for the exam is as follows:

Chalmers: **3**: 24 - 35 points, **4**: 36 - 47 points, **5**: 48 - 60 points. GU: Godkänd 24-47 points, Väl godkänd 48-60 points PhD student: 36 points to pass.

- Results: within 21 days.
- Permitted materials (Hjälpmedel): Dictionary (Ordlista/ordbok).

You may bring up to two pages (on one A4 sheet of paper) of pre-written notes – a "summary sheet". These notes may be typed or handwritten. They may be from any source. If this summary sheet is brought to the exam it must also be handed in with the exam (so make a copy if you want to keep it).

• Notes:

- Read through the paper first and plan your time.
- Answers preferably in English, some assistants might not read Swedish.
- If a question does not give you all the details you need, you may make reasonable assumptions. Your assumptions must be clearly stated. If your solution only works under certain conditions, state them.
- Start each of the questions on a new page.
- The exact syntax of Haskell is not so important as long as the graders can understand the intended meaning. If you are unsure just put in an explanation of your notation.
- Hand in the summary sheet (if you brought one) with the exam solutions.
- As a recommendation, consider spending around 1h 20 minutes per exercise. However, this is only a recommendation.
- To see your exam: by appointment (send email to Alejandro Russo)

FUNCTOR TYPE-CLASSIDENTITYclass Functor c where fmap :: $(a \rightarrow b) \rightarrow c \ a \rightarrow c \ b$ IDENTITYMAP FUSIONfmap $(f \circ g) \equiv fmap \ f \circ fmap \ g$

Figure 1: Functors

Problem 1: (Functors) As its name implies, a binary tree is a tree with a two-way branching structure, i.e., a left and a right sub tree. In Haskell, such trees can be defined as follows.

data Tree a where Leaf :: $a \rightarrow Tree \ a$ Node :: Tree $a \rightarrow Tree \ a \rightarrow Tree \ a$

a) Show that Tree a is a functor. For that, you should provide an instance for the Functor type-class and prove that fmap for finite trees, i.e., fmap :: $(a \rightarrow b) \rightarrow$ Tree $a \rightarrow$ Tree b, fulfills the laws for functors – see Figure 1.

instance Functor Tree where $fmap \ f \ (Leaf \ a) = Leaf \ (f \ a)$ $fmap \ f \ (Node \ t1 \ t2) = Node \ (fmap \ f \ t1) \ (fmap \ f \ t2)$

Important: Assume that f and g are total, i.e., they do not raise any errors or loop indefinitely when applied to an argument. If your proof is by induction, you should indicate *induction on what* (e.g., in the length of the list). Justify every step in your proof.

(8p)

Proofs by induction on the height of the tree

-- Identity law -- Base case fmap id (Leaf a) \equiv -- by definition fmap.0 Leaf $(id \ a)$ \equiv -- by definition of id Leaf a \equiv -- by definition of id id (Leaf a) -- Inductive case fmap id (Node l r) \equiv -- by definition of fmap.1 Node (fmap id l) (fmap id r) \equiv -- by I.H. Node $(id \ l) (id \ r)$ \equiv -- by definition of id Node l r \equiv -- by definition of id $id (Node \ l \ r)$ -- Map fusion -- Base case fmap $(f \circ q)$ (Leaf a) \equiv -- by definition fmap.0 Leaf $((f \circ q) a)$ \equiv -- by definition of . Leaf (f(q a)) \equiv -- by definition of fmap.0 $fmap f (Leaf (g a)) \equiv$ -- by definition of fmap.0 fmap f (fmap g (Leaf a))-- Inductive case fmap $(f \circ g)$ (Node l r) \equiv -- by definition of fmap.1 Node $(fmap (f \circ g) l) (fmap (f \circ g) r)$ \equiv -- by I.H. Node $(fmap \ f \ (fmap \ g \ l)) \ (fmap \ f \ (fmap \ g \ r)) \equiv$ -- by definition of fmap.1 $fmap \ f \ (Node \ (fmap \ q \ l) \ (fmap \ q \ r))$ \equiv -- by definition of fmap.1 fmap f (fmap q (Node l r))

b) As with lists, it is also useful to "fold" over trees. Given a tree t with elements e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n and an operator \oplus , folding over the tree t with operator \oplus intuitively means to *intercalate* the operator among the elements of the tree, i.e., $e_1 \oplus e_2 \oplus e_3 \oplus \ldots \oplus e_n$. For simplicity, we assume that the operator \oplus is always associative. We call the function implementing folding over trees *foldT*.

$$foldT :: (a \to a \to a) \to Tree \ a \to a$$

By using foldT, we can now express a bunch of useful functions on trees.

 $\begin{array}{ll} P_1 & P_2 \\ height_tree = foldT \; (\lambda l \; r \to max \; l \; r+1) \circ fmap \; (const \; 0) & sum_tree = foldT \; (+) \\ P_3 \\ leaves = foldT \; (+) \circ fmap \; (\lambda x \to [x]) \end{array}$

Program P_1 computes the height of a tree. Program P_2 sums all the numbers in a tree. Program P_3 extracts all the elements of a tree.

Your task is to implement foldT.

(4p)

 $foldT :: (a \to a \to a) \to Tree \ a \to a$ $foldT \ op \ (Leaf \ a) = a$ $foldT \ op \ (Node \ l \ r) = (foldT \ op \ l) \ `op` (foldT \ op \ r)$

c) There is a relation between mapping functions over trees' leaves and lists. More specifically, we have the following equation for finite and well-defined trees.

 $map \ f \circ leaves \equiv leaves \circ fmap \ f$

It is the same to first extract the leaves and then map the function (left-hand side), as it is to map the function first and then extracting the leaves (right-hand side).

Your task is to prove that the equation holds.

You can assume the following properties and definition for this exercise and the rest of the exam!

(.)	Assoc. (.)	(ID LEFT)	(ID RIGHT)	(ETA)
$(f \circ g) \ x = f \ (g \ x)$	$(f \circ g) \circ z = f \circ (g \circ z)$) $id \circ f = f$	$f \circ id = f$	$\lambda x \to f \ x \equiv f$
(cons.0)	((++).0)	((++).1])	
x : [] = [x]	[] + ys = ys	(x:xs)	++ ys = x : (xs + ys) = x :	++ ys)
(Assoc. (++))	(me)	(p.0) ((map.1)	
$xs + (ys + zs) \equiv (x$	zs + ys) + zs ma	$p f [] = [] \qquad r$	$map \ f \ (x:xs) =$	f x : map f xs

You cannot assume any property that relates (++), map, and fmap – if you need such properties, you should prove them too! (8p)

-- Auxiliary lemma $map f (xs + ys) \equiv map f xs + map f ys$ -- Proof by induction on the length of xs -- Base case $map f ([] + ys) \equiv$ -- (++).0 map f ys \equiv -- (++).0 $[] + map f ys \equiv$ -- map.0 map f [] + map f ys-- Inductive case map f ((x:xs) + ys) \equiv -- map.1 f x : map f (xs + ys) \equiv -- I.H. $f x : (map f xs + map f ys) \equiv$ -- (++).1

 $(f \ x : map \ f \ xs) + map \ f \ ys \equiv$ -- map.1 $map \ f \ (x : xs) + map \ f \ ys$

-- Proof by induction on the height of trees $map \ f \circ leaves \equiv leaves \circ fmap \ f$ -- Base case map f (leaves (Leaf a)) \equiv -- Def. leaves map f (foldT (++) (fmap $(\lambda x \rightarrow [x])$ (Leaf a))) \equiv -- Def. fmap on Leaf map f (foldT (++) (Leaf [a])) \equiv -- Def. foldT map f [a] \equiv -- Def (:) map f (a:[]) \equiv -- Def map.1 f a : map f [] \equiv -- Def. map.0 f a : [] \equiv -- Def (:) [f a] \equiv -- Def. leaves leaves (Leaf (f a)) \equiv -- Def. fmap leaves (fmap f (Leaf a))-- Inductive case $map \ f \ (leaves \ (Node \ l \ r))$ \equiv -- Def. leaves map f (foldT (++) (Node l r)) \equiv -- Def. foldT map f ((foldT (+) l) + (foldT (+) r)) \equiv -- Auxiliary lemma map f (foldT (+) l) + map f (foldT (+) r) \equiv -- Def. leaves map f (leaves l) + map f (leaves r) \equiv -- IH leaves $(fmap \ f \ l) + leaves (fmap \ f \ r)$ \equiv -- Def. leaves $foldT (+) (fmap f l) + foldT (+) (fmap f r) \equiv$ -- Def. foldT foldT (+) (Node (fmap f l) (fmap f r)) \equiv -- Def. leaves leaves (Node (fmap f l) (fmap f r)) \equiv -- Def. fmap

leaves (fmap f (Node l r))

class Monad m a where return :: $a \to m a$ (\gg) :: $m a \to (a \to m b) \to m b$ Associativity (x does not appear in m_2 and m_3) $(m \gg k_1) \gg k_2 \equiv m \gg (\lambda x \to k_1 x \gg k_2)$ RIGHT IDENTITY $m \gg$ return $\equiv m$



Problem 2. (Monads) During the lectures we said that a data type m is a monad if we can define the primitives *return* and (\gg), and that m fulfills the monadic laws – see Figure 2. There is, however, an alternative interface for monads described as follows.

class MonadAlternative m where IDENTITY MAP FUSION $return' :: a \to m \ a$ $fmap \ (f \circ g) \equiv fmap \ f \ (fmap \ g)$ fmap id $m \equiv m$ join $:: m (m \ a) \rightarrow m \ a$ fmap :: $(a \rightarrow b) \rightarrow m \ a \rightarrow m \ b$ A_1 A_2 A_3 $join \circ fmap \ return' \equiv id$ $fmap \ f \circ return' \equiv return' \circ f$ $join \circ return' \equiv id$ A_4 A_5 $join \circ fmap \ (fmap \ f) \equiv fmap \ f \circ join$ $join \circ fmap \ join \equiv join \circ join$

This interface requires m to be a functor and introduces an operation called *join*. Furthermore, *return'*, *join*, and *fmap* are required to obey various different laws.

a) Your task consists of showing that the alternative interface is enough to implement *return* and (\gg). In other words, if you define *return'*, *fmap*, and *join* for certain data type *m*, then you can show that *m* is an instance of the type-class *Monad* in Haskell. You should provide the following type-class instance:

instance MonadAlternative $m \Rightarrow Monad m$ where return = ... $(\gg) = ...$ instance MonadAlternative $m \Rightarrow Monad m$ where return = return' $m \gg k = join (fmap k m)$

(6p)

b) Assuming the laws for the alternative monadic interface, you should show that the implementation that you gave in the previous question is indeed a monad in the traditional sense, i.e. it fulfills the laws from Figure 2. (14p)

-- Left identity return $x \gg f$ \equiv -- Def. return join (fmap f (return x)) \equiv -- Def. return join (fmap f (return' x)) \equiv -- Def. of (.) $join ((fmap \ f \circ return') \ x) \equiv$ -- A1 *join* $((return' \circ f) x)$ \equiv -- Def (.) $(join \circ return' \circ f) x$ \equiv -- A3 $(id \circ f) x$ \equiv -- Def. id f x

-- Right identity $m \gg return \equiv$ -- Def. bind join (fmap return m) \equiv -- Def. return join (fmap return' m) \equiv -- Def. (.) (join \circ fmap return') $m \equiv$ -- A2 id m \equiv -- Def. id m

-- Associativity $m \gg (\lambda x \to k_1 \ x \gg k_2)$ \equiv -- Def. bind *join* (fmap $(\lambda x \to k_1 \ x \gg k_2) \ m)$ \equiv -- Def. bind *join* (fmap $(\lambda x \rightarrow join (fmap \ k_2 \ (k_1 \ x))) \ m)$ \equiv -- Def. (.) join (fmap $(\lambda x \rightarrow (join \circ fmap \ k_2 \circ k_1) \ x) \ m)$ \equiv -- Eta-contraction *join* (fmap (join \circ fmap $k_2 \circ k_1$) m) \equiv -- Map fusion *join* (*fmap join* (*fmap* $(fmap \ k_2 \circ k_1) \ m)$) \equiv -- Map fusion *join* (fmap join (fmap $(fmap \ k_2) \ (fmap \ k_1 \ m)))$ \equiv -- Def (.)

$(join \circ fmap \ join) \ (fmap \ (fmap \ k_2) \ (fmap \ k_1$	$m))) \equiv$
A4	
$(join \circ join) (fmap (fmap k_2) (fmap k_1 m)))$	≡
Def (.)	
$join (join (fmap (fmap k_2) (fmap k_1 m)))$	≡
Def (.)	
$join \; ((join \circ fmap \; (fmap \; k_2)) \; (fmap \; k_1 \; m))$	≡
A5	
$join \ ((fmap \ k_2 \circ join) \ (fmap \ k_1 \ m))$	\equiv
Def (.)	
$join \ (fmap \ k_2 \ (join \ (fmap \ k_1 \ m)))$	\equiv
Def. bind	
$(join \ (fmap \ k_1 \ m)) \gg k_2$	\equiv
Def. bind	
$(m \gg k_1) \gg k_2$	

Problem 3: (**EDSL**) Information-flow control (IFC) is a promising technology to guarantee confidentiality of data when manipulated by untrusted code, i.e. code written by someone else.

In IFC, data gets classified either as *public* (low) or *secret* (high), where public information can flow into secret entities but not vice versa. We encode the sensitivity of data as abstract data types, and the allowed flows of information in the type-class CanFlowTo – see Figure 3.

To build secure programs which do not leak secrets, we build a small EDSL in Haskell with two core concepts: *labeled values* and *secure computations*. Labeled values are simply data tagged with a security level indicating its sensitivity. For example, a weather report is a public piece of data, so we can model it as a public labeled string *weather_report*:: *Labeled L String*. Sim-- Security level for public data
data L
-- Security level for secret data
data H
-- allowed flows of information
class l 'CanFlowTo' l' where
-- Public data can flow into public entities
instance L 'CanFlowTo' L where
-- Public data can flow into secret entities
instance L 'CanFlowTo' H where
-- Secret data can flow into secret entities
instance H 'CanFlowTo' H where

Figure 3: Allowed flows of information

ilarly, a credit card number is sensitive, so we model it as a secret integer cc_number :: Labeled H Integer.

A secure computation is an entity of type $MAC \ l \ a$, which denotes a computation that handles data at sensitivity level l and produces a result (of type a) of this level. In order to remain secure, secure computations can only observe data that "can flow to" the computation (see primitive *unlabel* below), and can only create labeled values provided that information from the computation "can flow to" the newly created labeled value (see primitive *label* below). We describe the API for the EDSL in Figure 4, and provide a *deep-embedded* implementation for the API in Figure 5.

a) Your task is to take the implementation in Figure 5 and obtain an "intermediate embedding" by removing *Bind* from the *MAC l a* data type. As a result, *runMAC* will no longer run *Bind*; instead, the definition of (\gg) will change. After your modifications, it is important to show that you can faithfully implement the *whole* EDSL API.

Important: If you alter the definition of $MAC \ l \ a$, or any other function in the deepembedded implementation, you need to show that your modifications are correct by deriving them.

Help: You can assume that runMAC $(m \gg f) \equiv runMAC$ $m \gg runMAC \circ f$ (12p)

data MAC l a where Label :: $(l \, CanFlowTo' \, l') \Rightarrow$ Labeled l' $a \rightarrow MAC \, l \, (Labeled \, l' \, a)$ Unlabel :: $(l' \, CanFlowTo' \, l) \Rightarrow$ Labeled l' $a \rightarrow MAC \, l \, a$ JoinBind :: $(l \, CanFlowTo' \, l') \Rightarrow MAC \, l' \, a$ $\rightarrow ((Labeled \, l' \, a) \rightarrow MAC \, l \, b)$ $\rightarrow MAC \, l \, b$

 $Return \quad :: a \to MAC \ l \ a$

```
-- Types
newtype Labeled 1 a
             MAC \ l \ a
data
   -- Labeled values
label
             :: (l `CanFlowTo' l') \Rightarrow a \rightarrow MAC l (Labeled l' a)
             :: (l'`CanFlowTo`l) \Rightarrow Labeled \ l' \ a \rightarrow MAC \ l \ a
unlabel
   -- MAC monad
             :: a \to MAC \ l \ a
return
(≫=)
             :: MAC \ l \ a \rightarrow (a \rightarrow MAC \ l \ b) \rightarrow MAC \ l \ b
joinMAC :: (l `CanFlowTo' l') \Rightarrow MAC l' a \rightarrow MAC l (Labeled l' a)
   -- Run function
runMAC :: MAC l \ a \rightarrow IO \ a
```



```
-- Types
newtype Labeled l \ a = MkLabeled \ a
data MAC \ l \ a where
         :: (l `CanFlowTo` l') \Rightarrow Labeled l' a \rightarrow MAC l (Labeled l' a)
  Label
  Unlabel :: (l' `CanFlowTo` l) \Rightarrow Labeled l' a \rightarrow MAC l a
          :: (l `CanFlowTo' l') \Rightarrow MAC l' a \rightarrow MAC l (Labeled l' a)
  Join
  Return :: a \to MAC \ l \ a
  Bind
          :: MAC \ l \ a \to (a \to MAC \ l \ b) \to MAC \ l \ b)
  -- Labeled values
          = Label \circ MkLabeled
label
unlabel
          = Unlabel
  -- MAC operations
joinMAC = Join
instance Monad (MAC \ l) where
  return = Return
  (\gg) = Bind
  -- Run function
runMAC (Label lv)
                                    = return \ lv
runMAC (Unlabel (MkLabeled v)) = return v
runMAC (Join mac_a)
                                    = runMAC mac_a \gg return \circ MkLabeled
runMAC (Return a)
                                    = return a
runMAC (Bind mac f)
                                     = runMAC \ (mac \gg f)
```



-- joinMAC $joinMAC mac_h = JoinBind mac_h Return$ -- Implementing bind instance Monad (MAC l) where return = Return $\gg f = f lv$ Label lv Unlabel (MkLabeled v) $\gg f = f v$ JoinBind mac_h k $\gg f = JoinBind mac_h (\lambda lv \to k lv \gg f)$ Return x $\gg f = f x$ -- Derivation for JoinBind JoinBind mac_h k $\gg f$ -- definition of JoinBind $(Join mac_h \gg k) \gg f$ -- associativity of bind Join mac_h $\gg (\lambda lv \rightarrow k \ lv \gg f)$ -- definition of JoinBind JoinBind mac_h ($\lambda v \rightarrow k \ lv \gg f$) runMAC (Label lv) $= return \ lv$ runMAC (Unlabel (MkLabeled v)) = return vrunMAC (Return a) = return a $= runMAC mac_h \gg runMAC \circ k \circ MkLabeled$ runMAC (JoinBind mac_h k) -- Derivation for runMAC for JoinBind runMAC (JoinBind mac_h k) -- definition of JoinBind $runMAC (Join mac_h \gg k)$ -- property of runMAC and bind $runMAC (Join mac_h) \gg runMAC \circ k$ -- definition runMAC for Join from before $(runMAC mac_h \gg return \circ MkLabeled) \gg runMAC \circ k$ -- associativity law for monads $runMAC mac_h \gg (\lambda x \rightarrow (return \circ MkLabeled) x \gg runMAC \circ k)$ -- Definition of . and application $runMAC mac_h \gg (\lambda x \rightarrow return (MkLabeled x) \gg runMAC \circ k)$ -- Left identity $runMAC mac_h \gg (\lambda x \rightarrow (runMAC \circ k) (MkLabeled x))$ -- definition of (.) $runMAC mac_h \gg (\lambda x \rightarrow (runMAC \circ k \circ MkLabeled) x)$ -- eta-contraction $runMAC mac_h \gg runMAC \circ k \circ MkLabeled$

b) We would like to add the function *output* to the EDSL in order to print out messages. Ideally, we will have two output channels, one for public data and one for secret values. However, for simplicity, we assume that we have only one output channel: the screen. To mimic having two output channels, however, we will pre-append some text to indicate on which channel data is being sent. See the functions *add_location* and *print_cc* below.

```
-- outputting in a secret channel
  -- outputting in a public channel
                                                         print_cc :: Labeled \ H \ Int \to MAC \ H \ ()
add\_location :: Labeled \ L \ String \rightarrow MAC \ L \ ()
                                                         print_cc\ lcc = do
add\_location \ lstr = do
                                                            number \leftarrow unlabel \ lcc
  str \leftarrow unlabel \ lstr
                                                                      \leftarrow label ("CC number "
                                                            msq
  msq \leftarrow label (str + "Gothenburg")
                                                                                  + show number)
            :: MAC \ L \ (Labeled \ L \ String)
                                                                          :: MAC \ H \ (Labeled \ H \ String)
  output msg
                                                            output msq
```

If we call *add_location* with a weather report, then it prints out a message in the public channel.

> let weather = MkLabeled "Sunny, 31 degrees, ":: Labeled L String in runMAC (add_location weather) public channel : Sunny, 31 degrees, Gothenburg

By contrast, if we call *print_cc* with a credit card number, then it sends the credit card digits to the secret channel.

> let cc_number = MkLabeled 1234 :: Labeled H Int in runMAC (print_cc cc_number) private channel : CC number 1234

Observe that the implementation of *output* depends on the <u>type</u> of the labeled value taken as argument, i.e. *output* is overloaded. Your task is to extend the definitions of *MAC* l a, (\gg), and *runMAC* to include the primitive *output* in the EDSL. (8p)

class $TermLevel \ l$ where $term :: Labeled \ l \ a \rightarrow Level$ data $Level = Public \ | Secret$ instance $TermLevel \ L$ where $term \ _ = Public$ instance $TermLevel \ H$ where $term \ _ = Secret$ data $MAC \ l \ a$ where

...

Output :: *TermLevel* $l \Rightarrow Labeled \ l \ String \rightarrow MAC \ l \ ()$ **instance** *Monad* (*MAC* l) **where** ... $Output \ lv \gg f = f()$ $runMAC \ (Output \ lv@(MkLabeled \ msg)) =$ **case** $term \ lv \ of$ $Public \rightarrow putStrLn \ "public \ channel:" \gg putStrLn \ msg$ $Secret \rightarrow putStrLn \ "secret \ channel:" \gg putStrLn \ msg$