Software Engineering using Formal Methods

Introduction

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Chalmers University of Technology
and
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2 September 2014

Course Team

Teachers

- Wolfgang Ahrendt (WA) examiner, lecturer
- Mauricio Chimento (MC) teaching assistant
- Bart van Delft (BvD) teaching assistant

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course assistant activities include:

- giving exercise classes
- correcting lab hand-ins
- student support via:
  - e-mail
  - meetings on e-mail request
    - Mauricio, room 5446
    - Bart, room 5483

Organisational Stuff

Course Home Page

`www.cse.chalmers.se/edu/course/TDA293/`

Also linked from course portal

Google News Group

- Sign up via course home page (see News)
- Changes, updates, questions, discussions (don't post solutions)

Passing Criteria

- Written exam 31 October, 2014; re-exam 05 January 20015
- Two lab hand-ins
- Exam and labs can be passed separately

Course Structure

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Topic	# Lectures	# Exercises	Lab
Intro	1	✗	✗
Modeling & Model Checking with PROMELA & SPIN	6	3	✓
Guest lecture A.-L. Lamprecht (Univ. Potsdam)	1	✗	✗
Modeling & Verification with JML & KeY	6	3	✓

PROMELA & SPIN abstract programs, model checking, automated

JML & KeY concrete Java, deductive verification, semi-automated

. . . more on this later!

Lectures

Lectures

- Please ask questions during lectures
- Please respond to my questions
- Slides appear online shortly *after* each lecture

Exercises

Exercises

- One exercise web page (almost) each week (6 in total)
- Discussed in next exercise class
- Try to solve before coming to the class!
- Exercises highly recommended
- Bring laptops if you have
  (ideally w. installed tools or browser interface working)

Labs

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- 2 lab handins: PROMELA/SPIN 3 Oct, JML/KeY 27 Oct
- Submission via Fire, linked from course home page
- If submission is returned, roughly one week for correction

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- If submission is returned, roughly one week for correction
- You work in groups of two. No exception![a]
  You pair up by either:
  1. talk to people
  2. post to the Google group
  3. participate in pairing at first exercise session

  In case all that is not sufficient, contact Mauricio by e-mail

[a] Only PhD student have to work alone.

Schedule

see course homepage

Course Evaluation

1. course evaluation group:
   - randomly selected student representatives + teacher
   - one meeting during the course, one after
2. web questionnaire after the course

Course Literature

- The Course Book:

  Ben-Ari Mordechai Ben-Ari: Principles of the Spin Model Checker, Springer, 2008.
  Authored by receiver of ACM award for outstanding contributions to CS education. Recommended by G. Holzmann. Excellent student text book.
  (E-book at `link.springer.com`)

- further reading:

  Holzmann Gerard J. Holzmann: The Spin Model Checker, Addison Wesley, 2004.

  KeYbook B. Beckert, R. Hähnle, and P. Schmitt, editors. Verification of Object-Oriented Software: The KeY Approach, vol 4334 of *LNCS*. Springer, 2006.
  Chapters 1 and 10 only. (Download via Chalmers library → E-books → Lecture Notes in Computer Science)

Connection to other Courses

Skills in object-oriented programing (like Java) assumed.

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Knowledge corresponding to the following courses can further help:

- Concurrent Programming
- Finite Automata
- Testing, Debugging, and Verification
- Logic in Computer Science

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if not: don't worry, we introduce everything we use here

Motivation: Software Defects cause BIG Failures

Tiny faults in technical systems can have catastrophic consequences

In particular, this goes for software systems

- Ariane 5
- Mars Climate Orbiter
- London Ambulance Dispatch System
- NEDAP Voting Computer Attack

Motivation:
Software Defects cause OMNIPRESENT Failures

Ubiquitous Computing results in Ubiquitous Failures

Software is almost everywhere:

- Mobiles
- Smart devices
- Smart cards
- Cars
- ...

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software/specification quality is a growing commercial and legal issue

Achieving Reliability in Engineering

Some well-known strategies from civil engineering

- Precise calculations/estimations of forces, stress, etc.

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- Design follows patterns that are proven to work

Why This Does Not (Quite) Work For Software?

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- Cost efficiency favoured over reliability
- Design practise for reliable software in immature state
  for complex, particularly distributed, systems

How to Ensure Software Correctness/Compliance?

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Testing against external faults

- inject faults (memory, communication) by simulation or radiation
- trace fault propagation

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  How to test for the unexpected? Rare cases?
- Testing is labour intensive, hence expensive

What are Formal Methods

- Rigorous methods used in system design and development
- Mathematics and symbolic logic ⇒ formal
- Increase confidence in a system
- Two aspects:
  - System requirements
  - System implementation
- Make formal model of both
- Use tools for
  - exhaustive search for failing scenario, or
  - mechanical proof that implementation satisfies requirements

What are Formal Methods for

- Complement other analysis and design methods
- Increase confidence in system correctness
- Good at finding bugs
  (in code and specification)
- *Ensure* certain properties of the system model
- Should ideally be as automated as possible

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and

- Training in Formal Methods increases high quality development skills

Specification — What a System Should Do

- Simple properties
  - Safety properties
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  - Modularity, encapsulation
  - Refinement relation

The Main Point of Formal Methods is Not

- to show “correctness” of entire systems
- to replace testing entirely
- to replace good design practises

There is no silver bullet!

- No correct system w/o clear requirements & good design
- One can’t formally verify messy code with unclear specs

But . . .

- Formal proof can replace (infinitely) many test cases
- Formal methods improve the quality of specs
  (even without formal verification)
- Formal methods guarantee specific properties of system model

A Fundamental Fact

Formalisation of system requirements is hard

Let's see why . . .

Difficulties in Creating Formal Models



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

Real World

over-simplification

e.g., zero delay

Formal Requirements Specification

Formal Execution Model

Difficulties in Creating Formal Models



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

Formalization Helps to Find Bugs in Specs

- Wellformedness and consistency of formal specs partly machine-checkable
- Declared signature (symbols) helps to spot incomplete specs
- Failed verification of implementation against spec gives feedback on erroneous formalization

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Errors in specifications are at least as common as errors in code

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Errors in specifications are at least as common as errors in code,
but their discovery gives deep insights in (mis)conceptions of the system.

Another Fundamental Fact

Proving properties of systems can be hard

Level of System (Implementation) Description



- Abstract level
  - Finitely many states (bounded size datatypes)
  - Automated proofs are (in principle) possible
  - Simplification, unfaithful modeling inevitable
- Concrete level
  - Unbounded size datatypes
    (pointer chains, dynamic arrays, streams)
  - Complex datatypes and control structures
  - Realistic programming model (e.g., Java)
  - Automated proofs hard or impossible!

Expressiveness of Specification

- Simple
  - Simple or general properties
  - Finitely many case distinctions
  - Approximation, low precision
  - Automated proofs are (in principle) possible

- Complex
  - Full behavioural specification
  - Quantification over infinite domains
  - High precision, tight modeling
  - Automated proofs hard or impossible!

Main Approaches

Abstract programs, Simple properties	Abstract programs, Complex properties
Concrete programs, Simple properties	Concrete programs, Complex properties

Main Approaches

Spin
1st part
of course

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KeY
2nd part
of course

Proof Automation

- “Automated” Proof
  (“batch-mode”)
  - No interaction (or lemmas) necessary
  - Proof may fail or result inconclusive
    Tuning of tool parameters necessary
  - Formal specification still “by hand”



- “Semi-Automated” Proof
  (“interactive”)
  - Interaction (or lemmas) may be required
  - Need certain knowledge of tool internals
    Intermediate inspection can help
  - Proof is checked by tool

Model Checking with Spin

System Model

System Property



[] ! (criticalSectP && criticalSectQ)

```
byte n = 0;
active proctype P() {
  ...
}
active proctype Q() {
  ...
}
```

Model Checker

✗

✓

criticalSectP = 0 1 1
criticalSectQ = 1 0 1

Model Checking in Industry—Examples

- Hardware verification
  - Good match between limitations of technology and application
  - Intel, Motorola, AMD, . . .
- Software verification
  - Specialized software: control systems, protocols
  - Typically no checking of executable source code, but of abstractions
  - Bell Labs, Microsoft

A Major Case Study with Spin

Checking feature interaction for telephone call processing software

- Software for PathStar© server from Lucent Technologies
- Automated abstraction of unchanged C code into Promela
- Web interface, with Spin as back-end, to:
  - determine properties (ca. 20 temporal formulas)
  - invoke verification runs
  - report error traces
- Finds shortest possible error trace, reported as C execution trace
- Work farmed out to 16 computers, daily, overnight runs
- 18 months, 300 versions of system model, 75 bugs found
- Strength: detection of undesired feature interactions (difficult with traditional testing)
- Main challenge: defining meaningful properties

Deductive Verification with KeY

Java Code

Formal specification

Deductive Verification with KeY



correct?

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

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Program Verification System

Deductive Verification with KeY



correct✔

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

correct✓

Java Code

Formal specification

Program Verification System

Proof rules establish relation “implementation conforms to specs”

Computer support essential for verification of real programs

```
synchronized StringBuffer append(char c)
```

- ca. 15.000 proof steps
- ca. 200 case distinctions
- Two human interactions, ca. 1 minute computing time

Deductive Verification in Industry—Examples

- Hardware verification
  - For complex systems, mostly floating-point processors
  - Intel, Motorola, AMD, ...
- Software verification
  - Safety critical systems:
    - Paris driver-less metro (Meteor)
    - Emergency closing system in North Sea
  - Libraries
  - Implementations of Protocols

A Major Case Study with KeY

Mondex Electronic Purse

- Specified and implemented by NatWest ca. 1996
- Original formal specs in **Z** and proofs by hand
- Reformulated specs in JML, implementation in Java Card
- Executable on actual smart cards
- Full functional verification
- Total effort 4 person months
- With correct invariants: proofs fully automated
- Main challenge: loop invariants, getting specs right

Tool Support is Essential

Some Reasons for Using Tools

- Automate repetitive tasks
- Avoid typos, etc.
- Cope with large/complex programs
- Make verification certifiable

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SPIN to verify PROMELA programs against Temporal Logic specs

SPIN **web interface** Developped by Bart for this course!

JSPIN A Java interface for SPIN

KeY to verify Java programs against contracts in JML

All are free and run on Windows/Unixes/Mac.

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Install first SPIN and JSPIN on your computer,
or make sure the SPIN web interface works.

Literature for this Lecture

FM in SE B. Beckert, R. Hähnle, T. Hoare, D. Smith, C. Green, S. Ranise, C. Tinelli, T. Ball, and S. K. Rajamani: Intelligent Systems and Formal Methods in Software Engineering. *IEEE Intelligent Systems*, 21(6):71–81, 2006.
(Access to e-version via Chalmers Library)

KeY R. Hähnle: A New Look at Formal Methods for Software Construction. In: B. Beckert, R. Hähnle, and P. Schmitt, editors. *Verification of Object-Oriented Software: The KeY Approach*, pp 1–18, vol 4334 of *LNCS*. Springer, 2006.
(Access to e-version via Chalmers Library)

SPIN Gerard J. Holzmann: A Verification Model of a Telephone Switch. In: *The Spin Model Checker*, pp 299–324, Chapter 14, Addison Wesley, 2004.

You will gain experience in ...

- Modelling, and modelling languages

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- Modelling, and modelling languages
- Specification, and specification languages

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- Specification, and specification languages
- In depth analysis of possible system behaviour

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- ...

Learning Outcomes—Knowledge and Understanding

- judge the potential and limitations of using logic based verification methods for assessing and improving software correctness,
- judge what can and what cannot be expressed by certain specification/modelling formalisms,
- judge what can and cannot be analysed with certain logics and proof methods,
- differentiate between syntax, semantics, and proof methods in connection with logic-based systems for verification

Learning Outcomes—Skills and Abilities

- express safety properties of (concurrent) programs in a formal way,
- describe the basics of verifying safety properties via model checking,
- use tools which integrate and automate the model checking of safety properties,
- write formal specifications of object-oriented system units, using the concepts of method contracts and class invariants,
- describe how the connection between programs and formal specifications can be represented in a program logic,
- verify functional properties of simple Java programs with a verification tool,

Learning Outcomes—Judgement and Approach

- acknowledge the socio-economical costs caused by faulty software,
- judge and communicate the significance of correctness for software development,
- approach the issue of correctly functioning software by means of abstraction, modeling, and rigorous reasoning

Student opinions 2013

Q: What should be preserved for 2014?

Some answers (shortened):

- SPIN web interface
- Lab PMs not published before content appeared in lectures
- Exercise lectures were really thought out; much effort put into them
- Interactive teaching
- Wheter or not I will use the content in my professional life, it was eye opening
- Overall structure, i.e., the "lecture → exercise → lab" dynamic trio
- Labs in groups of two

Student opinions 2013

Q: What should be changed for 2014?

Some answers (shortened):

- Supervised lab sessions
- SPIN output hard to read; more on that in lectures
- Explain what JML is good in first JML lecture
- More interaction from students in exercises
- Don't push poeple to solve things in exercises
- Too much information in lectures
- Lab 2 deadline not in exam week
- More time for areas such as Büchi automata, LTL, sequent calculus
- Less time with PROMELA
- Lecturer should give details about student's study outcomes