Computer Security course

Risk Analysis

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(based on material from Lawrie Brown)

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Security Management Overview

- Security requirements means asking
 - what **assets** do we need to protect?
 - how are those assets threatened?
 - what can we do to **counter those threats?**
- IT Security management means
 - determine security objectives and risk profile
 - perform security risk assessment of assets
 - select, implement, monitor controls

IT Security Management

- IT Security Management: a process used to achieve and maintain appropriate levels of security (including confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability.)
- IT security management functions include:
 - determining organizational IT security objectives, strategies, policies and security requirements
 - identifying and analyzing security threats to IT assets
 - identifying and analyzing risks
 - specifying appropriate safeguards
 - implementation and operation of safeguards
 - developing and implement a security awareness program
 - incident handling


ISO 27000 Security Standards


| 10007000 | a propo sed standard which will define the vocabu lary and definitions used in | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| ISO27000 | | | | | | | |
| | the 27000 family of standards. | | | | | | |
| ISO27001 | defines the information security management system specification and | | | | | | |
| 10027001 | requirements against which organizations are formally certified. It replaces | | | | | | |
| | the old er Australian and British national standards AS7799.2 and BS7799.2. | | | | | | |
| ISO27002 | currently published and better known as ISO17799, this standard specifies a | | | | | | |
| 15027002 | code of practice detailing a comprehensive set of information security control | | | | | | |
| (ISO17799) | objectives and a menu of best-practice security controls. It replaces the older | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | Australian and British national standards AS7799.1 and BS7799.1. | | | | | | |
| ISO27003 | a propo sed standard containing implementation guidance on the use of the | | | | | | |
| | 27000 series of standards following the "Plan-Do-Check-Act" process quality | | | | | | |
| | cycle. Publication is propo sed for late 2008. | | | | | | |
| ISO27004 a draft standard on information security management measurement to hel | | | | | | | |
| 13027004 | organizations measure and report the effectiveness of their information | | | | | | |
| | security management systems. It will address both the security management | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | processes and con trols. Publication is proposed for 2007. | | | | | | |
| ISO27005 | a propo sed standard on information security risk management. It will replace | | | | | | |
| | the recently released British national standard BS7799.3. Publication is | | | | | | |
| | proposed for 2008/9. | | | | | | |
| ICO12225 | provides guidance on the management of IT security. This standard comprises | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | a number of parts. Part 1 defines concepts and models for information and | | | | | | |
| | communications technology security management. Part 2, currently in draft, | | | | | | |
| | will provide operational guidance on ICT security. These replace the older | | | | | | |
| | series of 5 technical reports ISO/IEC TR 13335 parts 1-5. | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |

Detailed Risk Analysis

- most comprehensive alternative
- assess using formal structured process
 - with a number of stages
 - identify likelihood of risk and consequences
 - hence have confidence controls appropriate
- costly and slow, requires expert analysts
- may be a legal requirement to use
- suitable for large organizations with IT systems critical to their business objectives

Risk Analysis Process





Establish Context

- determine the broad risk exposure of the organisation
 - related to wider political / social environment
 - and legal and regulatory constraints
 - o provide baseline for organization's risk exposure
- specify organization's risk appetite
- set boundaries of risk assessment
 - partly on risk assessment approach used
- decide on risk assessment criteria used

Asset Identification

- identify assets
 - "anything which needs to be protected"
 - items of value to organization to meet its objectives
 - tangible or intangible
 - in practice try to identify significant assets
- draw on expertise of people in relevant areas of organization to identify key assets
 - identify and interview such personnel
 - see checklists in various standards

Threat Identification

- to identify threats or risks to assets ask
 - I. who or what could cause it harm?
 - 2. how could this occur?
- threats are anything that hinders or prevents an asset to provide the appropriate levels of the key security services:
 - confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability
- assets may have multiple threats

Vulnerability Identification

- identify exploitable flaws or weaknesses in organization's IT systems or processes
- hence determine applicability and significance of threat to organization
- note that you need a combination of a threat and a vulnerability to create a risk to an asset
- use lists of potential vulnerabilities in standards etc

Analyse Risks

- specify likelihood of occurrence of each identified threat to asset given existing controls
 - management, operational, technical processes and procedures to reduce risk exposure
- specify consequence should the threat occur
- hence derive overall risk rating for each threat:
 risk =
 probability threat occurs x cost to organization
- in practice very hard to determine probabilities exactly, thus you may need to use qualitative (rather than quantitative) ratings for each
- aim to order resulting risks in order to treat them

Determine Likelihood

| Rating | Likelihood Expanded Definition | | | | |
|--------|--------------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| J | Description | | | | |
| 1 | Rare | May occur on ly in exceptional circumstances and may | | | |
| | | deemed as 'un lucky' or very unlikely. | | | |
| 2 | Unlikely | Could occur at some time but not expected given current | | | |
| | | controls, circumstances, and recent events. | | | |
| 3 | Possible | Might occur at some time, but just as likely as not. It may be | | | |
| | | difficult to control its occurrence due to external influences. | | | |
| 4 | Likely | Will probably occur in some circumstance and one should | | | |
| | | not be surprised if it occurred. | | | |
| 5 | Almost | Is expected to occur in most circumstances and certainly | | | |
| | Certain | soon er or later. | | | |

Determine Consequence

| | Rating | Consequence | Expanded Definition. | | | | | |
|-------|--------|---------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| | 1 | Insignificant | Gene rally a result of a minor security breach in a single area. | | | | | |
| | 1 | Insignincant | Impact is likely to last less than several days and requires only | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | minor expend iture to rectify. | | | | | |
| 9 8 8 | 2 | Minor | Result of a security breach in one or two areas. Impact is likely t | | | | | |
| 1 | | | last less than a week, but can be dealt with at the segment or proj | | | | | |
| | | | level without management intervention. Can gene rally be rectified | | | | | |
| | | | within project or team resources. | | | | | |
| | 3 | Moderate | Limit ed systemic (and possibly ongoing) security breaches. Impact | | | | | |
| | | | is likely to last up to 2 weeks and generally requires management | | | | | |
| | | | intervention. Will have ongoing compliance costs to overcome. | | | | | |
| | 4 | Major | Ongo ing systemic security breach. Impact will likely last 4-8 weeks | | | | | |
| | • | 1viajoi | and require significant management intervention and resources to | | | | | |
| | | | overcome, and compliance costs are expected to be substantial. | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Loss of business or organizational outcomes is possible, but not | | | | | |
| | | | expected, especially if this is a once off. | | | | | |
| | 5 | Catastrophic | Major systemic security breach. Impact will last for 3 months or | | | | | |
| | | | more and senior management will be required to intervene for the | | | | | |
| | | | duration of the event to overcome shortcomings. Compliance costs | | | | | |
| | | | are expected to be very substantial. Substantial public or political | | | | | |
| | | | debate about, and loss of confidence in, the organization is likely. | | | | | |
| | | | Possible crimi nal or disciplinary action is likely. | | | | | |
| 000 | 6 | Doomsday | Multiple instances of major systemic security breaches. Impact | | | | | |
| | | | duration cannot be de termined and senior management will be | | | | | |
| | | | required to place the company under voluntary administration or | | | | | |
| 000 | | | other form of major restructuring. Crimi nal proceedings against | | | | | |
| 86 | | | senior management is expected, and sub stantial loss of bus iness and | | | | | |
| | | | failure to meet organizational objectives is unavoidable. | | | | | |
| 88 | | | Tandie to meet organizational of each to it dim to rado to. | | | | | |

Determine Resultant Risk


| | | Consequences | | | | | | |
|----------|------------|--------------|--------------|-------|----------|-------|----------------------|--|
| Likelih | ood | Doomsday | Catastrophic | Major | Moderate | Minor | Insignificant | |
| Almost | | Е | Е | Е | Е | Н | Н | |
| Certain | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Likely | | Е | Е | Е | Н | Н | M | |
| Possible | e | Е | Е | Е | Н | M | L | |
| Unlikel | . y | Е | Е | Н | M | L | L | |
| Rare | | Е | Н | Н | M | L | L | |

| Risk Level | Description | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Extreme (E) | Will require detailed research and management planning at an executive/director | | | | | | |
| | level. Ongoing planning and monitoring will be required with regular reviews. | | | | | | |
| | Substantial adjustment of controls to manage the risk are expected, with costs | | | | | | |
| | pos sibly exceeding o riginal forecasts. | | | | | | |
| High (H) | Requires management attention, but management and planning can be left to senior | | | | | | |
| | project or team leaders. Ongo ing planning and monitoring with regular reviews are | | | | | | |
| | likely, though ad justment of controls are likely to be met from within existing | | | | | | |
| | resources. | | | | | | |
| Medium (M) Can be managed by existing specific monitoring and response procedures. | | | | | | | |
| | Management by employees is suitable with appropriate monitoring and reviews. | | | | | | |
| Low (L) | Can be managed through routine procedures. | | | | | | |

Document in Risk Register and Evaluate Risks

| Asset | Threat/ | Existing | Likelihood | Consequence | Level of | Risk |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|------------|-------------|----------|----------|
| | Vulnerability | Controls | | | Risk | Priority |
| Internet Router | Outside Hacker | Admin | Possible | Moderate | High | 1 |
| | attack | pas sword only | | | | |
| Destruction of Data | Accidental Fire or | None (no | Unlikely | Major | High | 2 |
| Center | Flood | disaster | | | | |
| | | recovery plan) | | | | |

Risk Treatment Alternatives



Risk Treatment Alternatives

- risk acceptance
- risk avoidance
- risk transferal
- reduce consequence
- reduce likelihood

Summary

- risk assessment is an important part of the IT security management process
- detailed risk assessment process involves
 - context including asset identification
 - identify threats, vulnerabilities, risks
 - analyse and evaluate risks
- deal with the risk assessment correctly