





Identifying and Authentication Protocols

- □ Authentication to verify an Identity.
- □ Main classes of Authentication in a distributed system:
 - Authentication of the contents of a message, i.e. verifying that the content is the same at receiving as at sending.
 - Authentication of the origins i of a message, i.e. verifying that the real sender of the message is the indicated sender.
 - Authentication of identities, i.e. verifying that an entity has the identity it claims.
- □ Authentication exists in the following combinations:
 - O Host Host.
 - User Host.
 - Process process.
- Client-server communication.
- Peer-to-peer communication.
- □ Authentication Protocol to execute authentication in a distributed system

Capability

- A Capability will normally be composed of a three part bit pattern:
 - a unique identifier for the object or resource that is associated with the capability,
 - a specification of the access rights to the object, e.g. one boolean bit for each allowed operation type,
 - a random number making it hard to guess the content of the capability and also to make a fraud.

This pattern will be encrypted so only the service giver can decrypt (read) it).

| Authentication Protocol | Cryptography | |
|---|--|--|
| Example: | | |
| Common login routine, e.g. like in UNIX: $\begin{array}{c} & & \\ \hline & & \\ & &$ | clear text $\xrightarrow{\text{encrypting function}}$ cryptogram $M' = E(\mathbf{k}_{\mathrm{E}}, M)$ | |
| $ \begin{array}{cccc} H & \rightarrow U & "Password?" \\ U & \rightarrow H & passwd \\ H & compute \lambda = f(passwd). \\ & Coimpare \lambda with what is stored in a special file, the "password-file". \\ & if equal:then start login shell \\ H & \rightarrow U & "%" \\ & else: abort login \end{array} $ | cryptogram $\xrightarrow{\text{decrypting function}} M = D(k_D, M')$ clear text | |
| | \Box symmetrical encrypting: $k_E = k_D$ | |
| | asymmetrical encrypting: $k_F \neq k_D$ | |
| 9 (33) - DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS Security - Sven Ame Andreasson - Computer Science and Engineering (i) Authentication Protocol using symmetrical encrypting (1) In the following we will use the following notation: | 10 (33) - DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS Security - Sven Ame Andreasson - Computer Science and Engineering 🛞 CHALMERS | |
| • m: Clear text message | Second try: | |
| <i>m</i>': Encrypted message <i>E</i> (<i>k</i>,<i>m</i>) : Encryption function with key <i>k</i>. <i>D</i> (<i>k</i>, <i>m</i>') : Decryption function with key <i>k</i>. | $\begin{array}{ccccc} P & \rightarrow Q & \text{"I am P"} \\ Q & \rightarrow P & ts //ts \text{ is a unique value read from the clock each time} \\ P & & & & & & \\ P & & & & & & \\ P & \rightarrow Q & ts' & = E(k, ts) \\ P & \rightarrow Q & ts' \\ Q & & & & & & & \\ \end{array}$ | |
| $\begin{array}{ccc} P & & & & \text{create } m = "1 \text{ am } P" \\ & & & & \text{compute } m' = E(k,m) \\ P & \rightarrow Q & & m,m' \\ Q & & & \text{verify that } D(k,m') = m \\ & & & \text{if equal then accept} \\ \hline & & & \text{else reject} \end{array}$ This protocol is vulnerable to replaying. | This protocol is secure but can not be used due to the problem to administer the many keys. There has to be one key for each pair of processes P and Q. | |
| | | |

| Three way Authentication Protocol | Authentication Protocol using asymmetrical encrypting Image: We will use the following notation: Image: Lew Encrypting law (multiple) | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| Third try: | | | |
| P \rightarrow Q "I am P" Q \rightarrow P ts P compute $ts' = E(k_Q, P, ts')$ Q \rightarrow Q Q \rightarrow A A retreive (P, ts') by decrypting: $D(k_Q, ts'')$ compute $ts''' = D(k_P, ts')$ (= ts) compute $ts''' = D(k_P, ts')$ (= ts) compute $m = E(k_Q, ts''')$ A \rightarrow Q M \forall verify $D(k_Q, m) = ts$ if equal then accept else reject | $\begin{array}{c} P & \rightarrow Q & \text{"I am P"} \\ Q & \rightarrow P & ts \\ P & \text{compute } ts' = E(ke_{p},ts) \\ P & \rightarrow Q & ts' \\ Q & \text{verify that } ts = D(kd_{p},ts') \\ & \text{if equal then accept} \\ & \text{else reject} \end{array}$ | | |
| 3 (33) - DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS Security - Sven Ame Andreasson - Computer Science and Engineering Authentication Protocol using asymmetrical encrypting Three Way | I4 (33) - DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS Security - Sven Ame Andreasson - Computer Science and Engineering Kerberos Image: Instrume the image of the | | |
| $\begin{array}{cccc} P & \rightarrow Q & \text{"I am P"} \\ Q & \rightarrow P & ts \\ p & & \text{compute } ts' = E(ke_{P},ts) \\ P & \rightarrow Q & ts' \\ Q & \rightarrow A & \text{"I need P's public key"} \\ A & & \text{retreive } kd_{P} \text{ from the database} \\ & & \text{compute } c = E(ke_{A},P,kd_{P}) \\ A & \rightarrow Q & P,c \\ Q & & \text{retreive } (P,kd_{P}) \text{ by decrypting: } D(kd_{A},c) \\ & & \text{verify } ts = D(kd_{P},ts') \\ & & \text{if equal then accept} \\ & & \text{else reject} \end{array}$ | Incket-granting server authentication server Two main protocols: The credential-initialization protocol. Authentication of users login in to the system. Is performed by the Kerberos authentication server. Certificated user will get a ticket-granting ticket. The client-server authentication protocol. Authentication of user processes that requests services over the network. The authentication is executed as a three part authentication between client, server, and Kerberos ticket-granting server. | | |

The credential-initialization protocol

- Use the following notation:
 - *L*: session key length of life
 - T: a timestamp

| U | \rightarrow H | U |
|------|--------------------|---|
| Н | \rightarrow Auth | U, TGS |
| Auth | | retreive $k_{\rm H}$ and $k_{\rm TGS}$ from the database |
| | | generate a session key k |
| | | create $tick_{TGS} = E(k_{TGS}, (U, TGS, k, T, L))$ |
| Auth | \rightarrow H | $E(k_{\rm II}, ({\rm TGS}, k, T, L, tick_{\rm TGS}))$ |
| Н | \rightarrow U | "Password?" |
| U | \rightarrow H | passwd |
| Н | | compute $\lambda = f(passwd)$ |
| | | decrypt $D(k_{\text{U}}, (\text{TGS}, k, T, L, tick_{\text{TGS}}))$ |
| | | with $\hat{\lambda}$ to obtain k, tick _{TGS} |
| | | if not succeed: |
| | | abort login |
| | | else |
| | | keep $tick_{TCS}$ and k . |
| | | erase $passwd_{II}$ from memory |
| | | |
| | | |

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Cryptography

private keys

symmetrical cryptographic algorithms

Pros:

- Fast encryption/decrypting
- Cheap encryption/decrypting
- Implemented in hardware

Cons:

- Must be frequently exchanged
- Must be transported in a safe manner

The client-server authentication protocol

| С | | \rightarrow TGS | S, $tick_{TGS}$, $E(k, (C, T_1))$ |
|---|----|-------------------|---|
| Т | GS | | retreive k from $tick_{\mathrm{TGS}}$ by decrypting with k_{TGS} |
| | | | retreive T_1 from $E(k, (C, T_1))$ by decrypting with k . |
| | | | test T_1 to the local clock |
| | | | create $tick_{S} = E(k_{S}, (C, S, k', T', L'))$ |
| Т | GS | \rightarrow C | $E(k, (S, k', T', L', tick_S))$ |
| C | | | retreive k' and $tick_{S}$ by decrypting with k . |
| C | | \rightarrow S | $tick_{S}$, $E(k', (C, T_2))$ |
| S | | | retreive k' from $tick_{S}$ by decrypting with k_{S} . |
| | | | retreive T_2 from $E(k', (C, T_2))$ by decrypting with k' . |
| | | | test T_2 to the local clock. |
| S | | \rightarrow C | $E(k', (T_2 + 1))$ |
| | | | |

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 public keys asymmetrical cryptographic algorithms
 Pros:

 Can be openly transported
 All can send encrypted to all others
 Doesn't need frequently exchange

 Cons:

 Slow encryption/decrypting
 Expensive encryption/decrypting
 Strategy:

 private key algorithm
 for normal data
 public key algorithm
 for distributing private keys







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