

# Software Engineering using Formal Methods Model Checking with Temporal Logic

Wolfgang Ahrendt & Wojciech Mostowski & Richard Bubel


20 September 2011

# Model Checking with Spin






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
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  - end labels
  - accept labels
  - progress labels




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
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- meta labels
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  - accept labels (briefly)
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- never claims (briefly)
- temporal logic formulas (today's main topic)

### **Preliminaries**

- 1. accept labels in Prometa  $\leftrightarrow$  Büchi automata
- 2. fairness

### **Definition (Accept Location)**

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A run which infinitely often passes through an accept location is called an acceptance cycle.

Acceptance cycles are mainly used in 'never claims' (see below), to define forbidden behavior of infinite kind.

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### **Definition (Weak Fairness)**

A run is called weakly fair iff the following holds: each continuously executable statement is executed eventually.

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Remark:

in this course, "temporal logic" is synonymous to "linear temporal logic" (LTL)

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Example: mutual exclusion expressed by adding assertion into *each* critical section.

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- no separation of concerns (model vs. correctness property)
- changing assertions is error prone (easily out of synch)
- easy to forget assertions: correctness property might be violated at unexpected locations
- many interesting properties not expressible via assertions

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#### **Absence of Starvation**

"If one process tries to enter its critical section, eventually that process does so."

all these are temporal properties  $\Rightarrow$  use temporal logic

# **Boolean Temporal Logic**

talking about numerical variables (like in critical <= 1 or 0 <= i <= len-1) requires variation of propositional temporal logic which we call Boolean temporal logic:

► Boolean expressions (over PROMELA variables), rather than *propositions*, form basic building blocks of the logic

# **Boolean Temporal Logic over PROMELA**

### **Set** For<sub>BTL</sub> **of Boolean Temporal Formulas** (simplified)

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
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- if  $\phi$  and  $\psi$  are formulas  $\in For_{BTL}$ , then all of

$$! \phi, \quad \phi \&\& \psi, \quad \phi \mid\mid \psi, \quad \phi \rightarrow \psi, \quad \phi \Longleftrightarrow \psi$$

$$[]\phi, \quad <>\phi, \quad \phi U \psi$$

are  $\in For_{RTI}$ 


#### A run $\sigma$ through a Promela model M is a chain of states



 $\mathcal{L}_j$  maps each running process to its current location counter. From  $\mathcal{L}_j$  to  $\mathcal{L}_{j+1}$ , only one of the location counters has advanced (exception: channel rendezvous).

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


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Evaluating other formulas  $\in For_{BTL}$  in runs  $\sigma$ : see previous lecture.

 $\operatorname{SPIN}$  supports Boolean temporal logic

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#### instead

Boolean expressions must be abbreviated using #define

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"it is guaranteed throughout each run that at most one process visits its critical section"

or equivalently:

"more than one process visiting its critical section will never happen"

# **Applying Temporal Logic to Critical Section Problem**

We want to verify '[](critical<=1)' as correctness property of: active proctype P() { do :: /\* non-critical activity \*/ atomic { !inCriticalQ; inCriticalP = truecritical++; /\* critical activity \*/ critical --; inCriticalP = false od/\* similarly for process Q \*/

## Model Checking a Safety Property with JSPIN

- 1. add '#define mutex (critical <= 1)' to PROMELA file
- 2. open PROMELA file
- 3. enter [] mutex in LTL text field
- **4.** select Translate to create a 'never claim', corresponding to the negation of the formula
- 5. ensure Safety is selected
- 6. select Verify
- 7. (if necessary) select Stop to terminate too long verification

### **Never Claims**

- ▶ a never claim tries to show the user wrong
- ▶ it defines, in terms of Promela, all violations of correctness property
- ▶ it is semantically equivalent to the negation of correctness property
- ▶ JSPIN adds the negation for you
- using SPIN directly, you have to add the negation yourself
- accept labels in never claims mark accepting states in the sense of Büchi automata

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- **3.** If

$$\mathcal{L}^{\omega}(\mathcal{M}) \cap \mathcal{L}^{\omega}(\mathcal{NC}_{\neg \phi}) = \emptyset$$

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- then  $\phi$  holds in  $\mathcal{M}$ , otherwise we have a counterexample.
- **4.** To check  $\mathcal{L}^{\omega}(\mathcal{M}) \cap \mathcal{L}^{\omega}(\mathcal{NC}_{\neg \phi})$  construct intersection automaton (both automata advance in each step) and search for accepting run.

# Model Checking a Safety Property with $\operatorname{Spin}$ directly

#### **Command Line Execution**

```
make sure '#define mutex (critical <= 1)' is in safety1.pml
> spin -a -f '!([] mutex)', safety1.pml
> gcc -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c
> ./pan
```

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"in each run, process P visits its critical section eventually"

# **Applying Temporal Logic to Starvation Problem**

We want to verify '<>csp' as correctness property of: active proctype P() { do :: /\* non-critical activity \*/ atomic { !inCriticalQ; inCriticalP = truecsp = true;/\* critical activity \*/ csp = false; inCriticalP = false od /\* similarly for process Q \*/ /\* here using csq

# Model Checking a Liveness Property with ${\tt JSPIN}$

- 1. open Promela file
- 2. enter <>csp in LTL text field
- select Translate to create a 'never claim', corresponding to the negation of the formula
- **4.** ensure that **Acceptance** is selected (SPIN will search for *accepting* cycles through the never claim)
- 5. for the moment uncheck Weak Fairness (see discussion below)
- select Verify

Verification fails.

Why?

Verification fails.

Why?

The liveness property on one process 'had no chance'.

Not even weak fairness was switched on!

### Model Checking Liveness with Weak Fairness!

Always switch Weak Fairness on when checking for liveness!

- 1. open Promela file
- 2. enter <>csp in LTL text field
- select Translate to create a 'never claim', corresponding to the negation of the formula
- **4.** ensure that **Acceptance** is selected (SPIN will search for *accepting* cycles through the never claim)
- 5. ensure Weak Fairness is checked
- select Verify

# Model Checking Lifeness with Spin directly

#### **Command Line Execution**

```
> spin -a -f '!<>csp' liveness1.pml
> gcc -o pan pan.c
> ./pan -a -f
```

Verification fails again.

Why?

Verification fails again.

Why?

Weak fairness is still too weak.

Verification fails again.

Why?

Weak fairness is still too weak.

Note that !inCriticalQ is not continuously executable!

### **Temporal MC Without Ghost Variables**

We want to verify mutual exclusion without using ghost variables

```
#define mutex !(P@cs && Q@cs)
bool inCriticalP = false, inCriticalQ = false;
active proctype P() {
  do :: atomic {
          !inCriticalQ;
          inCriticalP = true
        /* critical activity */
cs:
        inCriticalP = false
  od
}
/* similarly for process Q */
/* with same label cs:
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Verify 'Ilmutex' with JSPIN.
```

## Liveness again

- ► revisit fair.pml
- ▶ try to prove termination

#### Literature for this Lecture

Ben-Ari Chapter 5