

Secure Programming via Libraries

Secure Multi-Execution in Haskell

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
Enforcement for non-interference

- It is usually given as
 - Type-system
[Volpano Smith Irvine 96]
 - Monitor
[Volpano 99][Le Guernic et al. 06]
- Monitors are more permissive than traditional type-systems
[Sabelfeld, Russo 09]
- Inspection of the code is necessary

Secure Multi-Execution

[Devriese, Piessens 10]


- Black box approach to enforce non-interference
 - No need to inspect the code
 - Manipulate input and output (IO) operations



Secure Multi-Execution


[Devriese, Piessens 10]

- Execute the program once for each security level.
- *Outputs are only produced in the execution linked to their security level*
- *Inputs are replaced by default inputs in executions linked to security levels lower than the security level of the input*
- *The high execution reuses inputs obtained in the low execution*



Guarantees?


- Executed program satisfies non-interference
 - No explicit and implicit flows
- The secure multi-execution produces the same results
- Otherwise, the semantics changes to preserve security



Secure Multi-Execution in Haskell

[Jaskelioff, Russo 11]


- Clear separation of pure computations with those with side-effects
- Every computation with side-effects is encapsulated into the monad *IO*
- Identify where IO is performed



Secure Multi-Execution in Haskell

[Jaskelioff, Russo 11]

- For simplicity, consider IO operations on files
- Reading produces a visible side-effect for the attacker
 - Actualization of access time



Monad ME

- It models the IO operations in a pure manner
[Swierstra,Altenkirch 06]

```
data ME a      = Return a
                | Write FilePath String (ME a)
                | Read FilePath (String -> ME a)
```

```
writeFile      :: FilePath -> String -> ME ()
writeFile file s = Write file s (return ())
```


```
readFile      :: FilePath -> ME String
readFile file = Read file return
```


Monad ME


```
data ME a = Return a
          | Write FilePath String (ME a)
          | Read FilePath (String -> ME a)
```

```
instance Monad ME where
```

```
  return x = Return x
  (Return x) >>= f = f x
  (Write file s p) >>= f = Write file s (p >>= f)
  (Read file g) >>= f = Read file (\i -> g i >>= f)
```




Interpreter for ME



```

run :: Level -> ChanMatrix -> ME a -> IO a
run l _ (Return a) = return a
run l c (Write file o t)
  | level file == l = do IO.writeFile file o
                      run l c t
  | otherwise = run l c t
run l c (Read file f)
  | level file == l = do x <- IO.readFile file
                        broadcast c l file x
                        run l c (f x)
  | sless (level file) l = do x <- reuseInput c l file
                              run l c (f x)
  | otherwise = run l c (f (defvalue file))

defvalue :: FilePath -> String
  
```



Example Scenario

- Credit terms *discount / discount period net / credit period*
- Invoice 1000 can have the term **2/10 net/30**
 - 2% discount if you cancel the credit before 10 days
 - The total credit should be paid in 30 days
- **Financial company** wants to compute
 - Total interest paid by the customer
 - $loan - loan \times (1 - discount/100)$
 - $\$1000 - \$1000 \times (1 - .2) = \$20$
 - Cost of credit
 - $\frac{discount}{100 - discount} \times \frac{360}{credit\ period - discount\ period}$
 - $\frac{2}{98} \times \frac{360}{20} = .3673$

Example Scenario

- The financial company wants to preserve the confidentiality of their clients
 - *Amount of every loan is secret*
- The cost of credit is public information
 - It can be used for statistics
- Implement a calculator that computes the interested obtained as well as the costs of credit
 - Be sure that confidentiality is preserved

Security Policy

```
level :: FilePath -> Level
level "Client"           = H
level "Client-Terms"     = L
level "Client-Interest" = H
level "Client-Statistics" = L
level file                = error $ "File " ++ file ++
                                   " has no security level"
```

```
defvalue :: FilePath -> String
defvalue "Client"           = "0 % 1"
defvalue "Client-Interest" = "0 % 1"
defvalue f                  = error "No default value for " ++ f
```

Example: Code

```
data CreditTerms = CT { discount :: Rational,
                        ddays    :: Rational,
                        net       :: Rational }
    deriving Read

calculator :: ME ()
calculator =
    do loanStr    <- readFile "Client"
       termsStr   <- readFile "Client-Terms"
       let loan    = read loanStr
           terms   = read termsStr
           interest = loan - loan * (1 - discount terms / 100)
           disct   = discount terms / (100 - discount terms)
           ccost   = disct * 360 / (net terms - ddays terms)
       writeFile "Client-Interest" (show interest)
       writeFile "Client-Statistics" (show ccost)
```

- It looks like if it was implemented using IO
 - However, it uses the monad ME
- Does it work?

Example: Malicious Code

```
data CreditTerms = CT { discount :: Rational,
                        ddays    :: Rational,
                        net       :: Rational }
                        deriving Read

calculator :: ME ()
calculator =
  do loanStr    <- readFile "Client"
     termsStr   <- readFile "Client-Terms"
  let loan      = read loanStr
      terms     = read termsStr
      interest  = loan - loan * (1 - discount terms / 100)
      disct     = discount terms / (100 - discount terms)
      ccost     = disct * 360 / (net terms - ddays terms)
  writeFile "Client-Interest" (show interest)
  writeFile "Client-Statistics" (show loan)
```

- Secure Multi-Execution avoids the leak!
- Does it work?

Future Work

- Take Secure Multi-Execution in Haskell to a library
 - Easy map different IO actions into monad ME
 - Not only IO actions related to file operations
 - References
 - Sockets
 - Etc
- Declassification
 - Challenging subject
 - Difficult to enforce without braking the black-box approach
 - Open question

Final Remarks

- The first approach to consider secure multi-execution in Functional Programming
- Core part of Secure Multi-Execution (interpreter) fits in one slide
- Implementation is available on request
 - Approximately 130 lines of code
- Challenges
 - Secure Multi-Execution as a library
 - Declassification