

# Secure Programming via Libraries

A library for information-flow in Haskell  
(side-effects)

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# Side-effects?

[Russo, Claessen, Hughes 08]

- What about trying to do side-effects inside of the security monad?



Sec H (IO ())



- Would you run the IO computation?

# Malicious Code

- The following code shows malicious side-effects

```
func :: Sec H Char -> Sec H (IO ())
func sec_c = do c <- sec_c
              return $ do putStrLn "The secret is gone!"
                          writeFile "PublicFile" [c]
```

- Important Haskell feature for security: ***by looking the type of a piece of code, it is possible to determine if it performs side-effects!***

# Side-effects and Sec

- Trustworthy code

```
module SideEffectsSecT where

import Data.Char
import SecLib.LatticeLH
import SecLib.Trustworthy

import SideEffectsSecU (func) -- Import the untrustworthy function unsafe

secret :: Sec H Char          -- This is the secret to be manipulated by the
                             -- untrustworthy code
secret = return 'X'

execute :: IO ()
execute = reveal $ func secret
```

# Side-effects and Sec

- Untrustworthy code

```
module SideEffectsSecU where

import Data.Char
import SecLib.LatticeLH
import SecLib.Untrustworthy

-- Do not execute IO operations inside Sec!
func :: Sec H Char -> Sec H (IO ())
func sec_c = do c <- sec_c
               return $ do putStrLn "The secret is gone!"
                           writeFile "PublicFile" [c]
```

# Little Quiz

- What about programs of the following type?

NO

Sec H (IO (Sec L Int) )

NO

Sec H (Sec L (IO Char) )

NO

Sec L (Sec H (IO ()))

YES

Sec L (IO (Sec H Char) )

# Side-effects?

[Russo, Claessen, Hughes 08]

- What about trying to do side-effects inside of the security monad?



Sec H (IO ())



- We do not know if the side-effects are safe to perform
- What should we do?
- IO is a monad that encapsulates side-effects
- **Let us make another monad that encapsulates safe side-effects!**

# Monad SecIO

- It is a monad that performs secure side-effects
  - Side-effects that preserve confidentiality!

It is a computation that  
**a) can write to security locations above s and**  
**b) which result, of type a, has confidentiality**  
**level at least a**

```
data SecIO s a -- abstract  
instance Monad (SecIO s)
```



# Monad SecIO

- We show how it works for files
  - It also works for references and sockets (check the library)

**data** SecIO s a

It is a computation that  
**a) can write to security locations above s and  
b) which result, of type a, has confidentiality  
level at least a**

c1 :: SecIO H **Int**

It can write to secret files and returns  
a secret integer

c2 :: SecIO L (Sec H **Int**)

It can write to public and secret files  
and returns a secret integer

c3 :: SecIO L **Int**

It can write to public and secret files  
and returns public integer

# API for SecIO

```
data SecIO s a  
instance Monad (SecIO s)
```

```
type File s
```

It is a file which content has confidentiality level s

The secure version of the operations to read and write files in Haskell

```
readFileSecIO :: File s -> SecIO s' (Sec s String)
```

```
writeFileSecIO :: File s -> String -> SecIO s ()
```

```
readFile :: FilePath -> IO String
```

```
writeFile :: FilePath -> String -> IO ()
```


# API for SecIO

```
value :: Sec s a -> SecIO s a
```

It pushes any pure secure value into a side-effectful computation

```
plug :: Less sl sh =>  
      SecIO sh a -> SecIO sl (Sec sh a)
```

It plugs computations that perform side-effects at a higher level into computations that perform side-effect into lower levels



*-- Used in trustworthy code*

```
revealSecIO :: SecIO s a -> IO (Sec s a)
```

# Small Example

- We want to write a function that copy contents of files
- We do not want *the function to leak information*
- The function should allow copying:
  - a public file into another public file,
  - a secret file into another secret file,
  - a public one into a secret one
- It must avoid *copying a secret file into a public one*
- We will use the library to get the security part of the code right!

# Small Example: Trustworthy code

```
module CopyT where
```

```
import SecLib.LatticeLH
import SecLib.Trustworthy
```

```
import CopyU (copy)
```

```
secret_file :: File H
secret_file = mkFile "SecretFile"
```

```
public_file :: File L
public_file = mkFile "PublicFile"
```

```
trusted_copy :: Less s s' => (File s -> File s' -> SecIO s' ())
               -> File s -> File s' -> IO ()
```

```
trusted_copy copy_func fs fs' = do sec <- revealIO $ copy_func fs fs'
                                   return $ reveal sec
```

```
execute :: IO ()
```

```
execute = trusted_copy copy public_file secret_file
```

It imports the untrustworthy copying function

It establishes the confidentiality level of the files

Type for the untrustworthy copying function

It executes the untrustworthy function. Does it preserve confidentiality?

# Small Example: Untrustworthy code

```
module CopyU where
```

```
import SecLib.LatticeLH
```

```
import SecLib.Untrustworthy
```

```
copy :: Less s s' => File s -> File s' -> SecIO s' ()
copy file1 file2 = do sec_str <- readFileSecIO file1
                      str      <- value (up sec_str)
                      writeFileSecIO file2 str
```

It provides a function with the type requested by module CopyT

- Can you write the function above in such a way that copies the content of a secret file into a public one?
  - Try it out!
- The type-checker will not allow it

# Constructing a Secure Password Administrator

- Linux Password Administrator


- /etc/passwd

```
bjorn:x:1003:100::/home/andrei:/bin/bash
hana:x:500:100::/home/tsa:
josef:x:1006:100::/home/john:/bin/bash
```

- /etc/shadow

```
bjorn:$1$0ID5oZxB$0tdKR1VQWWQlkJR1Uj7na0:13397:0:99999:7:::
hana:$1$.28fO/M9$aaNMN4SWEKZiGPYoeq9996:13460:0:0:0:0
josef:$1$UP1uD.28$hi3vYEa20.zgWYNVN/Lq81:13539:0:99999:7:::
```

- Linux Shadow Password HOWTO: Adding shadow support to a C program



Adding shadow support to a program is actually fairly straightforward. The only problem is that the program must be run by root (or SUID root) in order for the the program to be able to **access** the /etc/shadow file.

# Password Administrator




- What are the security concerns?
  - Give root permission to a program that only needs to authenticate a user
  - Password might be leaked (un)intentionally (dictionary attacks)
- Linux provides an API to access `/etc/shadow`

```
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#include <shadow/pwauth.h>
#endif
```
- **File `/etc/shadow` can be accessed by other means (not only by the API)**
- We assume the opposite (e.g. in kernel space, remote server, etc)




# More graphically



	Required root access	Confidentiality
<b>C program + shadow.h</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
<b>Haskell program + SecLib</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b>

# Password Administrator

- Let us implement the API in Haskell
  - Recall that shadow passwords are only accessible via the API
- The module structure of the API



# GenericAPI

```
module GenericAPI
  ( getSpwdName, putSpwd, getNames )
```

```
where
```

```
import Spwd
```

```
type UID      = Int
type Cypher   = String
type Name     = String

data Spwd = Spwd { uid :: UID, cypher :: Cypher }
```

```
getSpwdName :: FilePath -> FilePath -> Name -> IO (Maybe Spwd)
```

Store for user information

Store for password

```
putSpwd :: FilePath -> Spwd -> IO ()
```

Store for password

```
getNames :: FilePath -> IO [Name]
```

Store for user information

# API

```
module API
(
    getSpwdName
  , putSpwd
  , getNames
)
where

import Spwd
import qualified GenericAPI as GenericAPI (getSpwdName, putSpwd, getNames)

passwd :: FilePath
passwd = "./passwd"

shadow :: FilePath
shadow = "./shadow"

getSpwdName :: Name -> IO (Maybe Spwd)
getSpwdName = GenericAPI.getSpwdName passwd shadow

putSpwd :: Spwd -> IO ()
putSpwd = GenericAPI.putSpwd shadow

getNames :: IO [Name]
getNames = GenericAPI.getNames passwd
```

Store of user information


Store for passwords

The module applies the generic API interface to specific stores

# Implementing getSpwdName

- Some internals of the implementation
  - It is not the most advance password administrator
  - You can do it better!
  - It is only for pedagogical purposes

```
parse_passwd :: FilePath -> IO [(Name, UID)]
```



```
parse_shadow :: FilePath -> IO [(UID, Cypher)]
```

# Implementing getSpwdName

```
getSpwdName :: FilePath -> FilePath -> Name -> IO (Maybe Spwd)
getSpwdName passwd shadow user =
  do pw <- parse_passwd passwd
     sh <- parse_shadow shadow
     case lookup user pw of
       Nothing -> return Nothing
       Just id  -> return $ Just (case lookup id sh of
                                   Nothing -> error "Error!"
                                   Just c  -> Spwd { uid = id ,
                                                    cypher = c})
```

pw :: [(Name, UID)]

sh :: [(UID, Cypher)]

```
parse_passwd :: FilePath -> IO [(Name, UID)]
parse_shadow :: FilePath -> IO [(UID, Cypher)]
```

# Using the API

- Programs using that API can build up more sophisticated functions

```
module Auxiliaries where
```

```
import Data.Maybe
```

```
import Spwd
```

```
import API
```

```
-- Function to suggest a user name
```

```
suggest_name :: Name -> IO Name
```

```
suggest_name name =
```

```
  do ns <- getNames
```

```
     case (name `elem` ns) of
```

```
       False -> return name
```

```
       True  -> return $ fst $ head
```

```
         $ filter (\(_,b) -> b == False)
```

```
           [ (name', name' `elem` ns)
```

```
             | n <- [0..], let name' = name ++ show n]
```

- How does it work?

- User “david” is in the system, then it suggests “david0”. If “david0” is in the system, then it suggests “david1”, etc.
- Could someone implement some unintended behaviour in this function?

# Using the API

```
suggest_name :: Name -> IO Name
suggest_name name =
  do ns <- getNames
     f ns
  case (name `elem` ns) of
    False -> return name
    True  -> return $ fst $ head
                $ filter (\(_,b) -> b == False)
                [ (name', name' `elem` ns)
                  | n <- [0..], let name' = name ++ show n ]
```

What is this?

```
f :: [Name] -> IO ()
f ns = do lst <- f' ns
        writeFile "foo" (show lst)
        return ()

where f' []      = return []
      f' (n:ns) = do spwd <- getSpwdName n
                    lst  <- f' ns
                    return $ (n, (cypher $ fromJust spwd)) : lst
```

It is copying the passwords to a file



# Modifying the API?

- We see two versions of `suggest_name`
  - Built on the password administrator API
- To identify the one violating confidentiality, we looked at the code and think for a bit
  - *Code revision*
- Let us use the `SecLib` to automatically enforce confidentiality
  - In that manner, we do not need to do code review!
  - Of course, we still need to do testing for correctness

# Marking the Secret Data

- How do we start?
  - Indicating which are the secrets (passwords) in our program

```
type UID      = Int
type Cypher   = String
type Name     = String

data Spwd = Spwd { uid :: UID, cypher :: Cypher }
```



```
type UID      = Int
type Cypher   = String
type Name     = String

data Spwd = Spwd { uid :: UID, cypher :: Sec H Cypher }
```

# GenericAPI: Secure Version

```
module GenericAPI
  ( getSpwdName, putSpwd, getNames )
where
import SecLib.LatticeLattice
import SecLib.Untrustworthy
import Spwd

type UID      = Int
type Cypher   = String
type Name     = String

data Spwd = Spwd { uid :: UID, cypher :: Sec H Cypher }

-- getSpwdName :: FilePath -> FilePath -> Name -> IO (Maybe Spwd)
-- putSpwd    :: FilePath -> Spwd -> IO ()
-- getNames   :: FilePath -> IO [Name]
```

```
getSpwdName :: File L -> File H -> Name -> SecIO s (Maybe Spwd)
```

Store for user information

Store for password

This function does not write to any file

```
putSpwd :: File H -> Spwd -> SecIO H ()
```

Store for password

This function writes to a secret file

```
getNames :: File L -> SecIO s [Name]
```

This function does not write to any file

# API: Secure Version

```
module API
  (
    getSpwdName
  , putSpwd
  , getNames
  )
where

import Spwd
import qualified GenericAPI as GenericAPI (getSpwdName, putSpwd, getNames)

import SecLib.Trustworthy
import SecLib.LatticeLH

passwd :: File L
passwd = mkFile "./passwd"

shadow :: File H
shadow = mkFile "./shadow"

getSpwdName :: Name -> SecIO s (Maybe Spwd)
getSpwdName = GenericAPI.getSpwdName passwd shadow

putSpwd :: Spwd -> SecIO H ()
putSpwd = GenericAPI.putSpwd shadow

getNames :: SecIO s [Name]
getNames = GenericAPI.getNames passwd
```

This module is trustworthy

It assigns the security level of each store. That is why this module is trustworthy!

As the unsecure version but it returns a SecIO instead as IO

# Summarizing

- We have a new API

```
data Spwd = Spwd { uid :: UID, cypher :: Sec H Cypher }
```

```
getSpwdName :: Name -> SecIO s (Maybe Spwd)
```

```
putSpwd :: Spwd -> SecIO H ()
```

```
getNames :: SecIO s [Name]
```

- Any program that wants to use the API needs to use SecLib
- Confidentiality is then provided!
  - No need for root permission



# Using the Secure API

- Remember the *well-behaved* function to suggest a user name?
  - Let us try to reimplemented using the secure API

```
module Auxiliaries where
```

```
import Data.Maybe
import Spwd
import API
```

```
-- Function to suggest a user name
suggest_name :: Name -> SecIOms Name
suggest_name name =
```

```
  do ns <- getNames
```

```
     case (name `elem` ns) of
```

```
       False -> return name
```

```
       True  -> return $ fst $ head
```

```
         $ filter (\(_,b) -> b == False)
```

```
           [ (name', name' `elem` ns)
```

```
             | n <- [0..], let name' = name ++ show n]
```



It is almost the same!

# Using the Secure API

- Remember the *bad-behaved* function to suggest a user name?

```
suggest_name :: Name -> IO Name
suggest_name name =
  do ns <- getNames
     f ns
  case (name `elem` ns) of
    False -> return name
    True  -> return $ fst $ head
                  $ filter (\(_,b) -> b ==
                  [ (name' `elem` ns)
                  | n <- ns ], let name' = name ++ show n ]

f :: [Name] -> IO ()
f ns = do lst <- f' ns
        writeFile "foo" (show lst)
        return ()

where f' [] = return []
      f' (n:ns) = do spwd <- getSpwdName n
                    lst <- f' ns
                    return $ (n, (cypher $ fromJust spwd)) : lst
```

**It will not work!**

It is not possible to write a value of type `Sec H Cypher` into a public file

The result of `f'` is a list of type `[(Name, Sec H Cypher)]` instead of `[(Name, Cypher)]`

# Implementing the Secure API (getSpwdName)

- Recall

```
data Spwd = Spwd { uid :: UID, cypher :: Sec H Cypher }
```

```
getSpwdName :: Name -> SecIO s (Maybe Spwd)
```

```
putSpwd :: Spwd -> SecIO H ()
```

```
getNames :: SecIO s [Name]
```

- We set up the types of the secure API
- How do we implement it?
  - We will see how to do one of the primitives (the rest is homework!)



# Implementing Secure Version of getSpwdName

```
getSpwdName :: FilePath -> FilePath -> Name -> SecIOOs (Maybe Spwd)
```

```
getSpwdName passwd shadow user =
```

```
  do pw <- parse_passwd passwd  
     sh <- parse_shadow shadow
```

```
  case lookup user pw of  
    Nothing -> return Nothing  
    Just id  -> return $ Just
```

pw :: [(Name, UID)]

sh :: Sec H [(UID, Cypher)]

```
  (case lookup id sh of  
   Nothing -> error "Error!"  
   Just c  -> Spwd { uid = id ,  
                     cypher = c})
```

```
parse_passwd :: FilePath -> SecIOName (Name, UID)
```

```
parse_shadow :: FilePath -> SecIOUSD (Spwd H [(UID, Cypher)])
```

We need to adapt these functions as well! (homework)

# Implementing Secure Version of getSpwdName

```
getSpwdName :: FilePath -> FilePath -> Name -> IO (Maybe Spwd)
```

```
getSpwdName passwd shadow user =
```

```
  do pw <- parse_passwd passwd  
     sh <- parse_shadow shadow
```

```
  case lookup user pw of  
    Nothing -> return Nothing  
    Just id  -> return $ Just (
```

pw :: [(Name, UID)]

```
      case lookup id sh of  
        Nothing -> error "Error!"  
        Just c  -> Spwd { uid = id ,  
                          cypher = c})
```

sh :: Sec H [(UID, Cypher)]

```
parse_passwd :: FilePath -> IO [(Name, UID)]
```

```
parse_shadow :: FilePath -> IO [(UID, Cypher)]
```

We need to adapt these functions as well! (homework)

# Implementing Secure Version of getSpwdName

```
getSpwdName :: File L -> File H -> Name -> SecIO s (Maybe Spwd)
```

```
getSpwdName passwd shadow user =
```

```
  do pw <- parse_passwd passwd  
     sh <- parse_shadow shadow
```

```
  case lookup user pw of  
    Nothing -> return Nothing  
    Just id  -> return $ Just
```

pw :: [(Name, UID)]

sh :: Sec H [(UID, Cypher)]

```
  (case lookup id sh of  
    Nothing -> error "Error!"  
    Just c  -> Spwd { uid = id ,  
                      cypher = c})
```

```
parse_passwd :: File L -> SecIO s [(Name, UID)]
```

```
parse_shadow :: File H -> SecIO s (Sec H [(UID, Cypher)])
```

We need to adapt these functions as well! (homework)

# Implementing Secure Version of getSpwdName

```
getSpwdName :: File L -> File H -> Name -> SecIO s (Maybe Spwd)
```

```
getSpwdName passwd shadow user =
```

```
  do pw <- parse_passwd passwd  
     sec_sh <- parse_shadow shadow
```

```
  case lookup user pw of  
    Nothing -> return Nothing  
    Just id  -> return $
```

```
    Just $ Spwd { uid = id ,  
                  cypher =
```

```
sh :: Sec H [(UID, Cypher)]
```

pw :: [(Name, UID)]

SecIO

```
do sh <- sec_sh  
  case lookup id sh of  
    Nothing -> error "Error!"  
    Just c   -> return c }
```

Sec H

```
parse_passwd :: File L -> SecIO s [(Name, UID)]
```


```
parse_shadow :: File H -> SecIO s (Sec H [(UID, Cypher)])
```

We need to adapt these functions as well! (homework)

# General Guidelines

- Take a non-secure version of some code that you wrote
- Indicate in your program (datatypes and API) which data is confidential
  - As we did with `Spwd` and `getSpwdName`
- Indicate the confidentiality level of your external resources
  - As we did with files `passwd` and `shadow`
- Once the types are in place (`Sec H`, `SecIO s`, `SecIO L`) just adapt the code to type-check!

# Declassification



# Declassification


[Sabelfeld, Sands 07]

- Login program: it is necessary to leak information that depends on secrets
  - `cypher spwd == input_user`
- Dimensions and principles of declassification
  - **What** information can be leak?
  - **When** can information be leaked?
  - **Where** in the program is safe to leak information?
  - **Who** can leak information?
- How to be certain that our programs leak what they are supposed to leak?

# Declassification in the Library

- The library handle different kind of *declassification policies*
- *Declassification policies are programs!*
  - Trustworthy code defines them
  - Controlled at run-time

```
module DeclPolicies where  
import SecLib.Trustworthy  
...
```



```
module X where  
import SecLib.Untrustworthy  
...
```



# Declassification in the Library

- The library defines *combinators* for different declassification policies (**what, when, who**)
  - It is possible to combine dimension of declassification
  - “When event X happens, you can declassify information Y provided that the code is running by Z”
- In the course: **what**

# Escape Hatches

- Declassification is performed by functions
  - Terminology: *escape hatches* [Sabelfeld, Myers 04]
- In the library: a escape hatch is just a function of type

Less s1 sh => Sec sh a -> SecIO s (Sec s1 b)

It indicates that information can flow to the lower levels in the lattice

We leave this type “free” (see later)

# About the Type for Espace Hatches

- Why `SecIO`?

Less `s1 sh => Sec sh a -> SecIO s (Sec s1 b)`

There is an **internal state** that determines if declassification can proceed

- Why `s` is “free”?
  - The state might change when applying a escape hatch. However, that change can only be *observed if declassification fails or succeed*.
  - *Since we are termination-insensitive is like no-effect is produced*

# Some Declassification Combinators

- Base combinator
  - It always succeed in declassifying

```
hatch :: Less s1 sh =>  
      (a -> b) -> Sec sh a -> SecIO s (Sec s1 b)
```

It applies an arbitrary function

- What combinator (how often)

```
ntimes :: Int -> (Sec sh a -> SecIO s (Sec s1 b))  
       -> IO (Sec sh a -> SecIO s (Sec s1 b))
```

Escape hatch

How many times can be applied per run

It creates a counter

# Module Login (Trustworthy)

---

- This module sets up
  - The confidentiality level of the resources (stdin/stdout)
  - The escape hatches
- It calls the untrustworthy module that implements the login
  - We assume that the login function provided by the untrustworthy module fulfill its specification, but we want to guarantee that it is also secure.

# Module Login (Trustworthy)

```
module Login (login) where
```

```
import Spwd
```

```
import qualified ULogin as ULogin (login)
```

```
import SecLib.Trustworthy
```

```
import SecLib.LatticeLH
```

```
check :: Sec H (String, Cypher) -> SecIO s (Sec L Bool)  
check = hatch \(input, key) -> input == key
```

```
check3 :: IO (Sec H (String, Cypher) -> SecIO s (Sec L Bool))  
check3 = ntimes 3 check
```

```
screen :: Screen L  
screen = mkScreen ()
```

Escape hatch to declassify if the input provided matches the password

The escape hatch can only be applied, at most, 3 times per run

stdin/stdout is a public channel

# Module Login (Trustworthy)

```
safe_login :: ( Screen L
               -> (Sec H (String, Cypher) -> SecIO s (Sec L Bool))
               -> SecIO L ()
             )
           -> IO ()
```

The type of the function provided by the untrustworthy

```
safe_login expected_login = do esc_hatch <- check3
                               run $ expected_login screen esc_hatch
                               return ()
```

```
login = safe_login ULogin.login
```

It provides with the screen and escape hatch to the untrustworthy login

# Module Ulogin (Untrustworthy)

```
login :: Screen L
      -> (Sec H (String, Cypher) -> SecIO L (Sec L Bool))
      -> SecIO L ()

login scr eh
  = do putStrLnSecIO scr "Welcome!"
       putStrSecIO scr "login:"
       user <- getLineSecIO scr
       spwd <- getSpwdName user
       case spwd of
         Nothing      -> putStrLnSecIO scr "Invalid user!"
         Just spwd    -> do b <- verify 3 spwd scr eh
                          if b then putStrLnSecIO scr "Launching shell!"
                              else error "Access denied!"
```

- Very similar to a login function written without `SecIO`



# Module Ulogin (Untrustworthy)

```
verify 0 _scr _ =
  do putStrLnSecIO scr "Maximum number of tries reached!"
  return False
verify (n+1) spwd scr eh =
  do putStrLnSecIO scr "password:"
  p <- getLineSecIO scr
  sec_l <- eh (do c <- cypher spwd
                 return (p,c) )

  let result = public sec_l
  if result then return True
  else do putStrLnSecIO scr "Invalid password!"
         verify n spwd scr eh
```

It applies the escape hatch

Put together the password and the input provided by the user into Sec **H**

# Function login

- What do we know about it?

`module Login (login) where`

- It preserves confidentiality (non-interference) but allows to declassify some information
  - Escape hatch
- Login cannot, for example, send the password into a public file
- Login cannot apply the escape hatch more than 3 times
  - Limit the number of bits to be leaked per run

# SecLib: Pros

- Provides confidentiality
  - Type-system and abstraction provided by the module system in Haskell
- Only check types and some imports (no code revision)
- Light-weight library (342 LOC)
  - Polymorphic secure code for free!
- Promise to be practical
  - Simple (Monads)
  - Side-effects: files, references, stdin/stdout, etc.
- Support for declassification
  - It is the most experimental part of the library
  - Room for innovation here!

# SecLib: Cons

- Static security lattice
  - Dynamic security levels?
  - Mutual-distrust environments
- Timing channel
  - Usually a difficult channel to close up
- It relies on Haskell's type-safety (no cheating) and that abstraction is respected (modules system)
  - **SafeHaskell** is coming soon!