Univalent Foundation and Constructive Mathematics

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References on univalent foundation

- V. Voevodsky Univalent foundation home page and "Experimental library of univalent foundation of mathematics"
- B. Ahrens. C. Kapulkin, M. Shulman "Univalent categories and the Rezk completion"
 - D. Grayson Foundations. Ktheory

The Univalent Foundation Program

Homotopy Type Theory: Univalent foundation of mathematics

References on constructive mathematics

- R. Mines, F. Richman and W. Ruitenburg A Course in Constructive Algebra
 - H. Lombardi home page
- H. Lombardi and C. Quitté Algèbre commutative: méthodes constructives

Content of the lectures

4 first lectures: introduction to univalent foundation

Roughly cover the first 4 chapters of the Univalent Foundation Program book

2 last lectures: semantics, groupoid model, presheaf models

The goal is to design a suitable formal system for expressing and *checking* mathematical proofs on a computer

These issues have close connections with *proof theory* and *foundation of mathematics*

Traditionally, this interaction has been going in one direction

I will present a *new vision on the foundations of mathematics* suggested by the quest of a good formal system for expressing mathematical proofs

In particular, new insight on one of the most basic notion of mathematics the notion of *equality*

Current existing foundations

- (1) Set theory: ZFC
- \rightarrow system MIZAR
- (2) Category theory

"It is extremely difficult to accept that mathematics is in need of a completely new foundation ..."

"There is a good reason it is difficult: the existing foundation of mathematics -ZFC, and its main contender for a new foundation -category theory, have been very successful"

It is overcoming the appeal of category theory as a candidate for a new foundation of mathematics that was for me personally most difficult

V. Voevodsky

Any mathematical object is an "object of" a category

Any mathematical object is an "object of" a category

Any mathematical object is an object of a type

Any mathematical object is an "object of" a category

Any mathematical object is an object of a type

Any type comes with its own notion of equality

- (3) Type theory: mostly unknown among mathematicians (some exceptions: A. Turing, N.G. de Bruijn, T. Hales, V. Voevodsky)
 - → systems HOL, Isabelle, Idris, Coq, Agda
 - 1908 Russell Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types
 - 1940 Church A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types

Uses λ -calculus notation

Notation which is at the basis of functional programming (LISP,Scheme, Miranda, O'Caml, Haskell) and denotational semantics

Through the work of P.J. Landin, this calculus is very appropriate to describe many features of programming languages

In set theory, a function is essentially a functional graph a "static" notion

Through λ -calculus, we can represent functions as programs

Simple types: a type o which represents the type of "propositions"

A type \(\begin{aligned}
\text{which represents the type of "individuals"}
\end{aligned}

Function type: $\alpha \to \beta$, or $(\beta)\alpha$ in Church's notation

Such a type system is essentially the one used in O'Caml or Haskell

Addition of type variables; already suggested in R. Gandy's PhD thesis 1952

Two notions of functions: functional graph or program

How to connect the two notions?

Any functional graph has to determine a program

Description operator $\iota x.\varphi$ and axiom

$$(\exists!x:\alpha)\varphi \rightarrow \varphi(\iota x.\varphi)$$

We then have the "axiom of unique choice"

$$(\forall x : \alpha)(\exists ! y : \beta)\psi(x, y) \rightarrow (\exists f : (\beta)\alpha)(\forall x : \alpha)\psi(x, f(x))$$

To use $(\exists !x : \alpha)\varphi$ assumes that we have a notion of equality on the type α

In *set theory*, the axiom of extensionality states that two sets are equal if they have the same(!) elements

In Church's system we have two form of the axiom of extensionality

10° two equivalent propositions are equal

$$(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow \varphi = \psi$$

 $10^{lphaeta}$ two pointwise equal functions are equal

$$((\forall x : \alpha) \ f(x) = g(x)) \rightarrow f = g$$

Church notices that 10° allows to identify classes with propositional functions

Equality x = y is defined as

$$(\forall P: \alpha \to o) \ P \ x \to P \ y$$

x = y is of type o if x y are of type α

 $\varphi \equiv \psi$ is defined to be $\varphi \rightarrow \psi \wedge \psi \rightarrow \varphi$

We can rewrite the extensionality axioms

$$(\varphi = \psi) \equiv (\varphi \equiv \psi)$$

$$(f = g) \equiv ((\forall x : \alpha) \ f(x) = g(x))$$

In Church's system equality x = y is defined as

$$(\forall P: \alpha \to o) \ P \ x \to P \ y$$

Henkin, and then P. Andrews, gave alternative presentations of type theory taking equality as primitives

Cf. Lambek and Scott "Introduction to Higher-Order Categorical Logic"

One can *justify* these axioms by *defining* equality by induction on the types In set theory, one can also interpret the extensionality axiom

Can we justify/explain the operation $\iota x.\varphi$?

How to "explain" logical laws

1908 Russell Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types
1940 Church A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types
1973 Martin-Löf An Intuitionistic Theory of Types: Predicative Part
(Curry, de Bruijn, Howard, Tait, Scott, Martin-Löf, Girard, ...)
To consider propositions as types

How to "explain" logical laws

This "explains" some logical laws such as

modus-ponens: from $A \rightarrow B$ and A we can deduce B

introduction: if we can deduce B from A we can deduce $A \rightarrow B$

This reduces the problem of proof-checking to the problem of type-checking

Introduction of dependent type B (x:A) and dependent product $(\Pi x:A)B$ and dependent sum $(\Sigma x:A)B$

In type theory and therefore in Univalent Foundations the fundamental notion is that of a dependent function, not of a "straight" function, and this is what makes the whole system successful

Type system

We can also introduce a notion of "disjoint sum"

The elements are inl(a) with a in A or inr(b) with b in B

We can define function by cases

We can also introduce data types like the type of natural numbers

This strengthens the connection with programming languages constructors corresponds to introduction rules

Type of propositions

A proposition is a (special kind of) type

For the type of proposition we need a "type of types"

Universe *U*

What is the equality on U?

When are two types equal?

Rules for equality

P. Martin-Löf (1973) introduces a primitive notion of equality $Eq_A(a_0, a_1)$

What are the laws?

Any element is equal to itself $1_a : Eq_A(a, a)$

Leibnitz's law C(a) implies C(x) if $p : Eq_A(a, x)$

Rules for equality

New law

$$\mathsf{J}(d): (\Pi x_0 \ x_1:A)(\Pi p: \mathsf{Eq}_A(x_0,x_1))C(x_0,x_1,p)$$

given $d: (\Pi x: A)C(x, x, 1_x)$

Computation rule: $J(d) x x 1_x = d x$

This generalizes

$$(\forall x \ y) \mathsf{Eq}_A(x,y) \to C(x,y) \ \mathsf{given} \ (\forall x) C(x,x)$$

Strengthening similar to the one for existence and disjunction

Rules for equality

Other formulation

$$\mathsf{J}'(d): (\Pi x:A)(\Pi p:\mathsf{Eq}_A(a,x))C(x,p)$$

given $d:C(a,1_a)$

Computation rule: J'(d) a $1_a = d$

This generalizes

$$(\forall x) \mathsf{Eq}_A(a,x) \to C(x) \text{ given } C(a)$$

Problem: are these two formulations equivalent?

The singleton law

A.k.a. the "vacuum cleaner power chord principle"

The type $S_a = (\Sigma x : A) \mathsf{Eq}_A(a, x)$ has for element (x, p) with $p : \mathsf{Eq}_A(a, x)$

In particular it has for element $(a, 1_a)$

Singleton Law $(\Pi z: S_a) \mathsf{Eq}_{S_a}((a, 1_a), z)$

This follows from the first formulation, and this implies the second formulation

(The fact that the two formulations are equivalent was considered to be a tricky result before work on univalent foundations)

New logical law for equality (unknown until 1973)!

The singleton law

"Indeed, to apply Leray's theory I needed to construct fibre spaces which did not exist if one used the standard definition. Namely, for every space X, I needed a fibre space E with base X and with trivial homotopy (for instance contractible). But how to get such a space? One night in 1950, on the train bringing me back from our summer vacation, I saw it in a flash: just take for E the space of paths on X (with fixed origin E), the projection $E \to X$ being the evaluation map: path E0 extremity of the path. The fibre is then the loop space of E1. I had no doubt: this was it! ... It is strange that such a simple construction had so many consequences."

As soon as we introduce $\mathsf{Eq}_A(x,y)$ as a type we can iterate this operation

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{\mathsf{Eq}_A(x,y)}(p,q)$$

A type A is a proposition

$$(\Pi x_0 \ x_1 : A) \mathsf{Eq}_A(x_0, x_1)$$

A type A is a set

```
(\Pi x_0 \ x_1 : A) \mathsf{prop}(\mathsf{Eq}_A(x_0, x_1))
```

a.k.a UIP(A) "Uniqueness of Identity Proof"

Question (around 1991): is any type a set?

It seems possible to show

```
(\Pi \ x : A)(\Pi p : \mathsf{Eq}_A(x,x))\mathsf{Eq}(1_x,p)
```

and it is instructive to understand where is the problem with this

This statement is actually equivalent to UIP(A)

 N_1 is a proposition

 N_0 is a proposition

A is a groupoid

```
(\Pi x_0 \ x_1 : A) \mathsf{set}(\mathsf{Eq}_A(x_0, x_1))
```

Theorem: any type satisfies the groupoid laws

Follows from the singleton law

Application: $\mathsf{UIP}(A)$ iff each $\mathsf{Eq}_A(a,a)$ has one element

Theorem: any function $f: A \rightarrow B$ satisfies the functorial laws

Any $f: A \rightarrow B$ defines

 $\mathsf{pMap}(f) : \mathsf{Eq}_A(a_0, a_1) \to \mathsf{Eq}_B(f \ a_0, f \ a_1)$

We can define 2-groupoids, 3-groupoids, ...

Type theory appears to be a generalization of set theory

Properties of Equality

$$1_a : \mathsf{Eq}_A(a,a)$$

$$\mathsf{transp}: C(a) \to \mathsf{Eq}_A(a,x) \to C(x)$$

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{C(a)}(\mathsf{transp}\ u\ 1_a, u)$$

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{(\Sigma x:A)\mathsf{Eq}_A(a,x)}((a,1_a),(x,p))$$

Univalence Axiom

Constructive mathematics

Let N_k be the data type with k element

Let N be the data type of natural numbers

The type N_0 represents the empty type/the absurd proposition

Let $\neg A$ be the type $A \rightarrow N_0$

We say that A is "decidable" $A + \neg A$

A type A is discrete if each type $Eq_A(x, y)$ is decidable

Proposition: The types N_k and the type N are discrete

Hedberg's Theorem

Theorem: (Hedberg, 1996) Any discrete type is a set

Lemma: If we have an operation f p : $Eq_A(x,y)$ for p : $Eq_A(x,y)$ then Eq(f p, (f $1) \cdot p)$ for any p : $Eq_A(x,y)$

Lemma: If C is decidable we can define $f:C\to C$ with a proof of $(\Pi x\ y:C) {\sf Eq}_C(f\ x,f\ y)$

Given extensionality we can weaken the hypothesis to

$$\neg \neg C \rightarrow C$$

instead of C decidable

Constructive mathematics

 N_2, N are sets

With one universe, we can show that they are not propositions

SSReflect considers only decidable structures because of this result

If A is a set we will see later that we have

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{(\Sigma x:A)B}((a,b_0),(a,b_1)) \to \mathsf{Eq}_{B(a)}(b_0,b_1)$$

but this implication may fail if A is not a set

Voevodsky gives a simple and uniform notion of equivalence between two types

If A and B are sets, this gives the notion of bijection

If A and B are propositions, this gives the notion of logical equivalence

If A and B are groupoids, this gives the notion of categorical equivalence of groupoids

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If f:A\to B the fiber of f at b:B is the type F(b)=(\Sigma x:A)\mathrm{Eq}_B(b,f|x) f is an equivalence iff this fiber is contractible at each point b \mathrm{prop}(F(b))\times F(b) We write A\simeq B for (\Sigma f:A\to B)\mathrm{Equiv}(f)
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Proposition: The identity function on any type is an equivalence

This is not trivial!

```
If g:C\to D is an equivalence we have a proof of (\Pi d:D)F(d) Hence there exists a function h:D\to C which is a section of g (\Pi x:D)\mathsf{Eq}_B(x,g\ (h\ x))
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Since $X \simeq X$ we have a map $\mathsf{Eq}_U(A,B) \to A \simeq B$

The *Univalence Axiom* states that this map is an equivalence

In particular we have

$$A \simeq B \to \mathsf{Eq}_U(A,B)$$

This generalizes Church's axiom of extensionality for propositions

Lemma: If A and B are two propositions and $B \to A$ then any map $A \to B$ is an equivalence

This will be proved later

We have $\mathsf{Eq}_U(A,B)$ if A and B are equivalent propositions We can hope closer connections to HOL

and to the SSReflect style of doing proofs (equational reasoning)

E.g.
$$Eq_A(a_0, a_1) \to Eq_A(u_0, u_1) \to Eq_U(Eq_A(a_0, u_0), Eq_A(a_1, u_1))$$

The Univalence Axiom implies that two isomorphic sets are equal

It also implies that two equivalent groupoids are equal

Voevodsky has shown that this axiom implies function extensionality

From now on, we shall work with Univalence and hence function extensionality

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We say that g:B\to A is a section of f:A\to B iff \operatorname{Eq}(f\circ g,\operatorname{id}_B) We say that f is a retraction of g iff \operatorname{Eq}(g\circ f,\operatorname{id}_A) f and g are inverse iff g is a section of f and f a retraction of g
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Graduate Lemma: If f and g are inverse then f is an equivalence

Given this we can prove e.g.

Lemma: If A and B are two propositions and $B \to A$ then any map $A \to B$ is an equivalence

The proof of the Graduate Lemma consists itself in several Lemmas

Lemma 1: If $f: A \to B$ has a left inverse g then prop(B) implies prop(A)

Lemma 2: If f has a left inverse, then

$$\mathsf{pMap}(f) : \mathsf{Eq}_A(a_0, a_1) \to \mathsf{Eq}_B(f \ a_0, f \ a_1)$$

has a left inverse

Lemma 3: If we have a family of maps $\varphi_x : D(x) \to E(x)$ and for all x : A, the map φ_x has a left inverse then the map

$$(\Sigma x : A)D(x) \to (\Sigma x : A)E(x)$$

 $(x, d) \longmapsto (x, \varphi_x \ d)$

has a left inverse

Applications

Any involutive function is an equivalence

 $\neg: N_2 \to N_2$ is an equivalence

We need function extensionality to prove $\neg \circ \neg = id_{N_2}$

Hence we have a proof of $\mathsf{Eq}_U(N_2,N_2)$ which is not the reflexivity

By univalence $\mathsf{Eq}(\mathsf{Eq}_U(N_2,N_2),\mathsf{Equiv}(N_2,N_2))$

Hence U is not a set

It can be shown that U_1 is not a groupoid, U_2 is not a 2-groupoid and so on

Applications

Axiom of "choice"

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U((\Pi x:A)(\Sigma y:B)C(x,y),(\Sigma f:A\to B)(\Pi x:A)C(x,f|x))$$

Distributivity law

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U((\Sigma x:A)(B+C),(\Sigma x:A)B+(\Sigma x:A)C)$$

Induction principle

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U((\Pi z:A+B)C(z),(\Pi x:A)C(\mathsf{inl}(x))\times(\Pi y:B)C(\mathsf{inr}(y)))$$

We have

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U(A \times B, B \times A)$$

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U(A \times (B \times C), (A \times B) \times C)$$

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U(A \times N_1, A)$$

This is less surprising than it seems however

 $A \times B$ is *not* convertible to $B \times A$

We have $\mathsf{Eq}_U(N,N+N_1)$

Notice that this is *not* true in set theory

0 belongs to N but not to $N+N_1$

a type structure is a "syntactical discipline for enforcing level of abstraction" Reynolds 1983

0:N is a judgement and not a type (using Martin-Löf terminology)

This can already be found in the design of Automath (1967)

Universal family of types

A family of types over A can be seen as a function $A \to U$

The map

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U(A,B) \to A \simeq B$$

gives for each $p : \mathsf{Eq}_U(A,B)$ a map

$$\lambda x$$
.transp $x p : A \to B$

and the transport of a family $C:A\to U$ can be seen as the composition of this map and $\mathsf{pMap}(C)$

Induction Principle for equivalences

If we have a statement P(B, f) for

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B:U, f:A \rightarrow B, p:\mathsf{isEquiv}(A,B,f)
```

For proving that P(B, f) holds universally, it is enough to prove $P(A, id_A)$

This follows from univalence and the singleton law

Application

E.g. define the type of pointed types $Pt=(\Sigma X:U)X$ If $f:A\to B$ equivalence and $\text{Eq}_B(f\;a,b)$ then $\text{Eq}_{Pt}((A,a),(B,b))$

Application

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Consider now the type \mathsf{Fam} = (\Sigma X : U)X \to U
This is the type of "families" (X,F) with F:X 	o U
If f:A\to B equivalence and C:B\to U then
\mathsf{Eq}_{\mathsf{Fam}}((A,C\circ f),(B,C))
Hence
\mathsf{Eq}_{U}((\Sigma x : A)C(f \ x), (\Sigma y : B)C(y))
and
\mathsf{Eq}_U((\Pi x:A)C(f|x),(\Pi y:B)C(y))
```

Using function extensionality we can show $prop(\neg A)$ for any type A

Using function extensionality, we can prove

Theorem: If we have $(\Pi x : A)\operatorname{prop}(B)$ then $\operatorname{prop}((\Pi x : A)B)$

A can be any type in this statement

This is similar to impredicativity: any product of propositions is a proposition

What about a product of sets?

We have a notion of *property*: family of propositions over a type

To be an equivalence is a property of a function

The axiom of univalence is a proposition

Essential difference between *property* and *structure*

E.g. $f: A \to B$ isomorphism is a structure in general

and a property if A and B are sets

E.g. to be discrete is a property of a set, and hence a property of a type

If P is a proposition and x y : P, is $Eq_P(x, y)$ a proposition?

Lemma: If A is a type and we have $\varphi : (\Pi x : A) \mathsf{Eq}_A(a, x)$ then

$$(\Pi x\ u:A)(\Pi p: \mathsf{Eq}_A(x,u))\mathsf{Eq}(p\cdot (\varphi\ u), \varphi\ x)$$

Direct from the singleton law and the groupoid laws

Corollary: If P is a proposition and x y : P then $\mathsf{Eq}_P(x,y)$ is contractible

Q contractible means $prop(Q) \times Q$, and this is a proposition

In particular any proposition is a set

Any set is a groupoid

Voevodsky's stratification is cumulative

To be a proposition, a set, \dots is a property $(\Pi u \ v : \mathsf{prop}(A))\mathsf{Eq}(u,v)$ we use that $\mathsf{prop}(A) \to \mathsf{set}(A)$ and function extensionality

By function extensionality, set(A) is a proposition as well

 N_0 is a proposition

 N_1 is contractible

 N_2, N_3, \ldots and N are sets (by Hedberg's Theorem)

With a universe one can prove that they are not propositions

If B(x) (x:A) is a family of type and $p: \mathsf{Eq}_A(a_0,a_1)$ we can define

$$B(a_0) \to B(a_1)$$

 $b \longmapsto \mathsf{transp}\ b\ p$

We have

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{U}(\mathsf{Eq}_{(\Sigma x:A)B}((a_{0},b_{0}),(a_{1},b_{1})),(\Sigma p:\mathsf{Eq}_{A}(a_{0},a_{1}))\mathsf{Eq}_{B(a_{1})}(\mathsf{transp}\ b_{0}\ p,b_{1}))$$

We have

$$\operatorname{prop}(A), \ (\Pi x : A)\operatorname{prop}(B) \to \operatorname{prop}((\Sigma x : A)B)$$

$$set(A), (\Pi x : A)set(B) \rightarrow set((\Sigma x : A)B)$$

In particular

$$prop(A), (A \rightarrow prop(B)) \rightarrow prop(A \times B)$$

$$prop(A) \times A$$
 is a proposition

It follows that "to be contractible"

$$prop(A) \times A$$

is a proposition

It then follows by extensionality that to be an equivalence is a property

We have $\mathsf{Eq}_U(\mathsf{prop}(A) \times A, \mathsf{Eq}_U(A, N_1))$

In particular A is contractible iff $Eq_U(A, N_1)$

If A is a set and

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{(\Sigma x:A)B(x)}((a,b_0),(a,b_1))$$

then

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{B(a)}(b_0,b_1)$$

This is because $\mathsf{Eq}_A(a,a)$ is a proposition

We say that $g: C \to D$ is an embedding iff

$$\mathsf{pMap}(g) : \mathsf{Eq}_C(x,y) \to \mathsf{Eq}_D(g\ x,g\ y)$$

is an equivalence

This is a property of g

If C and D are sets, this is the same as being *injective*

$$\operatorname{Eq}_D(g\ x, g\ y) \to \operatorname{Eq}_C(x, y)$$

Proposition: If B(x) is a family of propositions over a type A then the first projection $(\Sigma x : A)B \rightarrow A$ is an embedding

If A is a set we can think of $(\Sigma x : A)B$ as the

subset of elements in A satisfying B

Cf. definition of subset in Bishop's mathematics

Applications

Given A

There are two notions of family of types on A

$$A \to U$$
 and $\mathsf{Slice}(A) = (\Sigma X : U)X \to A$

Any $F: A \rightarrow U$ defines a pair

$$u(F) = (\Sigma x : A)F x, (\lambda z)z.1$$

in Slice(A)

Theorem: The map $u:(A \to U) \to \mathsf{Slice}(A)$ is an equivalence

Applications

If A B : U we can define $T : N_2 \to U$ by

$$T \ 0 = A$$
 $T \ 1 = B$

Proposition: We have $\mathsf{Eq}_U(A+B,(\Sigma x:N_2)T|x)$

This implies e.g. that A + B is a set if A and B are sets

Product of sets?

Lemma: The canonical map (and actually any map)

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{(\Pi x:A)B}(f,g) \to (\Pi x:A)\mathsf{Eq}_B(f\ x,g\ x)$$

is an equivalence

The proof is incredible

Product of sets?

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Let C = (\Pi x : A)B
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We notice that both

$$(\Sigma g:C) \mathsf{Eq}_C(f,g)$$
 and $(\Sigma g:C) (\Pi x:A) \mathsf{Eq}_B(f\ x,g\ x)$

are contractible

By "choice"

$$\mathsf{Eq}_U((\Sigma g:C)(\Pi x:A)\mathsf{Eq}_B(f\ x,g\ x),(\Pi x:A)(\Sigma y:B)\mathsf{Eq}_B(f\ x,y))$$

Corollary: The product of any family of sets is a set

Product of sets?

Lemma: if we have a family of maps $\varphi_x:D(x)\to E(x)$ for x:C and the total map $(x,b)\longmapsto (x,\varphi_x\ b)$ is an equivalence then each map φ_x is an equivalence

This is a standard lemma in the theory of fibrations in homotopy theory

E.g. P. May A concise course in algebraic topology

Product of sets?

The proof is a sequence of equality, where $F = (\Sigma x : C)D$ and $G = (\Sigma x : C)E$

$$(\Sigma(x,d):F)\mathsf{Eq}((x_0,e_0),(x,arphi_x|d))$$

$$(\Sigma x:C)(\Sigma d:D(x))(\Sigma p:\mathsf{Eq}_C(x_0,x))\mathsf{Eq}_{E(x)}(\mathsf{transp}\ e_0\ p,\varphi_x\ d)$$

$$(\Sigma x:C)(\Sigma p: \mathsf{Eq}_C(x_0,x))(\Sigma d:D(x))\mathsf{Eq}_{E(x)}(\mathsf{transp}\ e_0\ p,\varphi_x\ d)$$

$$(\Sigma u: N_1)(\Sigma d: D(x_0))\mathsf{Eq}_{E(x_0)}(e_0, \varphi_{x_0}\ d)$$

$$(\Sigma d: D(x_0))\mathsf{Eq}_{E(x_0)}(e_0, \varphi_{x_0} \ d)$$

Set mathematics

```
What is a poset? It should be a set A with a relation R:A\to A\to U such that \operatorname{prop}(R\ x\ y) this relation should be reflexive and transitive and we have \operatorname{Eq}_U(\operatorname{Eq}_A(x,y),R\ x\ y\times R\ y\ x)
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Set mathematics

What is a group?

It should be a set A

with some operations

$$m:A\to A\to A \qquad inv:A\to A \qquad e:A$$

and the usual axioms

We can form the type of all groups

Transport of structures

Let Grp(A) be the type of structures of groups over the set A

If $f: A \to B$ is a bijection between the sets A and B

then we have $\mathsf{Eq}_U(A,B)$ by univalence

Hence we have a map $Grp(A) \rightarrow Grp(B)$

Any group structure on A can be transported into a group structure on B along the bijection f

Transport of structures

On the other hand there is a direct notion of transport of operations

$$m_B \ b \ b' = f \ (m_A \ (g \ b) \ (g \ b'))$$
 $inv_B \ b = f \ (inv_A \ (g \ b))$ $e_B = f \ e_A$

where g is *the* inverse of f

The two notions of transport coincide

In particular, we get in this way that B satisfies the axioms of group with operations m_B, inv_B, e_B

Structures

The collection of binary sequences form a set because we know what it means for two binary sequences to be equal. Given two groups, or sets, on the other hand, it is generally incorrect to ask if they are equal; the proper question is whether or not they are isomorphic

Structures

The collection of all groups

$$\mathsf{Group} = (\Sigma X : U)\mathsf{set}(X) \times \mathsf{Grp}(X)$$

form a groupoid

Theorem: The map $\mathsf{Eq}_{\mathsf{Group}}(g_0,g_1) \to \mathsf{Iso}(g_0,g_1)$ is an equivalence

In particular, two isomorphic groups are "equal"

Resizing rule

We add $A: U_0$ if A is a type and prop(A)

With the resizing rule, the system becomes impredicative

Resizing rule

Voevodsky also requires that the collection of all propositions is a small type (which will be a small set)

For expressing this, we introduce a type $\Omega: U_0$ with the rules

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(A,p):\Omega if A is a type and p: prop(A)
```

If $X:\Omega$ then $X.1:U_0$ and $X.2:\mathsf{prop}(X.1)$

Theorem: Ω is a set

The collection of sets form a topos with Ω as the set of truth-values

Propositional truncation

Using the resizing rule, Voevodsky defines the operation

$$\mathsf{inh}(A) = (\Pi X : U)\mathsf{prop}(X) \to (A \to X) \to X$$

What is important is

- (1) inh(A) is a proposition
- (2) $A \rightarrow \operatorname{inh}(A)$
- (3) $inh(A) \rightarrow prop(X) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X$

Intuitively inh(A) is a proposition expressing that A is inhabited

If A is a proposition we have $Eq_U(A, inh(A))$

We can define *new* connectives

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(\exists x:A)B defined as \mathsf{inh}((\Sigma x:A)B)
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 $A \vee B$ defined as inh(A+B)

These connectives are similar to (but different from) the corresponding connectives in topos theory

Lemma: If A and B are incompatible propositions then $Eq_U(A+B, A \vee B)$

In particular, A + B is a proposition in this case

$$(\Pi X: U)\mathsf{prop}(X) \to X + \neg X$$
 is a proposition

Unique Choice

We also have the principle of unique choice, for C, D sets

$$(\forall x : C)(\exists ! y : D)\psi(x, y) \rightarrow (\Sigma g : C \rightarrow D)(\forall x : C)\psi(x, g \ x)$$

Without this principle, we would have two notions of functions

Function as λ -term or as functional relation

For A set and B propositions we have

$$(\exists!x:A)B \to (\Sigma x:A)B$$

This can be seen as a refinement of Church's description operator

We can define the *image* of a map $f: A \rightarrow B$

This is determined by the property $(\exists x: A) \mathsf{Eq}_B(b, f|x)$ on B

Compare with the fiber $(\Sigma x : A) \mathsf{Eq}_B(b, f \ x)$

We have a satisfactory correspondance between subsets and properties

Difference between inh(A) and $\neg \neg A$

We have $inh(A) \rightarrow \neg \neg A$

Let P(n) be a family of decidable propositions over N

Proposition: $inh((\Sigma n : N)P(n)) \rightarrow (\Sigma n : N)P(n)$

This is remarkable since $(\Sigma n : N)P(n)$ needs not be a proposition

Theorem: $\neg\neg((\Sigma n:N)P(n)) \rightarrow (\Sigma n:N)P(n)$ is not provable

No reason any more why countable choice

$$(\forall n: N)(\exists x: X)R(n, x) \rightarrow (\exists f: N \to X)(\forall n: N)R(n, f n)$$

should hold

This is like in topos theory

Definition of quotient by an equivalence relation

Given A a type and $R:A\to A\to U$ a proposition valued family of types which is an equivalence relation we define an equivalence class to be a proposition valued $P:A\to U$ such that

P is inhabited $(\exists x : A)P(x)$

$$P x \rightarrow P y \rightarrow R x y$$

$$P x \rightarrow R x y \rightarrow P y$$

Notice that from P a given equivalence class we cannot extract in general any element in A satisfying P

Univeral property

Let A/R the set of equivalence classes

We have a canonical map $s:A\to A/R$ and R x_0 $x_1\to \mathsf{Eq}_{A/R}(s\ x_0,s\ x_1)$

Let $f:A\to B$ a map into a set B such that R x_0 $x_1\to \mathsf{Eq}_B(f\ x_0,f\ x_1)$

There exists a unique map $g:A/R \to B$ such that $g \circ s = f$

And this despite the fact that we cannot extract in general an element in a given equivalence class!

A ring R will be represented as a set with the usual structure

a divides b will be defined as there exists x such that ax = b

If a is regular i.e. $au = 0 \rightarrow u = 0$ then this x is uniquely determined and we have an explicit division operation

An ideal P is a subset of R satisfying the usual laws

The ideal is *prime* iff $ab\epsilon P \rightarrow a\epsilon P \vee b\epsilon P$

Notice the use of \vee

We say that an ideal I is finitely generated iff there exists a finite list x_1, \ldots, x_n which generates I

Notice that given I finitely generated we cannot in general extract an explicit list of generators

Lemma: If $I \cdot J \subseteq P$ and P is prime then $I \subseteq P$ or $J \subseteq P$

In general, we can introduce the witness of an existential statement as long as we use this witness to build an object which *does not depend* on the exact choice of this witness

An example in analysis

If we define the type of real numbers R as a quotient of the set of Cauchy sequences of rationals

We can define x#y as meaning $(\exists r>0)r\leqslant |x-y|$

We can define the inverse function $(\Pi x : R)x \# 0 \to R$

This is because the inverse is uniquely determined

Even if we start with a discrete structure, some natural operations build non necessarily discrete structure

E.g. localization of a ring for a multiplicative monoid

What was missing before was the insight that structures in algebra should be represented by sets

Finite sets

Category of finite sets $N_{k+1} = N_k + N_1$

We say that X is finite iff there exists k such that $\mathsf{Eq}_U(X,N_k)$

 $(\exists k: N) \mathsf{Eq}_U(X, N_k)$ is a proposition

If X is finite, we can extract its cardinality but *not* the given equality proof $\mathsf{Eq}_U(X,N_k)$ (there are k! such proofs)

We use that $\mathsf{Eq}_U(N_k,N_l)$ implies $\mathsf{Eq}_N(k,l)$

If X has k elements we have $inh(Eq_U(Eq_U(X,X),N_{k!}))$

If X is finite then X is a discrete set

Torsors

We consider only \mathbb{Z} -torsors

A torsor is a set X with a \mathbb{Z} -action such that for any u in X the map $n \longmapsto u+n, \ \mathbb{Z} \to X$ is an equivalence

and inh(X)

If X is a torsor we cannot in general exhibit one element of X

There is always the trivial torsor triv where $X = \mathbb{Z}$

Theorem: $\mathsf{Eq}_U(\mathsf{Eq}_{\mathsf{Torsor}}(\mathsf{triv},\mathsf{triv}),\mathbb{Z})$

cf. D. Grayson Foundations.Ktheory

Torsors

If X is a torsor we have

$$(\Pi u_0 \ u_1 : X)(\exists ! n : \mathbb{Z}) \mathsf{Eq}_X(u_0 + n, u_1)$$

and so, by unique choice we have an application

$$X \times X \to \mathbb{Z}$$

$$(u_0, u_1) \longmapsto u_1 - u_0$$

such that $\mathsf{Eq}_X(u_0+u_1-u_0,u_1)$

Resizing rule

What about a resizing rule for sets?

We cannot add $A: U_0$ if A is a type and set(A)

We cannot have

$$T = (\Pi X : U_0) \operatorname{set}(X) \to (((X \to \Omega) \to \Omega) \to X) \to X$$

in U_0 , since then $\mathsf{Eq}_{U_0}(T,(T\to\Omega)\to\Omega)$ which implies N_0

Cf. Reynolds non set theoretic model of polymorphisms

So we still need the hierarchy of universe

Global choice

We have

$$\neg((\Pi X:U)\mathsf{set}(X)\to\mathsf{inh}(X)\to X)$$

which is the negation of the axiom of global choice

No global choice function is invariant by isomorphism

Look at the example of the collection of groups

A category is given by a type of objects A which should be a groupoid

We have $Hom(a_0, a_1)$ which is a set

with the usual operations and laws of composition

We can then define the *set* of isomorphisms $lso_A(a_0, a_1)$

We have a map $\mathsf{Eq}_A(a_0,a_1) \to \mathsf{Iso}_A(a_0,a_1)$

This map should be an equivalence (a bijection in this case)

Compare with the definition in set theory

Notion of "locally small" category

But this refers to the "size" and not to the complexity of equality

We can define the notion of equivalence between two categories

We can consider the collection of "all" categories

Two equivalent categories are equal

B. Ahrens, C. Kapulkin, M. Shulman "Univalent categories and the Rezk completion"

The notion of Galois connections between posets

The notion of adjunction between categories

Let $F: A \to B$ be a functor between two categories A and B

Like a monotone map at the level of groupoids

F is essentially surjective iff

$$(\Pi b:B)(\exists a:A)\mathsf{Iso}_B(b,F|a)$$

This is a *property* of the functor

F is full and faithful iff the map

$$\operatorname{\mathsf{Hom}}_A(a_0,a_1) \to \operatorname{\mathsf{Hom}}_B(F\ a_0,F\ a_1)$$

is an equivalence (here a bijection)

Lemma: If F is full and faithful then for any b in B the type

$$(\Sigma a:A)$$
lso $_B(b,F|a)$

is a proposition

Corollary: If F is full and faithful and essentially surjective then F is an equivalence of categories

We use the *principle of unique choice* at the level of groupoids!

This definition of category solves some foundational issues that are somewhat disturbing when category theory is formulated in set theory

For instance, what should be a *cartesian* category (i.e. category with binary product)?

Should the product of two objects given explicitely as a function?

We have two notions (if we don't assume choice)

In the univalent foundation, there is no problem since the product of two objects is uniquely determined up to isomorphism

And hence up to equality by definition of category

Since we have uniuqe choice, we have an explicit product function on objects

Beyond groupoids

 U_0 is not a set

 U_1 is not a groupoid

For 2-groupoids new phenomena arise

E.g. Eckmann-Hilton

$$\mathsf{Eq}_{\mathsf{Eq}_{\mathsf{Eq}_A(x,x)}(1_x,1_x)}(\alpha \cdot \beta,\beta \cdot \alpha)$$