

# Robust and private Bayesian inference<sup>1</sup>

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# Overview

- ▶ We wish to **estimate** something from a **dataset**  $x \in \mathcal{S}$ .
- ▶ We wish to communicate what we learn to a **third party**.
- ▶ How much can they learn about  $x$ ?

## Bayesian estimation

- ▶ What are its robustness and privacy properties?
- ▶ How important is the selection of the prior?

## Limiting the communication channel

- ▶ How should we communicate information about our posterior?
- ▶ How much can an adversary learn from our posterior?

## Example (Health insurance)

- ▶ We collect data about treatment and patients.
- ▶ Disclose treatment effectiveness, but not patient information.

# Setting

## Dramatis personae

- ▶  $x$  – data.
- ▶  $\mathcal{B}$  – a (Bayesian) statistician.
- ▶  $\xi$  – the statistician's prior.
- ▶  $\theta$  – a parameter
- ▶  $\mathcal{A}$  – an adversary. He knows  $\xi$ , should not learn  $x$ .

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
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## The game


1.  $\mathcal{B}$  selects a model family ( $\mathcal{F}$ ) and a prior ( $\xi$ ).
2.  $\mathcal{B}$  observes data  $x$  and calculates the posterior  $\xi(\theta|x)$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $\mathcal{B}$ .
4.  $\mathcal{B}$  responds with a function of the posterior  $\xi(\theta|x)$ .
5. Goto 3.

# Two related problem viewpoints

## Bayesian inference view



## Mechanism design view



## Privacy properties of Bayesian inference

Bayesian inference

Robustness of the posterior distribution

A query model

# Bayesian inference

## Setting

- ▶ Dataset space  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- ▶ Distribution family  $\mathcal{F} \triangleq \{ P_\theta \mid \theta \in \Theta \}$ .
- ▶ Each  $P_\theta$  is a distribution on  $\mathcal{S}$ .
- ▶ Prior distribution  $\zeta$  on  $\Theta$ .
- ▶ Posterior given data  $x \in \mathcal{S}$ :

$$\zeta(\theta \mid x) = \frac{P_\theta(x)\zeta(\theta)}{\phi(x)} \quad (\text{posterior})$$

$$\phi(x) \triangleq \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} P_\theta(x)\zeta(\theta). \quad (\text{marginal})$$

# What we want to show

- ▶ If we assume the family  $\mathcal{F}$  is well-behaved . . .
- ▶ . . . or that the prior  $\zeta$  is focused on the “nice” parts of  $\mathcal{F}$



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- ▶ Inference is robust.
- ▶ Our knowledge is private.
- ▶ There are also well-known  $\mathcal{F}$  satisfying our assumptions.

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First, we must generalise differential privacy...

# Differential privacy of conditional distribution $\zeta(\cdot | x)$

Definition ( $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy)

$\zeta(\cdot | x)$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private if,  $\forall x \in \mathcal{S} = \mathcal{X}^n$ ,  $B \subset \Theta$

$$\zeta(B | x) \leq e^\epsilon \zeta(B | y) + \delta,$$

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Definition ( $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy under  $\rho$ .)

$\zeta(\cdot | x)$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private under a **pseudo-metric**  $\rho : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$  if,  $\forall B \subset \Theta$  and  $x \in \mathcal{S}$ ,

$$\zeta(B | x) \leq e^{\epsilon\rho(x,y)} \zeta(B | y) + \delta\rho(x,y), \quad \forall y \in \mathcal{S}$$

If two datasets  $x, y$  are close, then the distributions  $\zeta(\cdot | x)$  and  $\zeta(\cdot | y)$  are also close.

# Sufficient conditions

Assumption ( $\mathcal{F}$  is well-behaved)

*i.e. all members of  $\mathcal{F}$  are  $L$ -Lipschitz.*

Assumption (The prior is concentrated on nice parts of  $\mathcal{F}$ )

# Sufficient conditions

Assumption ( $\mathcal{F}$  is well-behaved)

For a given  $\rho$  on  $\mathcal{S}$ ,  $\exists L > 0$  s.t.  $\forall \theta \in \Theta$ :

$$\left| \ln \frac{P_\theta(x)}{P_\theta(y)} \right| \leq L\rho(x, y), \quad \forall x, y \in \mathcal{S}, \quad (1)$$

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Let the set of  $L$ -Lipschitz parameters be  $\Theta_L$ . Then  $\exists c > 0$  s.t.  $\forall L \geq 0$ :

$$\xi(\Theta_L) \geq 1 - \exp(-cL), \quad (2)$$

# When do these assumptions hold?

## Example (Exponential families)

Family  $\mathcal{F}$ , with sufficient statistic  $T$ .

$$p_{\theta}(x) = h(x) \exp \left\{ \eta_{\theta}^{\top} T(x) - A(\eta_{\theta}) \right\}$$

For a given  $\theta \in \Theta$ , we want to test if:

$$\left| \ln(h(x)/h(y)) + \eta_{\theta}^{\top} (T(x) - T(y)) \right| \leq L\rho(x, y), \quad \forall x, y \in \mathcal{X} .$$



## Example (Exponential distribution)

Exponential prior with parameter  $c > 0$ , satisfies Assumption 2.

## Example (Discrete Bayesian networks)

$$\left| \ln \frac{P_\theta(x)}{P_\theta(y)} \right| \leq \ln \frac{1}{\epsilon} \cdot \rho(x, y),$$

where:  $\rho(x, y)$  is the number of edges and nodes influenced by the differences in  $x, y$  and  $\epsilon$  the smallest  $P_\theta$ -mass placed to any event.

# Robustness of the posterior distribution

Definition (KL divergence)

$$D(P \parallel Q) \triangleq \int \ln \frac{dP}{dQ} dP. \quad (3)$$

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$$D(\xi(\cdot | x) \parallel \xi(\cdot | y)) \leq 2L\rho(x, y) \quad (4)$$

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(i) *Under Assumption 1,*

$$D(\xi(\cdot | x) \parallel \xi(\cdot | y)) \leq 2L\rho(x, y) \quad (4)$$

(ii) *Under Assumption 2,*

$$D(\xi(\cdot | x) \parallel \xi(\cdot | y)) \leq \frac{\kappa}{c} \cdot \rho(x, y) \quad (5)$$

# Differential privacy of the posterior

## Theorem

1. Under Assumption 1,  $B \in \mathfrak{G}_\Theta$ :

$$\zeta(B | x) \leq e^{2L\rho(x,y)} \zeta(B | y) \quad (6)$$

*i.e. the posterior is  $(2L, 0)$ -DP under  $\rho$ .*

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2. Under Assumption 2, for all  $x, y \in \mathcal{S}$ ,  $B \in \mathfrak{G}_\Theta$ :

$$|\zeta(B | x) - \zeta(B | y)| \leq \sqrt{\frac{\kappa}{2c} \rho(x, y)}$$

*i.e. the posterior is  $(0, \sqrt{\frac{\kappa}{2c}})$ -DP under  $\sqrt{\rho}$ .*

## A query model

- ▶ We select a prior  $\zeta$ .
- ▶ We observe data  $x$ .
- ▶ We calculate a posterior  $\zeta(\cdot | x)$ .
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More generally,  $\mathcal{A}$  can select a question  $q : \Theta \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ , where  $\mathcal{R}$  is a response space:

$$r_t = q(\theta_t)$$

# Other mechanisms

## Laplace mechanism

Add noise to responses to queries.

$$r = q(x) + \omega, \quad \omega \sim \text{Laplace}(\lambda)$$

## Exponential mechanism

Define a utility function  $u(x, r)$

$$p(r) \propto e^{\epsilon u(x, r)} \mu(r).$$

## Subsampling

Perform inference on a random sample of the data.

# Reduction of privacy to a testing problem

## How fast can the adversary learn?

- ▶ Different datasets  $x, y$  give different  $\xi(\cdot | x), \xi(\cdot | y)$ .
- ▶ How many samples are needed to differentiate them?

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## Theorem

*Under Assumption 1, the adversary can distinguish between data  $x, y$  with probability  $1 - \delta$  if:*

$$\rho(x, y) \geq \frac{3}{4Ln} \ln \frac{1}{\delta}. \quad (7)$$

*Under Assumption 2, this becomes:*

$$\rho(x, y) \geq \frac{3c}{2\kappa n} \ln \frac{1}{\delta}. \quad (8)$$

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Lemma (Le Cam’s method)

Let  $\psi(\theta)$  be an estimator of  $x$ . Let  $\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2$  be  $2\delta$ -separated and say  $x \in \mathcal{S}_i \Rightarrow \xi(\cdot | x) \in \Xi_i \subset \Xi$ . Then:

$$\sup_{x \in \mathcal{S}} \mathbb{E}_{\xi}(\rho(\psi, x) \mid x) \geq \delta \sup_{\xi_i \in \text{co}(\Xi_i)} \|\xi_1 \wedge \xi_2\|. \quad (10)$$

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Expected distance between the real and guessed data:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\tilde{\zeta}}(\rho(\psi, x) | x) = \int_{\Theta} \rho(\psi(\theta), x) d\tilde{\zeta}(\theta | x),$$



# Conclusion

- ▶ Bayesian inference is inherently robust and private.
- ▶ It suffices to select the right prior. But how?
- ▶ In some cases, this is closed form.
- ▶ The general case is an open problem.
- ▶ Do we need to randomise at all?

## Job ad

PhD student in differential privacy and distributed decision making.