FAILURE OF NORMALIZATION IN IMPREDICATIVE TYPE THEORY
WITH PROOF-IRRELEVANT PROPOSITIONAL EQUALITY

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Abstract. Normalization fails in type theory with an impredicative universe of propositions and a proof-irrelevant propositional equality. The counterexample to normalization is adapted from Girard’s counterexample against normalization of System F equipped with a decider for type equality. It refutes Werner’s normalization conjecture [LMCS 2008].

Introduction

Type theories with an impredicative universe $\mathbf{Prop}$ of propositions, such as the Calculus of Constructions (Coquand and Huet, 1988), lose the normalization property in the presence of a proof-irrelevant propositional equality $=_\mathbb{Prop} : \Pi A : \mathbf{Type}. A \to A \to \mathbb{Prop}$ with the standard elimination principle. The loss of normalization is facilitated already by a coercion function with a reduction rule

$$\text{cast} : \Pi AB : \mathbb{Prop}. A =_{\mathbb{Prop}} B \to A \to B$$

that does not inspect the equality proof $e : A =_{\mathbb{Prop}} A$ but only checks whether the endpoints are (definitionally) equal.

The failure of normalization refutes a conjecture by Werner (2008, Conjecture 3.14). Consistency and canonicity is not at stake; thus, the situation is comparable to type theory with equality reflection (Martin-Löf, 1984a,b), aka Extensional Type Theory. At the moment, it is unclear whether the use of impredicativity is essential to break normalization; predicative type theory might be able to host a proof-irrelevant propositional equality (Abel, 2009) while retaining normalization.

Key words and phrases: impredicativity, normalization, proof-irrelevance, propositional equality.
Counterexample to Normalization

We employ the usual impredicative definition of absurdity \( \bot \) and negation \( \neg A \) and a derived definition of truth \( \top \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\bot & : \text{Prop} \\
\neg & : \text{Prop} \to \text{Prop} \\
\top & : \text{Prop}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\bot = \Pi A : \text{Prop}. A & \\
\neg A = A \to \bot & \\
\top = \neg \bot
\end{align*}
\]

The presence of \( \text{cast} \) allows us to define self-application under the assumption that all propositions all equal. The self-application term \( \omega \) refutes this assumption.

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta & : \top \quad \omega & : \neg \Pi AB : \text{Prop}. A =_{\text{Prop}} B \\
\delta z = z \top z & \quad \omega h A = \text{cast} \top A (h \top A) \delta
\end{align*}
\]

Impredicativity is exploited in \( \delta \) when applying \( z : \bot \) to type \( \top = \bot \to \bot \) so that it can be applied to \( z \) again. The type of \( \delta \) is \( \top \) which we cast to \( A \) thanks to the assumption \( h \) that all propositions are equal.

We build a non-normalizing term \( \Omega \) by applying \( \omega \) to itself through \( \delta \), reminiscent of the shortest diverging term in untyped \( \lambda \)-calculus.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Omega & : \neg \Pi AB : \text{Prop}. A =_{\text{Prop}} B \\
\Omega h = \delta (\omega h)
\end{align*}
\]

Thanks to the reduction rule of \( \text{cast} \), term \( \Omega h \) reduces to itself:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Omega h &= \delta (\omega h) \\
&= \text{cast} \top \top (h \top \top) \delta (\omega h) \\
&= \Omega h
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, normalization is lost in the presence of a hypothesis (free variable) \( h \). As a consequence, normalization that proceeds under \( \lambda \)-abstraction can diverge. This means that equality of open terms cannot be decided just by normalization.

The counterexample can be implemented in Werner’s type theory with proof-irrelevance (2008), refuting the normalization conjecture (3.14). We implement \( \text{cast} \) as instance of Werner’s more general equality elimination rule:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Eq.rec} & : \Pi A : \text{Type}. \Pi P : A \to \text{Type}. \Pi ab : A. P a \to a = A b \to P b \\
\text{Eq.rec} A P a b x e & \triangleright x \quad \text{if } a = b \\
\text{cast} A B e x &= \text{Eq.rec} \text{Prop} (\lambda a : A. \text{Prop}) A B e x
\end{align*}
\]

The term \( \Omega \) also serves as counterexample to normalization in the theorem prover Lean (de Moura et al., 2015), version 3.4.2 (Microsoft Research, 2019).

\[
\begin{align*}
def \text{False} & := \forall A : \text{Prop}, A \\
def \text{Not} & := \lambda A, A \to \text{False} \\
def \text{True} & := \text{Not} \text{False}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
def \text{delta} & := \lambda z, z \text{True} z \\
def \text{omega} & := \text{Not} (\forall A B : \text{Prop}, A = B) := \lambda h A, \text{cast} (h \text{True} A) \delta \text{omega} \\
def \text{Omega} & := \text{Not} (\forall A B : \text{Prop}, A = B) := \lambda h, \text{delta} (\text{omega} h)
\end{align*}
\]

Infinite reduction can now be triggered with the command \( \#\text{reduce} \text{Omega} \), which diverges.
A Counterexample Using Propositional Extensionality

The counterexample of the last section used the absurd assumption that all propositions are equal. The following counterexample utilizes just the axiom of propositional extensionality, propext, which is a default axiom of Lean. In fact, the weaker statement tautext, which states the equality of true propositions, is sufficient.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{propext} & : \Pi AB : \text{Prop}. (A \leftrightarrow B) \to A =_{\text{Prop}} B \\
\text{tautext} & : \Pi AB : \text{Prop}. A \to B \to A =_{\text{Prop}} B
\end{align*}
\]

The counterexample uses the standard impredicative definition of truth,

\[
\top = \Pi A : \text{Prop}. A \to A
\]

and a cast from \( \top \to \top \) to \( A \), which are both tautologies under the assumption \( a : A \).

\[
\begin{align*}
id, \, \delta & : \top \to \top \\
id x & = x \\
\omega & : \top \\
\Omega & : \top \\
\omega A a & = \text{cast} (\top \to \top) A (\text{tautext} (\top \to \top) A \ id \ a) \delta \\
\delta z & = z (\top \to \top) \ id \ z \\
\Omega & = \delta \omega
\end{align*}
\]

These definitions can be directly replayed in Lean 3.4.2 with the standard prelude, yielding a non-normalizing term Omega.

\[
\begin{align*}
def \text{tautext} \{A \, B : \text{Prop}\} \ (a : A) \ (b : B) & := \text{propext} (\text{iff.intro} (\lambda \_, \ b) (\lambda \_, \ a)) \\
def \text{True} : \text{Prop} & := \forall A : \text{Prop}, \ A \to A
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
def \text{delta} : \text{True} \to \text{True} & := \lambda \ Z : \text{True}, \ Z (\text{True} \to \text{True}) \ id \ Z \\
def \text{omega} : \text{True} & := \lambda A \ a, \ \text{cast} (\text{tautext} \ id \ a) \ \text{delta} \\
def \text{Omega} : \text{True} & := \text{delta} \ \text{omega}
\end{align*}
\]

Note that term Omega is closed with respect the standard axioms of Lean, and does not even have a weak head normal form.

Related Work and Conclusions

The cast operator is inspired by Girard’s operator \( J : \Pi AB : \text{Prop}. A \to B \) with reduction rule \( J A A M \triangleright M \) that destroys the normalization property of System F (Girard, 1971; Harper and Mitchell, 1999). In contrast to \( J \), our cast also requires a proof of equality of \( A \) and \( B \), but this proof is not inspected and thus does not block reduction if it is non-canonical. Thus, the simple lie that all propositions are equal is sufficient to trigger divergence.

Historically, the Automath system AUT-4 is maybe the first type-theoretic proof assistant to feature proof-irrelevant propositions (de Bruijn, 1994). The terminology used by de Bruijn is fourth degree identification, where proofs are expressions considered to have degree 4, propositions and values degree 3, types and Prop degree 2, and the universe Type of types degree 1.

Lean’s type theory (Carneiro, 2019) features an impredicative universe of proof-irrelevant propositions which hosts both propositional equality and the accessibility predicate (Aczel, 1977, 1.2). As both may be eliminated into computational universes, decidability of definitional equality is lost, as demonstrated by Carneiro (2019) for the case of accessibility. As a consequence, typing is not decidable.

The type-theoretic proof assistants Agda and Coq have recently (Gilbert et al., 2019) been equipped with a proof-irrelevant universe of propositions (“strict Prop”). In this
universe, propositional equality can be defined, but cannot be eliminated into types that are not strict propositions themselves. Under this restriction, Gilbert (2019, 4.3) formally proved normalization and decidability of type checking for the predicative case.

Several open problems remain:

(1) Does the theory with impredicative strict $\text{Prop}$ have normalization and decidability of type checking as well?

(2) Does the addition of Werner’s rule, while destroying proof normalization, preserve decidability of conversion and type checking? (Since proofs are irrelevant for equality, they need not be normalized during type checking.)

(3) Does Werner’s rule preserve normalization in the predicative case? (Our counterexamples make use of impredicativity.)

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References


