## Formal Methods for Software Development Introduction

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## **Course Team**

#### Teachers

- Wolfgang Ahrendt (WA) examiner, lecturer
- Oskar Abrahamsson (OA) teaching assistant
- Andreas Lööw (AL) teaching assistant

course assistant activities include:

- giving exercise classes
- correcting lab hand-ins
- student support via:
  - e-mail
  - meetings on e-mail request
    - Oskar, room 5461
    - Andreas, room 5461

#### **Course Home Page**

Linked from Chalmers and GU course portals

#### **Google News Group**

- Sign up via course home page (see News Group)
- Changes, updates, questions, discussions (don't post solutions)

#### **Course Structure**

Торіс	# Lectures	# Exercises	Lab
Intro	1	×	×
Modeling & Model Checking with	6	3	<b>v</b>
Promela & Spin			
Specification & Verification with	7	3	<b>v</b>
JML & KeY			

PROMELA & SPINabstract programs, model checking, automatedJML & KeYconcrete Java, deductive verification, semi-automated

... more on this later!

#### Lectures

- Please ask questions during lectures
- Please respond to my questions; 'wrong' answers highly welcome
- Slides appear online shortly after each lecture

#### Exercises

- One exercise web page (almost) each week (6 in total)
- Discussed in next exercise class
- Play around with the exercises before coming to the class
- Exercises highly recommended
- Bring laptops if you have (ideally w. installed tools or browser interfaces working)

- Oral examination in exam week
- Two lab hand-ins
- (No written end-exam)
- Oral exam and labs can be passed separately

- individual, oral examination
- 30 min per student
- slots between 29 October and 2 November
- see course page for more information

## Labs

#### Labs

- ▶ 2 Lab handins: PROMELA/SPIN 05 Oct, JML/KeY 29 Oct
- 2 Lab Questions Sessions
- Submission via Fire, linked from course home page
- If submission is returned, roughly one week for correction
- You work in groups of two. No exception!<sup>a</sup> You pair up by either:
  - 1. talk to people
  - 2. post to the Google group
  - 3. participate in pairing at first exercise session

In case all that is not sufficient, contact Oskar by e-mail.

<sup>a</sup>Only PhD students have to work alone.

## Schedule

see course homepage

## **Course Evaluation**

#### 1. course evaluation group:

- student representatives
  - randomly selected (Chalmers)
  - volunteers (GU)
- one meeting during the course, one after
- 2. web questionnaire after the course

Randomly selected Chalmers students:

- Zeeshan Ul Hassan Dar
- Erik Hermansson
- John Lind
- Heyu Qin
- Erik Thorsson Högfeldt

GU students: please consider volunteering

## **Course Literature**

In part I, we partly use:

Ben-Ari Mordechai Ben-Ari

Principles of the Spin Model Checker Springer, 2008 Ben-Ari received ACM award for outstanding contributions to CS education. Recommended by G. Holzmann. Excellent student text book. (E-book at link.springer.com)

Relevant for part II:

KeYbook W. Ahrendt, B. Beckert, R. Bubel, R. Hähnle, P. Schmitt, M. Ulbrich, editors. Deductive Software Verification - The KeY Book Vol 10001 of LNCS, Springer, 2016 (E-book at link.springer.com) Holzmann Gerard J. Holzmann The Spin Model Checker Addison Wesley, 2004 BayerKatoen Christel Baier, Joost-Pieter Katoen Principles of Model Checking MIT Press, 2008

# **Connection to other Courses**

## Prerequisites

Skills in first-order logic and temporal logic, e.g., from

- Logic in Computer Science, or
- Discrete Event Systems
- Skills in object-oriented programming (like Java)

## Related courses (not assumed!)

- Concurrent Programming
- Finite Automata
- Testing, Debugging, and Verification

## if you took any of those: nice

if not: don't worry, we introduce everything we use here

# Motivation: Software Defects cause BIG Failures

Tiny faults in technical systems can have catastrophic consequences

#### In particular, this goes for software systems

- Ariane 5
- Mars Climate Orbiter
- London Ambulance Dispatch System
- NEDAP Voting Computer Attack

# Motivation: Software Defects cause OMNIPRESENT Failures

Ubiquitous Computing results in Ubiquitous Failures

# Software is almost everywhere: Mobiles Clouds Smart cards Smart devices Cars ...

## software/specification quality is a growing commercial and legal issue

# Achieving Reliability in Engineering

## Well-known strategies from mechanical and civil engineering

- Precise calculations/estimations of forces, stress, etc.
- Hardware redundancy ("make it a bit stronger than necessary")
- Robust design (single fault not catastrophic)
- Clear separation of subsystems
- Design follows patterns that are proven to work

# Why This Does Not (Quite) Work For Software?

- Software systems compute non-continuous functions. Single bit-flip may change behaviour completely.
- Redundancy as replication does not help against bugs.
   Redundant SW development only viable in special cases.
- Insufficient separation of subsystems.
   Seemingly correct sub-systems may together behave incorrectly.
- Software designs have very high logical complexity.
- Most SW engineers untrained to address correctness.
- Cost efficiency favoured over reliability.
- Design practise for reliable software in immature state for complex (e.g., distributed) systems.

## How to Ensure Software Correctness/Compliance?

A central strategy: testing (others: SW processes, reviews, libraries, ...)

#### Testing against internal SW errors ("bugs")

- find (hopefully) representative test configurations
- check intentional system behaviour on those

#### Testing against external faults

- ▶ inject faults (memory, communication) by simulation or radiation
- trace fault propagation

- Testing shows presence of errors, not their absence (exhaustive testing viable only for trivial systems)
- Representativeness of test cases/injected faults subjective How to test for the unexpected? Rare cases?
- Testing is labour intensive, hence expensive

- Rigorous methods for system design/development/analysis
- ► Mathematics and symbolic logic ⇒ formal
- Increase confidence in a system
- Two aspects:
  - System requirements
  - System implementation
- Formalise both
- Use tools for
  - exhaustive search for failing scenario, or
  - mechanical proof that implementation satisfies requirements

- Complement other analysis and design methods
- Increase confidence in system correctness
- Good at finding bugs (in code and specification)
- Ensure certain properties of the system (model)
- Should ideally be as automated as possible

and

Training in Formal Methods increases high quality development skills

# Specification — What a System Should Do

## Simple properties

- Safety properties Something bad will never happen (e.g., green light mutual exclusion)
- Liveness properties Something good will happen eventually
- General properties of concurrent/distributed systems
  - deadlock-free, no starvation, fairness, …
- Non-functional properties
  - Execution time, memory, usability, ...
- Full behavioural specification
  - Code functionality described by contracts
  - Data consistency, system invariants (in particular for efficient, i.e., redundant, data representations)
  - Modularity, encapsulation
  - Refinement relation

## The Main Point of Formal Methods is Not

- to show correctness of entire systems
- to replace testing
- to replace good design practises

#### There is no silver bullet!


▶ No correct system w/o clear requirements & good design


- Formal proof can replace (infinitely) many test cases
- Formal methods improve the quality of specs (even without formal verification)
- Formal methods guarantee specific properties of system (model)


## **A Fundamental Fact**


#### Formalisation of system requirements is hard

Let's see why ...









# Formalization Helps to Find Bugs in Specs

Errors in specifications are as common as errors in code, but their discovery gives deep insights in (mis)conceptions of the system.

- Wellformedness and consistency of formal specs partly machine-checkable
- Declared signature (symbols) helps to spot incomplete specs
- Failed verification of implementation against spec gives feedback on erroneous formalization

## **Another Fundamental Fact**

Proving properties of systems can be hard

# Level of System (Implementation) Description



- Finitely many states (bounded size datatypes)
- Automated proofs are (in principle) possible
- Simplification, unfaithful modeling inevitable

#### Concrete level

- Unbounded size datatypes (pointer chains, dynamic containers, streams)
   Complex datatypes and control structures
- Complex datatypes and control structures
- Realistic programming model (e.g., Java)
- Automated proofs hard or impossible!

# **Expressiveness of Specification**


## ► Simple

- Simple or general properties
- Finitely many case distinctions
- Approximation, low precision
- Automated proofs are (in principle) possible

#### Complex

- Full behavioural specification
- Quantification over infinite or large domains
- High precision, tight modeling
- Automated proofs hard or impossible!

## Main Approaches




## **Proof Automation**

## "Automated" Proof ("batch-mode")


- No interaction (or lemmas) necessary
- Proof may fail or result inconclusive Tuning of tool parameters necessary
- Formal specification still "by hand"

#### "Semi-Automated" Proof ("interactive")

- Interaction (or lemmas) may be required
- Need certain knowledge of tool internals Intermediate inspection can help
- User steps are checked by tool



## Model Checking with $\operatorname{SPIN}$



### Model Checking in Industry—Examples

#### Hardware verification


- Good match between limitations of methods and application
- Intel, Motorola, AMD, ...
- Software verification
  - Specialized software: control systems, protocols
  - Typically no direct checking of executable system, but of abstractions
  - Bell Labs, Microsoft

# A Major Case Study with $\operatorname{SPIN}$

Checking feature interaction for telephone call processing software

- Software for PathStar<sup>©</sup> server from Lucent Technologies
- ► Automated abstraction of unchanged C code into PROMELA
- ▶ Web interface, with SPIN as back-end, to:
  - determine properties (ca. 20 temporal formulas)
  - invoke verification runs
  - report error traces
- Finds error trace, reported as C execution trace
- Work farmed out to 16 computers, daily, overnight runs
- 18 months, 300 versions of system model, 75 bugs found
- Strength: detection of undesired feature interactions (difficult with traditional testing)
- Main challenge: defining meaningful properties

## Deductive Verification with KeY



Proof rules establish relation "implementation conforms to specs"

Computer support essential for verification of real programs synchronized StringBuffer append(char c)

- ca. 15.000 proof steps
- ca. 200 case distinctions
- Two human interactions, ca. 1 minute computing time

### **Deductive Verification in Industry—Examples**

#### Hardware verification

- For complex systems, mostly floating-point processors
- Intel, Motorola, AMD, ...
- Software verification
  - Safety critical systems:
    - Paris driver-less metro (Meteor)
    - Emergency closing system in North Sea
  - Libraries
  - Implementations of Protocols

#### Java Card 2.2.1 API Reference Implementation

- Reference implementation and full functional specification
- All Java Card 2.2.1 API classes and methods
  - 60 classes; ca. 5,000 LoC (250kB) source code
  - specification ca. 10,000 LoC
- Conformant to implementation on actual smart cards
- All methods fully verified against their spec
  - 293 proofs; 5–85,000 nodes
- Total effort several person months
- Most proofs fully automatic
- Main challenge: getting specs right

# Major Case Studies with KeY: Timsort

#### Timsort

Hybrid sorting algorithm (insertion sort + merge sort) optimized for partially sorted arrays (typical for real-world data).

#### Facts

Designed by Tim Peters (for Python)

Since Java 1.7 default algorithm for non-primitive arrays/collections

#### Timsort is used in

- Java (standard libraries OpenJDK, Oracle)
- Python (standard library), used by Google
- Android (standard library), used by Google
- ... and many more languages / frameworks!

#### **Timsort: People**



- Tim Peters
- Sorting Algorithm Designer
- Python Guru



- Stijn de Gouw
- Assistant Professor
- Formerly postman in the NL
- Interested in sorting for professional reasons

### **Timsort: People**


	<ul> <li>☆ Stijn de Gouw</li> <li>◊ Away</li> </ul>	<b>4</b> <sup>+</sup>
-	are you ready for the meeting? 20 Oct 2014	
_	Hi Stijn, yes, I have time until 14:00 (or a bit longer)	13:35
	ok great	13:35
	I've been working a bit on timsort (though less than I intended to do)	0
<b>9</b>	27 Oct 2014	
	morning richard	
	don't want to keep this from you, but please keep it to yourself for now as you know I was working on proving correctness of timsort (the soring algorithm used in the jdk)	
► :	I figured that the jdk was probably pretty thoroughly tested so went right ahead with specifying rather than debugging the algorithm but I actually discovered a bug	
	Cool 🙄 Good morning!	
	protessional reasons	


#### Found Bug in Java Libraries' main Sorting Method using KeY

- java.util.Collections.sort and java.util.Arrays.sort implement Timsort
- KeY verification of OpenJDK implementation revealed bug.
- Same bug present in Android SDK, Oracle's JDK, Phyton library, Haskell library

#### Verified Fix using KeY

- Fixing the implementation
- Verified new version with KeY





# **Tool Support is Essential**

#### Some Reasons for Using Tools

- Automate repetitive tasks
- Avoid typos, etc.
- Cope with large/complex programs
- Make verification certifiable

#### Tools used in this course:

SPIN to verify PROMELA programs against Temporal Logic specs SPIN web interface developed for this course! JSPIN front-end for SPIN

KeY to verify Java programs against contracts in JML

All are free and run on Windows/Unixes/Mac. Install first SPIN and JSPIN on your computer, or make sure the SPIN web interface works.

### You will gain experience in ...

- Modelling, and modelling languages
- Specification, and specification languages
- In depth analysis of possible system behaviour
- Typical types of errors
- Reasoning about system (mis)behaviour

. . .

# Learning Outcomes—Knowledge and Understanding

- Explain the potential and limitations of using logic based verification methods for assessing and improving software correctness
- Identify what can and what cannot be expressed by certain specification/modeling formalisms
- Identify what can and cannot be analyzed with certain logics and proof methods

### Learning Outcomes—Skills and Abilities

- Express safety and liveness properties of (concurrent) programs in a formal way
- Describe the basics of verifying safety and liveness properties via model checking
- Successfully employ tools which prove or disprove temporal properties
- Write formal specifications of object-oriented system units, using the concepts of method contracts and class invariants
- Describe how the connection between programs and formal specifications can be represented in a program logic
- Verify functional properties of simple Java programs with a verification tool

### Learning Outcomes—Judgment and Approach

- Judge and communicate the significance of correctness for software development
- Employ abstraction, modelling, and rigorous reasoning when approaching the development of correctly functioning software

#### Literature for this Lecture

FM in SE B. Beckert, R. Hähnle, T. Hoare, D. Smith, C. Green, S. Ranise, C. Tinelli, T. Ball, and S. K. Rajamani: Intelligent Systems and Formal Methods in Software Engineering. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21(6):71–81, 2006 (Access to e-version via Chalmers Library)

- KeY R. Hähnle: Quo Vadis Formal Verification. In: W. Ahrendt, B. Beckert, R. Bubel, R. Hähnle, P. Schmitt, M. Ulbrich editors. Vol 10001 of LNCS, Springer, 2016 (E-book at link.springer.com)
- SPIN Gerard J. Holzmann: A Verification Model of a Telephone Switch. In: The Spin Model Checker, Chapter 14, Addison Wesley, 2004