

Why you never, ever should roll your own security protocol

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(Yes, we are three)

Background

- Security is never any stronger than the weakest link in the chain.
 - Protocol design lacks a firm mathematical base and is error prone.
 - Breaking a protocol is often easier than breaking the ciphers used.
 - There are LOTS of faulty protocols and implementations out there.
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Goals

we actually had two

- Find flaws in protocols and implement attacks against them.
 - Find out if the use of security typed languages would have prevented these flaws
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What we have done

- Investigated flaws in SSL v2 and v3 and implemented some nice, workable attacks
 - Investigated flaws in SSH and implemented an attack we haven't found a use for yet.
 - Investigated CHAP and the mistakes Microsoft did when implementing MS-CHAP
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SSL

- SSL v1?
 - SSL v2 has a serious flaw, an attacker can select which cipher should be used.
 - Some SSL v3 server implementations allows for an attacker to override client version and make the session be in SSL v2 instead.
 - We'll show you how in a minute or two.
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SSH

- SSH version 1 vs SSH version 2
 - SSH suffers from the same kind of version downgrade as SSL, but in this case it even simpler.
 - SSH has MITM warning messages, but doesn't consider version downgrade as an attack.
 - The attack isn't as rewarding as with SSL.
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**This is boring, let's
attack something**

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- Start by finding a vulnerable server, hint: <https://webmail.chalmers.se>
 - Find some unsuspecting users.
 - Intercept, modify and log their traffic.
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This is boring, let's attack something

- Get a LOT of computers....
 - Start chewing encryption keys.
 - Wait 27 hours. (don't worry we have prepared this step)
 - Use the key to decrypt the login request.
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This is boring, let's attack something

- Login
 - Read mail
 - PROFIT!
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Conclusions

- Simply stay away from implementing your own security protocol.
 - If you implement anything that acts as a server, don't use vulnerable languages like c.
 - MEDIC really needs to update the their server.
 - Security typed languages doesn't necessarily help anyone when dealing with protocols.
And who would have the energy to do it anyway?
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Questions?

Otherwise we'll go tell
MEDIC about this now.

