Energy Theft in the Smart Grid



Energy Theft in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure

Evaluating Electricity Theft Detectors in Smart Grid Networks Energy Theft in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure

Stephen McLaughlin, Dmitry Podkuiko, and Patrick McDaniel

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Energy Theft Attack Tree
Test system
AMI Security Analysis
Conclusions

Energy Theft Attack Tree



Test System



AMI Security Analysis

- Physical Tampering
- Password Extraction
- Eavesdropping
- Meter Spoofing

Conclusions

Attack Number & Description	Vulnerability	Design Assumption
(A1.1, A1.2) Measurement interruption	Inadequate physical tamper protections	1. Physical limitations
(A2.1) Password extraction	Insecure optical communication	2. Near field security
(A2.3) Meter storage tampering	No Firmware Integrity Protections	3. Physical integrity of meter
(A3.1) Communication interception	Insufficient intrusion detection	4. Trusted backhaul nodes
(A2.2, A3.2, A3.3) Com- munication tampering	Failure to check for replay	5. Trusted endpoint node

Evaluating Electricity Theft Detectors in Smart Grid Networks

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Contents

- Adversarial Classification and Learning
 Electricity-Theft Detectors and Attacks
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- Method & Results
- Future work

Adversarial Classification/Learning

Generate worst-case attack Cost function

Contamination attacks

Theft Detectors and Attacks

Average Detector ARMA-GLR (EWMA, CUSUM and LOF)

Method

6 months real, anonymized meter data 4 week training period Compute alarm threshold Test following data Calculate cost if needed

Results



Results



Future work

Time Of Use Longer datasets Cross-Correlation

Paper comparison

Energy Theft in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure

BroaderLacking depth

Paper comparison

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Evaluating Electricity
Theft Detectors in
Smart Grid Networks
Focused
Too deep for me



