

FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

CHAPTER 8, SECTIONS 1–3

Outline

- ◇ Why FOL?
- ◇ Syntax of FOL
- ◇ Semantics of FOL

Pros and cons of propositional logic

- 😊 Propositional logic is **declarative**: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- 😊 Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information (unlike most data structures and databases)
- 😊 Propositional logic is **compositional**:
meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$
- 😊 Meaning in propositional logic is **context-independent** (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- 😞 Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)
E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”
except by writing one sentence for each square

First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes that the world contains **facts**, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes that the world contains

- **Objects**: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
- **Relations**: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . . , sister of, brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
- **Functions**: mother of, father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of . . .

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants *John, 2, UCB, ...*

Predicates *Brother, >, ...*

Functions *Sqrt, LeftLeg, ...*

Variables *x, y, a, b, ...*

Connectives $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$

Equality $=$

Quantifiers $\forall \exists$

Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $\textit{predicate}(\textit{term}_1, \dots, \textit{term}_n)$
or $\textit{term}_1 = \textit{term}_2$

Term = $\textit{function}(\textit{term}_1, \dots, \textit{term}_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $\textit{Brother}(\textit{Richard}, \textit{John})$
 $\textit{Married}(\textit{Father}(\textit{Richard}), \textit{Mother}(\textit{John}))$

Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $\neg \text{Brother}(\text{LeftLeg}(\text{Richard}), \text{John})$
 $\text{Brother}(\text{Richard}, \text{John}) \wedge \text{Brother}(\text{John}, \text{Richard})$
 $\neg \text{King}(\text{Richard}) \Rightarrow \text{King}(\text{John})$

Note: The last one is equivalent to:

$$(\neg \text{King}(\text{Richard})) \Rightarrow \text{King}(\text{John})$$

and not:

$$\neg(\text{King}(\text{Richard}) \Rightarrow \text{King}(\text{John}))$$

Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**

Model contains ≥ 1 objects (**domain elements**) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for


constant symbols \rightarrow **objects**

predicate symbols \rightarrow **relations**

function symbols \rightarrow **functional relations**

An atomic sentence $\textit{predicate}(\textit{term}_1, \dots, \textit{term}_n)$ is true
iff the **objects** referred to by $\textit{term}_1, \dots, \textit{term}_n$
are in the **relation** referred to by $\textit{predicate}$

Models for FOL: Example



Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which

Richard → Richard the Lionheart

John → the evil King John

Brother → the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation, *Brother*(*Richard*, *John*) is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Models for FOL: Lots!

Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models

We **can** enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞

For each k -ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary

For each possible k -ary relation on n objects

For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary

For each choice of referent for C from n objects ...

Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

Universal quantification

$\forall \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$

All kings are persons:

$\forall x \text{ King}(x) \Rightarrow \text{Person}(x)$

$\forall x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **each** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the **conjunction** of **instantiations** of P

$(\text{King}(\text{Richard}) \Rightarrow \text{Person}(\text{Richard}))$
 $\wedge (\text{King}(\text{John}) \Rightarrow \text{Person}(\text{John}))$
 $\wedge (\text{King}(\text{TheCrown}) \Rightarrow \text{Person}(\text{TheCrown}))$
 $\wedge (\text{King}(\text{LeftLeg}(\text{Richard})) \Rightarrow \text{Person}(\text{LeftLeg}(\text{Richard})))$
 $\wedge \dots$

A common mistake to avoid

Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall

Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ King}(\text{John}) \wedge \text{Person}(\text{John})$$

means “Everything is both a king and a person”

Existential quantification

$\exists \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$

King John has a crown on his head:

$\exists x \text{Crown}(x) \wedge \text{OnHead}(x, \text{John})$

$\exists x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being **some** possible object in the model

Roughly speaking, equivalent to the **disjunction** of **instantiations** of P

$(\text{Crown}(\text{Richard}) \wedge \text{OnHead}(\text{Richard}, \text{John}))$
 $\vee (\text{Crown}(\text{John}) \wedge \text{OnHead}(\text{John}, \text{John}))$
 $\vee (\text{Crown}(\text{TheCrown}) \wedge \text{OnHead}(\text{TheCrown}, \text{John}))$
 $\vee (\text{Crown}(\text{LeftLeg}(\text{Richard})) \wedge \text{OnHead}(\text{LeftLeg}(\text{Richard}), \text{John}))$
 $\vee \dots$

Another common mistake to avoid

Typically, \wedge is the main connective with \exists

Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$$\exists x \text{Crown}(x) \Rightarrow \text{OnHead}(x, \text{John})$$

is true if there is anything that is not a crown!

Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$ (why??)

$\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$ (why??)

$\exists x \forall y$ is **not** the same as $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”

$\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$$

“Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

$$\forall x, y \text{ FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \\ \exists p, ps \text{ Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y)$$

Equality

$term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation
if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

E.g., to say that Richard has at least two brothers:

$$\exists x, y \text{ Brother}(x, \text{Richard}) \wedge \text{Brother}(y, \text{Richard}) \wedge \neg(x = y)$$

Without the final $\neg(x = y)$, it would just say that
Richard has at least one brother.

E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \\ [\exists m, f \neg(x = y) \wedge \neg(m = f) \wedge \\ \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$$

Example: The wumpus world

Squares are breezy near a pit:

Diagnostic rule—infer cause from effect

$$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)$$

Causal rule—infer effect from cause

$$\forall x, y \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(y)$$

Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy

Definition for the *Breezy* predicate:

$$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)]$$

Summary

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power:

- sufficient to define the wumpus world