Introduction to Malicious Code (Malware, part II)

EDA 263 – Computer Security

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Internet Worm – Intro

- written by Robert T. Morris Jr. at Cornell University
- released 1988-11-02
- 6,000 computer were shut down as a result (in USA only)
- Principle for function:
 - A. Intrusion
 - B. Transfer of main program
 - C. Settling down and establishing (cracking accounts, hiding, etc)
 - D. Continued intrusions

Internet Worm – Intrusion

• (A) Intrusion:

Three types of attacks were launched (all of them were well-known in the UNIX community)

- i. guess/crack passwords
- ii. use debug facility in the sendmail mail handler
- iii. exploit bug in finger program

• How?

- i. guessing "probable" passwords, "Joe accounts", etc
- ii. the debug facility in sendmail made it possible to execute a command sequence remotely
- iii. the fingerd daemon calls a subroutine gets, the argument of which is chosen so that an "intelligent" buffer overflow is executed

Internet Worm – Establishing

• (B) Program transfer

 After the intrusion the program (~200 Kbytes) was transferred in a secure way (!)

• (C) Establishing

- guess/crack passwords (root password was not utilised!)
- camouflage activities (fork, simple EOR-encryption, no copy left on disk)
- one-time password for program transfer

• (D) Continued Intrusions

 New machines were infected. There were facilities in the code to avoid multiple infections, but they did not work. Thus, the main result was that the computers/network were overloaded – an availability failure.

Covert Channel Basics

- a covert channel is a channel that leaks information from a protected area (module/program) to an unprotected area. Also called leakage path (swedish: hemlig kanal/dold kanal)
- its most important characterization is bandwidth (bits/s)
- covert channels can make use of almost any means for the information transfer
- a typical environment is a highly sensitive system
- Cmp steganography ("hidden writing"), watermarking and fingerprinting

Covert Channel Types Storage Channels


- Two main types: storage and timing channels
- A. storage channels:
 - Eg. process 1 writes to an object and process 2 reads it
 - A1: object attributes: file attributes (length, format, date of change, ACL,...)
 - A2: object existence:

check the existence of a certain file


– A3: shared resources:

use printing queue (full or empty)


File Lock Covert Channel



Pfleeger: p. 144 (154)



Example Covert Channel



Pfleeger: p. 143 (153)

Covert Channel Types Timing Channels

- Two main types: storage and timing channels
- B. timing channels
 - E.g. process 1 creates some "effect" and process 2 measures time.
 - Examples:
 - vary the CPU load in e.g. 1 ms intervals (works well if only 2 processes)
 - make program execution dependent on program data
- Timing channels tend to be noisy and hard to detect.
- Countermeasure:
 - deny access to system clock
 (but: it is possible to make your own clock)

Information Hiding Basics

- **information hiding** is a general concept that includes
 - steganography (covert communication) and
 - (digital) watermarking.
- steganography
 - means "hidden writing" (as does cryptography), but here it is the *existence* of the message that is secret.
 - steganography "embeds a secret message in some carrier, such as an open message".
- (digital) watermarking
 - means embedding a message into a cover message, normally to discourage theft of intellectual property rights (IPR).
 - Example: media watermarking:
- cover = digital image, secret = copyright notice

Practical Steganography (1)

- Steganography was used in WWII:
 - Germans used hem stitching patterns to hide Morse Code.
 - Invisible ink, indentation etc.
 were also used.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/03/AR2006090300811.html




Practical Steganography (2)



Randolph Femmer /life.nbii.gov

Practical Steganography (3)



Randolph Femmer /life.nbii.gov First chapter of "Around the world in eighty days", Jules Verne

Practical Steganography (4)

• It is also possible to hide an image within another image.





By removing all but the last 2 bits of each color component, an almost completely black image results. Making the resulting image 85 times brighter results in the following.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography

Summary

- A *covert channel* allows an inside malicious process to send sensitive data to an outside receiver, using an existing baseline communication band.
- Contrary, steganography presents the communication in clear sight, but in a form that is not likely to be noticed (instead of hiding it).
- *Cryptography* will be introduced in a later lecture. Here the content is concealed but the existence of the encrypted data is visible to all.



FEATURE

Vice Over IP: The VoIP Steganography Threat

A growing cadre of criminals is hiding secret messages in voice data By JÓZEF LUBACZ, WOJCIECH MAZURCZYK, KRZYSZTOF SZCZYPIORSKI / FEBRUARY 2010

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vice-over-ip-the-voip-steganography-threat, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/internet/

Image: Mick Wiggins