

# Security in Advanced Metering Infrastructure

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# Commercial break!



- If you understand Swedish...  
Listen to our podcast on security:  
[www.sakerhetspodcasten.se](http://www.sakerhetspodcasten.se)

Also available on iTunes

# Agenda:

- Security Principles
- AMI/AMR/Smart grid etc.
- Assessing security
- Security by design

# Why do we need security?



# Yesterday's news:

## Researchers Hack Building Control System at Google Australia Office

BY KIM ZETTER 05.06.13 6:30 AM


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<http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/05/googles-control-system-hacked/>

Build on solid ground:


# Security Principles

# Auguste Kerckhoff (1835-1903)

- The design of a system should not require secrecy and compromise of the system should not inconvenience the correspondents



# Security by obscurity



Thanks to <http://xkcd.com/> for the comic!



Risks and threat landscape

**AMI/AMR/Smart grid etc...**


# What is AMI?

- Automated Meter Reading
- Smart power grid that interacts with home control networks etc.



# ISC/SCADA Legacy

- Hard wired
- Physically separated
- Serial communication
- Proprietary protocols
- Under the RADAR



# The protocols



M-Bus



ZigBee®  
Control your world



IEEE  
802.15



# The trend


- “Smart”- Energy, Homes, Grid, etc...
- “Internet of things”
- Cost for PLCs/Controllers going down
- Cost for hard-wired installations going up  
Wireless to the rescue...
- Cost for analyzing (tools etc.) going down
- Tinkering is a wonderful hobby...

# Still under the radar?





- **Killerbee: Practical Zigbee Exploitation Framework**
- Joshua Wright, [InGuardians](#)
- ZigBee is a low-power, low-data wireless protocol. It uses IEEE 802.15.4 and came out in 2004. Max throughput 250Kb/s, mesh or star topology, long battery life (5-year goal), 10-100 m. range, 16 non-overlapping channels. Uses AES-CCM, but network key shared for all devices.
- ZigBee used because WiFi protocols are too bloated. Bluetooth uses too much power (frequency hopping), too complex. ZigBee low-cost, low-speed; used for lightweight embedded technology. Security suffers because of low-cost and simplicity goals.



- **Don Bailey**
- **War Texting: Identifying and Interacting with Devices on the Telephone Network**
- Devices have been attached to the telephone network for years. Typically, we think of these devices in terms of modems, faxes, or TTY systems. Now, there is a growing shift in the nature of the devices that are accessible over the telephone network. Today, A-GPS tracking devices, 3G Security Cameras, Urban Traffic Control systems, SCADA sensors, Home Control and Automation systems, and even vehicles are now telephony enabled. These systems often receive control messages over the telephone network in the form of text messages (SMS) or GPRS data. These messages can trigger actions such as firmware updates, Are You There requests, or even solicitations for data. As a result, it is imperative for mobile researchers to understand how these systems can be detected by attackers on the global telephone network, then potentially abused...



# DEFCON

- Dave Kennedy (ReL1K) presented a talk at Defcon 19 conference demonstrating the relative insecurity of home automation devices, such as X10, HomePlug and Z-Wave modules, which communicate either locally over power lines or via RF in the ISM bands.



# Attacks

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CNET News Attacks

January 22, 2008 7:38 AM PST

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## CIA: Cyberattack caused multiple-city blackout

By Tom Espiner  
Special to CNET News.com



A cyberattack has caused a power blackout in multiple cities outside the United States, the CIA has warned.

The SANS Institute, a computer-security training body, reported the CIA's disclosure on Friday. CIA senior analyst Tom Donahue told a SANS Institute conference on Wednesday in New Orleans that the CIA had evidence of successful cyberattacks against critical national infrastructures outside the United States.

"We have information that cyberattacks have been used to disrupt power equipment in several regions outside the U.S.," Donahue said. "In at least one case, the disruption caused a power outage affecting multiple cities."

...ealed a growing structure by cyber

net, Duqu,

## Water treatment systems



GETTY IMAGES

The alleged attack was made on a system that piped clean water to homes in Illinois

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### Related Stories

China accused of cyberattacks on New Zealand

It would be an enemy system of the nation's intelligence or crippling

# Current design principles

- Cheap to manufacture
- Optimized performance (data rates, power consumption etc.)
- Consumer experience (ease of use, deployment etc.)

Where is security in this equation?


# The problem

- As long as security is not a key priority, we will keep seeing vulnerable systems!
- The lack of public scrutiny is not helping
- Fixing usually means new hardware

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# The risks



# Motivating vendors

- Create and share tools to assess the security of ICS/SCADA/AMI protocols
- Practice responsible disclosure



Finding the vulnerabilities

# Assessing security


# Challenges with assessing proprietary protocols

- Requires specific hardware
- Few or no tools purpose built
- Lack of available documentation





# Hardware hacking



# Sniffing internal communication

---

```
Bus Pirate binary mode SPI SNIFFER utility v0.3 (CC-0)
http://dangerousprototypes.com
```

---

Parameters used:

```
Device = COM12, Speed = 115200, Clock Edge= 1, Polarity= 0 RawData= 1
Opening Bus Pirate on COM12 at 115200bps...
Starting SPI sniffer...
Entering binary mode...
Switching to SPI mode
Setting Clockedge/Polarity ..... CKE=10K
```

Channel 0x42  
(2466MHz)

```
. . .
5B [5C 0F 0x0F(FF 0xFF)5C A5 0xA5(85 0x85)5D ]
5B [5C 80 0x80(FF 0xFF)5C 42 0x42(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C C1 0xC1(FF 0xFF)5C 05 0x05(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C C3 0xC3(FF 0xFF)5C A0 0xA0(FF 0xFF)5C 14 0x14(FF 0xFF)5C 2E 0x2E(FF 0xFF)5C 15 0x15(FF 0xFF)5C 4A
0x4A(FF 0xFF)5C 04 0x04(FF 0xFF)5D ]
```

```
. . .
5B [5C 0F 0x0F(FF 0xFF)5C A1 0xA1(81 0x81)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C 66 0x66(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C CD 0xCD(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C 7C 0x7C(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C 50 0x50(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C DD 0xDD(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C 26 0x26(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C 7C 0x7C(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C A2 0xA2(FF 0xFF)5C 50 0x50(FF 0xFF)5D ]
5B [5C 8F 0x8F(FF 0xFF)5C A5 0xA5(FF 0xFF)5D ]
```

SOP code:  
66CD7C50DD267C50

# Dumping memory



How to do it right

# Security by design


# What can be done to minimize the attack surface?



# A holistic view



# Understand the threats



# Questions?

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