

Cryptology

An introduction

by
Ulf Lindqvist
translated and processed by Erland Jonsson

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- Asymmetrical systems (*public-key*)
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What is Cryptography?

- Methods for the protection of information and communications

BQQ EBJIFDQ JBAABIÅKAB

CRR FCKJGER KCBBCJÄLBC

DSS GDLKHFS LDCCDKÖMCD

ETT HEMLIGT MEDDELANDE

(English: a secret message)

Who needs cryptography?

- Earlier: only diplomats and the military
- Now: **everybody!**
- Reasons:
 - Electronic communication over insecure channels, e.g. the Internet
 - Traditional methods for authentication (signature, voice) does not work for data communications

Terminology (Swedish - English)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kryptologi, kryptoteknik • Kryptografi <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Kryptering – Dekryptering – Klartext – Kryptotext, kryptogram – Nyckel • Forcering <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Forcör – Forcera 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cryptology • Cryptography <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Encryption – Decryption – Plaintext, Cleartext – Ciphertext, cryptogram – Key • Cryptanalysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Cryptanalyst – Break
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
History

- The pre-scientific era
 - ca 400 BC Sparta (transposition)
 - ca 50 BC Julius Caesar (substitution)
 - 19th century A Kerckhoff (only the key secret)
 - 1920-ies G S Vernam (K as long as M)¹
 - 1939-45 2nd Word War
- Scientific era
 - 1949 C E Shannon
 - 1976 W Diffie & M E Hellman

1. One-time pad

History Secret versus open research

- Cryptology used to be available only for government authorities (military, diplomats)
- Comprehensive open research started in the mid 70-ies
- The secret research is probably considerably bigger than open research
- "NSA is believed to be 10-15 years ahead of the open research"



Symmetrical systems

Theoretical versus practical security

- **Theoretical** security
 - No problems with key management
 - The cryptanalyst has unlimited resources
- **Practical** security
 - Many limitations
 - The cryptanalyst also has limitations
 - The security is a function of the estimated possibilities of the cryptanalyst

Symmetrical systems

Cryptanalysis

Assumption:


the cryptanalyst knows everything about the system except the key.

- Different types of cryptanalysis attacks:
 - Ciphertext-only
 - The cryptanalyst only has encrypted text
 - Known-plaintext
 - The cryptanalyst has some plaintext-ciphertext pairs
 - Chosen-plaintext/Chosen-ciphertext
 - The cryptanalyst can make tests with selected plaintext and get the corresponding encrypted text

Symmetrical systems

Cryptanalysis cont'd

- Theoretical cryptanalysis
 - All possible keys are tested (unlimited time) and the cipher text is decrypted.
 - Successful cryptanalysis is possible if this leads to exactly one interpretable message.



Symmetrical systems

Cryptanalysis cont'd

Ciphertext: DJFKRIOPEPWPEPS

Key 1: ajfkjrisdfkjsdd

Key 2: jfjreieiefkdjdf

PT 1: **attack at eight**


PT 2: **no attack today**

Symmetrical systems Diffusion — Confusion

- Diffusion
 - Changing one symbol in the plaintext affects many symbols in the ciphertext
 - Changing one symbol in the key affects many symbols in the ciphertext
- Confusion
 - The ciphertext must depend on the plaintext and the key in a complicated way so that the derivation of statistical relations is hard to do

Symmetrical systems Product ciphers

- Product ciphers gives good diffusion and confusion




P is a permutation, possibly the same in every step.
S_i are general, different, non-linear substitutions.

Symmetrical systems Example of system: DES

- Data Encryption Standard
- Encrypts blocks of 64 bits, 56-bit key
- Developed by IBM and NSA, American standard since 1977
- NSAs involvement is discussed
 - Suspicion of back-doors has not been confirmed
 - Rather, NSA seems to have strengthened the algorithm
- Status: Algorithm is considered very strong, but the key is too short
- Development: Triple DES (3DES), 112 bits
- Since 2000: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Symmetrical systems Example of system: AES

- **A**dvanced **E**ncryption **S**tandard
 - International competition (NIST)
 - Call for candidates (1997)
 - Winners from Belgium (Rijndael)
 - Standard made official 2001
- Based on *Permutations & Substitutions*
 - Not completely symmetric (encryption versus decryption)
 - 128 bit data blocks
 - Supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key length (with 10, 12, 14 rounds, respectively)
 - Has become the “standard”!
 - 10G Ethernet, ZigBee, SSL, IPsec, WiMAX ...



Symmetrical systems

Key lengths

- Based on *computational complexity*
- Comparison for *exhaustive search*:


Key length	Possible keys	Time a	Time b
40 bits	^{Asymm. RSA} $2^{40} \approx 1.1 \cdot 10^{12}$	1 week	(9 s)
56 bits	$2^{56} \approx 7.2 \cdot 10^{16}$	1200 yrs	1 week
100 bits	^{2048 bits} $2^{100} \approx 1.3 \cdot 10^{30}$	$2 \cdot 10^{16}$ yrs	$3 \cdot 10^{11}$ yrs
128 bits	^{3072 bits} $2^{128} \approx 3.4 \cdot 10^{38}$	$6 \cdot 10^{24}$ yrs	$9 \cdot 10^{19}$ yrs

(100 million combinations correspond to 27 bits)

Asymmetrical systems

- Principle was discovered in 1976
- Two keys,
 - one public key, k_{PUB} for encryption and
 - one secret key k_{PRIV} for decryption (thus: public-key-systems)
- The public key, k_{PUB} , distributed openly to everybody
(as a matter of fact: this is the basic idea)
- Slow encryption, primarily used for signing and distribution of symmetrical keys

Asymmetrical systems Model



Asymmetrical systems Basic Principles

- One-way functions
 - $y = f(x)$ easy to calculate, but finding x for a given y , so that $y = f(x)$, i.e. $x = f^{-1}(y)$ is very hard (impossible in practice)
 - Example: Multiplication of two 100-character primes is easy, but finding the two primes for a given product is hard
- Trap-door one-way functions
 - $y = f_p(x)$ easy, but $x = f_p^{-1}(y)$ hard to calculate, unless you know the parameter P


Asymmetrical systems Characteristics

- No secure channel needed
- Communication between n units, requires $2n$ keys (cp symmetrical system: about $\sim n^2$)
- Authentication important
 - If a false public key is used, the intruder can read the message
 - The sender is unknown to me (since the public key is available to everybody)
 - Solution: signatures

Asymmetrical systems Signatures

- In principle the system goes “backwards”
 - Encryption with k_{PRIV}
 - everybody can decrypt with k_{PUB}

Note! No confidentiality!
- Signing *and* encryption:
 - Send A: calculates $E(k_{PUB-B}, E(k_{PRIV-A}, M)) = C$
 - Rec B: calculates $D(k_{PUB-A}, D(k_{PRIV-B}, C)) = M$



Asymmetrical systems Example of system: Diffie-Hellman

- A way to distribute the key to a symmetrical system without a secure channel
- One-way function: $f(x) = a^x$ (modulo p)
- Basic principle:
A and B choose a number b (not secret)

A: Chooses x_1 and
calculates $y_1 = b^{x_1}$
A sends y_1 to B.
A calculates $y_2^{x_1} = \underline{b^{x_1 x_2}}$

B: Chooses x_2 and
calculates $y_2 = b^{x_2}$
B sends y_2 to A.
B calculates $y_1^{x_2} = \underline{b^{x_1 x_2}}$


Asymmetrical systems Example of system: RSA

- RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) 1978
 - Uses a trap-door function that is based on the multiplication of big primes
 - Security depends on the development of
 - 1) Algorithms for factoring
 - 2) Computers with high computational power
 - Most well-known and most commonly-used asymmetrical system


Hybrid systems Example of system: PGP

- PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) **GnuPG**
 - Application for encryption and signing of emails
 - Uses RSA and IDEA (originally)
 - Large-scale test of the management of asymmetrical keys (signing, publication etc)
 - Disadvantages:
 - Certain lack of compatibility (different versions)
 - Hard to protect the secret key

PGP Encryption



PGP Decryption



Key Management

- Protocols
 - Combinations of symmetrical and asymmetrical systems are used for key distribution
 - Hard to design good protocols
- Key escrow
 - Users are forced to deposit “main keys” so that authorities (police, customs etc) can interpret secret communications
 - Fiercely debated in the USA, to some extent also within the EU
 - Organisationally questionable


Problems with cryptography

- Based on computational complexity, which is theoretically hard. Therefore it is easy to find a bad system that looks good. It is considerably harder to show that it really *is bad*.
- Requires profound knowledge to make good designs.
- Electronic commerce is based on the difficulty to factorize big numbers...
- Non-cryptological issues is the real problem!

Problems with Cryptography Block Cipher Modes

- In Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, a message is split into blocks and each is encrypted separately.

(from Wikipedia)



The Future

- The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is replacing DES.
- New methods required to build robust applications
- The need for commercial IT-services is a driving force, e.g. Internet B2B and B2C applications
- Political decisions slow down progress(?)
- Quantum Cryptography