Specification and Analysis of Contracts Lecture 1 Introduction

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2 Contracts 'and' Informatics

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- We should show that a system cannot fail to meet its requirement
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- By other kind of "proof"? Dijkstra again (1965): "One can never guarantee that a proof is correct, the best one can say is: 'I have not discovered any mistakes"'
- What about automatic proof? It is impossible to construct a general proof procedure for arbitrary programs¹

• Any hope?

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- Any hope? In some cases it is possible to mechanically verify correctness; in other cases... we try to do our best

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Saying 'a program is correct' is only meaningful w.r.t. a given specification!

What is Validation?

- In general, validation is the process of checking if something satisfies a certain criterion
- Some authors differentiate validation and verification:

Validation: "Are we building the right product?", i.e., does the product do what the user really requiresVerification: "Are we building the product right?", i.e., does the product conform to the specifications

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Remark

Some authors define verification as a validation technique, others talk about V & V –Validation & Verification– as being complementary techniques. In this tutorial I consider verification as a validation technique

• Testing

- Check the actual system rather than a model
- Focused on sampling executions according to some coverage criteria Not exhaustive
- It is usually informal, though there are some formal approaches

Simulation

• A model of the system is written in a PL, which is run with different inputs – Not exhaustive

Verification

• "Is the process of applying a manual or automatic technique for establishing whether a given system satisfies a given property or behaves in accordance to some abstract description (specification) of the system"²

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- "Formal methods are a collection of notations and techniques for describing and analyzing systems"³
- Formal means the methods used are based on mathematical theories, such as logic, automata, graph or set theory
- Formal specification techniques are used to unambiguously describe the system itself or its properties
- Formal analysis/verification techniques serve to verify that a system satisfies its specification (or to help finding out why it is not the case)

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- Software verification methods do not guarantee, in general, the correctness of the code itself but rather of an abstract model of it
- It cannot identify fabrication faults (e.g. in digital circuits)
- If the specification is incomplete or wrong, the verification result will also be wrong
- The implementation of verification tools may be faulty
- The bigger the system (number of possible states) more difficult is to analyze it (*state explosion problem*)

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OF COURSE!!

Formal methods are not intended to guarantee absolute reliability but to *increase* the confidence on system reliability. They help minimizing the number of errors and in many cases allow to find errors impossible to find manually

Formal methods are used in different stages of the development process, giving a classification of formal methods

- We describe the system giving a formal specification
- We can then prove some properties about the specification (formal verification)
- We can proceed by:
 - Deriving a program from its specification (formal synthesis)
 - Verifying the specification w.r.t. implementation (formal verification)

- A specification formalism must be unambiguous: it should have a precise syntax and semantics (e.g., natural languages are not suitable)
- A trade-off must be found between expressiveness and analysis feasibility
 - More expressive the specification formalism more difficult its analysis (if possible at all)

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- Prove the equivalence of different specifications

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- a should be true for the first two points of time, and then oscillates
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 INCORRECT! The error may be found when trying to prove some properties
 - Correct specification: $a(0) \wedge a(1) \wedge \forall t \ge 0 \cdot a(t+2) = \neg a(t+1)$

- It would be helpful to automatically obtain an implementation from the specification of a system
- Difficult since most specifications are *declarative* and not *constructive*
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Example

- Specify the operational semantics of a programming language in a constructive logic (Calculus of Constructions)
- Prove the correctness of a given property w.r.t. the operational semantics in Coq
- Extract an OCAML code from the correctness proof (using Coq's extraction mechanism)

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There are mainly two approaches:

- Deductive approach (automated theorem proving)
 - Describe the specification Φ_{spec} in a formal model (logic)
 - Describe the system's model Φ_{imp} in the same formal model
 - Prove that $\Phi_{imp} \implies \Phi_{spec}$
- Algorithmic approach
 - $\bullet\,$ Describe the specification $\Phi_{\textit{spec}}$ as a formula of a logic
 - Describe the system as an interpretation M_{imp} of the given logic (e.g. as a finite automaton)
 - Prove that M_{imp} is a "model" (in the logical sense) of Φ_{spec}

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Remark

The same technique may be used to prove properties about the specification

When and Which Formal Method to Use?

- It depends on the problem, the underlying system and the property we want to prove Examples:
 - Digital circuits ... (BDDs, model checking)
 - Communication protocol with unbounded number of processes.... (verification of infinite-state systems)
 - Overflow in programs (static analysis and abstract interpretation)
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- Open distributed concurrent systems with unbounded number of processes interacting through shared variables and with real-time constraints => VERY DIFFICULT!!
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Remark

In this tutorial: Specification and verification of contracts using logics and *model checking* techniques





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Contracts

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This deed of **Agreement** is made between:

1. [name], from now on referred to as Provider and

2. the Client.

INTRODUCTION

3. The **Provider** is obliged to provide the **Internet Services** as stipulated in this **Agreement**.

4. DEFINITIONS

a) Internet traffic may be measured by both Client and Provider by means of Equipment and may take the two values high and normal.

OPERATIVE PART

1. The **Client** shall not supply false information to the Client Relations Department of the **Provider**.

2. Whenever the Internet Traffic is **high** then the **Client** must pay [*price*] immediately, or the **Client** must notify the **Provider** by sending an e-mail specifying that he will pay later.

3. If the **Client** delays the payment as stipulated in 2, after notification he must immediately lower the Internet traffic to the **normal** level, and pay later twice (2 * [price]).

4. If the **Client** does not lower the Internet traffic immediately, then the **Client** will have to pay 3 * [price].

5. The **Client** shall, as soon as the Internet Service becomes operative, submit within seven (7) days the Personal Data Form from his account on the **Provider**'s web page to the Client Relations Department of the **Provider**.

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 - Traditional commercial and judicial domain

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- "Social contracts": Multi-agent systems
- "Deontic e-contracts": representing Obligations, Permissions, Prohibitions, Power, etc

• Traditional commercial and judicial domain

• Research on Law and Informatics

- Interesting questions:
 - Is it possible translate conventional contracts into formal languages/logics? Which "properties" are preserved?
 - How to analyze traditional contracts? Detect superfluous clauses, cross references, inconsistencies, etc?
 - Tools

• A nice successful story

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"Programming by contract"

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- Software designers should define precise verifiable interface specifications for software components
 - Based on the theory of abstract data types
 - Inspired by business contracts
- Impose an obligation to be guaranteed when calling a module: the routine's precondition
 - An obligation for the client, and a benefit for the supplier (of the routine)
- Guarantee a property on exit: the routine's postcondition
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- Several SOA standards provide a way to describe 'contractual' aspects
- Usually written in an XML-like language (e.g. WSLA)
- These service contracts act at different levels, specific to different aspects
 - Between service provider and consumer
 - Orchestration of services
 - Functional aspects
 - Describe collaboration between business partners
- Service-Level Agreement
 - It describes different levels of service
 - Availability, serviceability, performance, operation, other attributes like billing and even penalties in the case of violation

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Note

• We will expand on a taxonomy of SOA contract specification languages in next lecture

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- Specify the sequence of interactions between different participants
 - Such interface represents a "contract" between the participants
- The allowed interactions are captured by legal (sets of) traces
- The behavior of objects and components can be completely defined in terms of their reaction to incoming message sequences
- Advantages:
 - Different objects and component implementations can be compared based on their behavior
 - It helps analyzing compositionality of components
 - It is possible to analyze component implementations without knowing the context

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- Protocols may be seen as "contracts" regulating the parties' ideal mode of interaction
- Other names for the same kind of "contracts"
 - Trade procedures
 - Business protocols
 - Specifications
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- Usually one specify the point of view of each party as a Finite State Machine or Petri net
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• Based on different modal logics

• In the context of multi-agent systems

- Aim at simulate/specify "social" behavior
 - Interaction between agents who can decide based on knowledge and trust on other agents
 - Agents act according to certain normative rules prescribing:
 - Proper and acceptable behavior (moral)
 - Acceptable behavior (legal)
- Very expressive: It considers various types of norms
 - What *ought* to be
 - Expectation on what will be
 - Particular *reactions* to behavior
 - Sanctions to be applied, or how to induce a particular kind of conduct

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- Aim at simulate/specify "social" behavior
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 - Acceptable behavior (legal)
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- Based on deontic logic and combined with other modal logics
- It contains constructs to specify at least
 - Obligations, Permissions, and Prohibitions
- A contract can be obtained
 - From a conventional contract
 - Written directly in a formal specification language
- It allows formal reasoning

Contracts

In this tutorial

• We will see 'deontic' e-contracts

Two scenarios:

- Obtain an e-contract from a conventional contract
 - Context: legal (e.g. financial) contracts
- Write the e-contract directly in a formal language
 - Context: web services, components, OO, etc

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Definition

A contract is a document which engages several parties in a transaction and stipulates their (conditional) obligations, rights, and prohibitions, as well as penalties in case of contract violations. Introduction to Formal Methods: See first lecture of the course "Specification and verification of parallel systems" (INF5140) and references therein: http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/matnat/ifi/ INF5140/v07/undervisningsmateriale/1-formal-methods.pdf